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This mixed-methods sequential explanatory study explored the causes of teachers' 
resistance to evaluation reform. Teachers in this study demonstrated both resistant and 
compliant behaviors in response to a particular evaluation policy, which also started a 
process for teachers to express concerns over the implementation of a new law governing 
teachers’ careers. This research study utilized quantitative and qualitative methods for 
data collection and analysis, including surveys, interviews, and program documents. The 
responses, insights, and perspectives of 433 public school teachers provided the primary 
data in this study. The results indicated that the process by which the government of Peru 
implemented evaluation procedures negatively affected teachers’ motivation toward 
compliance and thus impaired the success of the reform. This study also revealed that 
although teachers opposed evaluation, they agreed with the idea of an evaluation policy.  
Further, when given the opportunity to voice their opinions about evaluation procedures 
   
vi 
 
and the inclusion of merit pay plans into the career ladder, teachers cited overriding 
problems with the organizational structures in which they worked. The nullification of 
teachers’ tenure and rights was the most important cause of teachers’ resistance to 
evaluation-based pay plans; responses did not differ greatly between less and more 
experienced teachers. Finally, throughout this study it was clear that simply mandating 
change was not enough to successfully and effectively implement it or to achieve 
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How do Latin American government policies address the problem of teacher 
quality? The main feature of Latin America’s education systems in the past twenty years 
has been a rapid increase in the proportion of children attending primary school and 
receiving a secondary education (Benavides, Carnoy, Cueto, & Gove, 2007; Cotlear, 
2008; Cueto, 2007, Luque, 2005; Navarro & Verdisco, 2000). However, even as Latin 
America made these large gains in the average schooling attained by young people, 
serious questions were raised about the quality of teaching being delivered to students 
(Portillo, 1999; Benavides, 2002). Although teacher quality has not been clearly defined 
in Latin America,
1
 there is a growing consensus that the quality of teaching is a key to the 
poor quality of education (Murillo, Tommasi, Ronconi, & Sanguinetti, 2002; Luque, 
2007; World Bank, 2010). Furthermore, while some state governments have established 
strong academic standards for what teachers need to know for a better teacher 
accountability policy, others have been creating teacher evaluation policies in some cases 
disconnected from the teacher career regulations and professional development 
(Lieberman & Pointer Mace, 2008).  
Despite the lack of consistency between teacher evaluation policy and 
professional regulations in teaching, attention to teachers’ incentives and their impact on 
teaching performance has been growing in Latin America. In particular, policies oriented 
to career regulations and mechanisms for recruitment, selection and promotion of 
teachers, are receiving a great deal of attention (Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos, 2011). 
                                                          
1
 In most Latin American countries a scale or teacher quality ranges from “good” teachers to the “best” 
teachers.  




However, reforms in these areas have been hard to achieve due to the opposition of 
teacher unions to policies perceived as hurting their members, among other reasons 




Similar to the United States, the structure of the teaching profession —from 
recruitment to training to management— has not fostered excellence. The distribution of 
teacher “quality” (as measured by education, experience, and test scores on evaluations of 
teacher knowledge in subject areas) among schools serving lower and higher-income 
students is highly unequal. Since salaries are generally set by salary schedules negotiated 
at the national or regional level, teachers get paid essentially the same salary no matter 
how and where they work (Hargreaves, Montero, Chau, Sibli, & Thanh, 2001). Students 
entering teacher training are seldom among the best of their classes, courses are often 
deficient, and the best teachers are rarely assigned to poor students who need them most. 
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to remove ineffective teachers from the classroom. 
Investments in teacher training programs have shown to be an ineffective way to 
strengthening educational systems (Navarro & Verdisco, 2000). Frequent clashes 
between teachers’ unions and governments that result in strikes, such as those in Mexico, 
Chile, Peru, Honduras and Nicaragua, continue to cost students precious days of 
instruction (Ortega, 2007; Salazar, 2007; Tatto et al., 2006). 
                                                          
2
 In Latin America, teacher unions represent the largest proportion of public service jobs and has significant 
political impact on educational reform (Vaillant, 2005).  




Teacher Quality Reforms in Latin America 
 In the late 1980s and 1990s Latin American and Caribbean countries, such as 
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Peru, implemented teacher quality education reforms 
(Villegas-Reimers, 2003). Many of these reforms underscored the importance of teacher 
preparedness and the quality of the teachers’ classroom practices. However, levels of 
education and years of experience, the current salary determinants for most Latin 
American countries, have not shown a correlation with quality teaching (Pearlman, 
Schulmeyer, Tedesco, Tenti, Aguerrondo, Vaillant, Rego, Avalos, Namo de Melo, Chezzi 
Dallan, Rama, Navarro, Liang, Herran, Uribe, Romaguera, & Mizzala, 2004). Currently, 
the reforms on the table for improving the quality of the Latin America teaching 
workforce are: setting standards, implementing teacher evaluation performance systems 
and merit pay plans, delivering school-based training programs, offering university-based 
scholarships to attract the best high school graduates and other professional into the 
teaching profession, and proposing alternative routes to becoming a teacher (Bruns et al., 
2011).  
The critical relationship between teacher quality and student achievement is also 
well established in Latin America, so ensuring that all students have teachers with the 
knowledge and skills to support their academic success has become a national priority in 
Peru. However, regulatory competency exams is currently the only method for evaluating 
teachers (linked or not linked to promotion). These evaluations of teachers’ knowledge 
represent initial efforts to increase teachers’ accountability and to introduce pressure to 
motivate teachers to raise student learning (Loyo, 2001). However, what makes a quality 




teacher or quality teaching remains elusive and hard to define in Peru (Cotlear, 2008) and 
elsewhere. Critics of these teacher policy reforms— such as teacher unions— argue that 
these measures constitute an attack on the traditional approach to public teacher 
management (Auris, 2003), which has emphasized credentials, seniority, job security, and 
union privileges instead of quantitative measurement of outcomes. Teachers’ unions also 
contend that most laws on teacher reforms are approved without any dialogue with 
teachers’ organizations, parent-teacher associations or organizations working on 
educational issues (Vaillant, 2005; Inter-American Development Bank, 2000).  
The Peruvian Educational System 
 The Peruvian educational system is regulated by the General Law of Education of 
1982. The Constitution of 1993 (Article 16) dictates that the state coordinates educational 
policy, and formulates general guidelines to fulfill the objectives of the public school 
systems. The Ministry of Education (MED)
3
 is responsible for planning, enforcing and 
managing all educational policies as a central authority and implements them through 
regional and zonal authorities, the Gerencia Regional de Educación GRE) and the Local 
Education Management Units (UGEL).
4
 The budgetary allocation to schools is decided 
centrally, and it finances the great majority of the education system since fewer than 15% 
of children are educated privately (Hargreaves et al., 2001; World Bank (2001). 
Educational attainment is relatively high in Peru but still very unequally distributed 
between urban and rural areas. The past 15 years of primary school expansion have 
                                                          
3
 The Ministry of Education was established in 1837 and it exercises authority over a sprawling network of 
schools for which it uniformly determines curricula, textbook content, and the general values that guide 
classroom activities.  
4
 Peru has 270 UGELs, which are organized under 26 regional education management offices. These 
regional offices report to the Ministry of Education, headquartered in the nation’s capital of Lima.  




produced near universal access to full primary education. The majority of urban youth are 
also likely to finish secondary education (64 percent of urban 16- to 18-year-olds have 
completed secondary school), but the vast majority of rural youth are not (only 24 percent 
of 16- to 18-year-olds have competed secondary). In urban areas, a relatively high 
percentage of youth also attend some years of post-secondary school (Ministry of 
Education of Peru, 2010).  
 In terms of quality, public education in Peru lags behind the rest of the Latin 
American countries. According to the 2000 publication of student achievement data 
(Centro de Estudios Internacionales TIMSS & PIRLS, 2004; Crouch & Fasih, 2004), 
more than half of Peru’s first and second graders could not read, and students fared 
poorly on international tests. One of the factors associated with the low level of education 
quality in Peru is attributed to the poor teaching quality. Poor quality teaching is a result 
of a number of factors including: poor teacher skills, lack of teacher supervision, low 
teacher motivation, and low teacher salaries. By early 2001, of 350,000 teachers, 30 
percent did not have official teaching positions (Benavides et al., 2007; Carnoy, 2008). 
According to the World Bank (2010): 
The latest student assessments indicated an increase in the proportion of students 
reading at or above grade level, from 16 percent in 2007 to 23 percent in 2009. 
These included 18 percent of students in state schools compared to 43 percent in 
non-state schools, and 29 percent of students in urban areas compared to 12 
percent in rural areas. (p. 47). 




The findings reported by the World Bank in 2010 are supported by previous 
research based on international comparisons. Quality of education in Peru, as measured 
by students’ scores on international tests (PISA, 2001, SERCE, 2006), is at the low end in 
Latin America, much below Costa Rica, Uruguay, Mexico’s, Chile’s, Argentina’s, and 
Colombia’s results on the same tests. Peruvian students on Pisa were worse than that of 
any other participating country’s students of Latin America with more pronounced rural-
urban differences (World Bank, 2001, UNESCO, 2009). Peru also spends relatively little 
on its primary and secondary education system. Its costs per pupil are among the lowest 
in Latin America, and its teachers are paid among the lowest in the region relative to per 
capita income and compared to other public servants. Peru expanded education in the 
1970s and 1980s largely by making it less expensive—principally by reducing teacher 
salaries in real terms (Benavides et al., 2007). Peru shares with most countries a 
fundamental lack of capacity for managing a massive and highly diffused education 
system. This is one more reason why the quality of these services is so low. 
The Teaching Profession in Peru 
The Peruvian educational system has a total of 489,000 teachers. More than 60% 
of these teachers (307,448 teachers) work in the public service and 31% (95,503) work in 
rural areas (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012d). Peruvian teachers are paid among the 
lowest in Latin America. In 1999 teachers earned on average S/ 787.88 (US$ 228).
5
 
Teacher pay and incentives are major problems in Peru, and it represents part of the 
                                                          
5
 Data provided by the Ministry of Education (1999). New teacher salary increases corresponded to 50 
soles in 2002, 100 soles in 2003, and 115 soles in 2004 (Alcázar, Rogers, Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, & 
Muralidharan, 2006).  




general problem of recruiting bright people into the teaching profession (Benavides et al., 
2007). Teachers earned about 25–30 percent more than the per capita income in the early 
1970s and earned about 23 percent less than the per capita income in 1990, a drop of 
about 50 percent relative to the average Peruvian’s economic situation (Arregui, Díaz, & 
Hunt, 1996; Benavides et al., 2007). Part of this fall in the teachers’ relative position of 
teachers is due to an increase in average education in the Peru’s labor force, but part is 
due to a fall in teachers’ wages relative to those of other professionals.  
In Peru’s educational system, the teaching supervision system and teacher and 
school accountability systems are essentially nonexistent (World Bank, 2006). The 
system also lacks incentives for the better teachers to serve as an example to other 
teachers. This would require redefining the teacher career ladder to provide possibilities 
for recognizing professional excellence (Chiroque, 2001; Chiroque, 2004a). All teachers 
have received proportional raises in 2002, 2003, and 2004. The raises have been based on 
academic degrees and location of the school where the teacher works, and are intended to 
correct the overall low level of salaries, not to develop a new teacher pay structure. 
Currently, a teacher’s salary increases primarily with years of experience, and those 
increases are small (Martinic & Pardo, 2000). There are no incentives for performing 
well or disincentives for not performing well, because teachers are not evaluated by their 
performance in classrooms, and no broad accountability system exists anywhere in the 
educational system (Alcázar, Rogers, Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, & Muralidharan, 
2006; Cotlear, 2008). 




Large investments in teacher training are being made in Peru. However, teacher 
policy issues are politically and ideologically charged (Grace, 1985), financially 
unsustainable, and technically weak and loose (Navarro & Verdisco, 2000). The World 
Bank and the Ministry of Education developed a program to train teachers to implement 
the new curriculum that was developed during the second half of the 1990s. This 
program, Plan Nacional de Capacitación Docente, or PLANCAD, which had the support 
of the Bank, was a major effort that included almost all primary school teachers 
throughout the country. The emphasis of the training was on constructivist methods of 
teaching. Three large national evaluations for teachers were undertaken in the second half 
of the 1990s that helped to regulate the distribution of permanent (nombrado) teaching 
jobs (temporary, untenured teachers are called contratados). Each evaluation was 
exclusively based on multiple-choice questions (i.e., teacher performance was not 
evaluated). These tests had several flaws, including no studies on their validity, but they 
were an important first step toward standardized evaluation of teachers. 
 In 2001, President Toledo’s new Minister of Education, Nicolas Lynch, called for 
radical changes in the teacher career plan (and career ladder), which had traditionally 
been based credentials and years of teaching experience. He set up a national evaluation 
as the first step toward  meritocracy (President Fujimori had developed several similar 
evaluations in the 1990s). The 2001 evaluation proceeded in three stages: (a) an 
evaluation of a teacher’s portfolio, (b) a personal interview by peers and parents, and (c) 
a written (multiple choice) test for those who passed the first two stages. Although radical 
factions in the teachers’ union opposed the evaluation, it went forward. Based on exam 




results, the Ministry of Education was able to fill only 23,000 of the 32,000 available 
teaching posts. The other 9,000 positions were distributed to teachers on the basis of their 
political connections. Even so, this was a major reform in a system in which there is a 
vast surplus of teaching graduates relative to available teaching positions. 
Multigrade Teaching in Rural Areas 
 Multigrade schools are the most common form of school for children who are 
dispersed throughout the countryside (Hargreaves et al., 2001). Working in a rural school 
is often the first job a teacher takes in her or his career. Therefore, it is common to find 
young teaching staff in rural areas. Rural teachers often lack the basics for living, such as 
running water, healthy food, electricity, housing furniture and adequate space for class 
preparation. Given the difficulties, rural teacher motivation is often very low (Benavides 
et al., 2007). The 1993 Education Census (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2003) revealed 
that only 35% of rural teachers had a teaching degree while the remaining 65% had none. 
While the situation has improved since then, the evidence from rural schools suggests 
that few teachers are capable of quality teaching.  
 The multi-grade situation, teaching students in different grades in a single 
classroom, makes quality teaching even less likely. Even those teachers who have 
training have not been instructed in multi-grade methodology and there appears to be an 
unwillingness to provide this kind of training (Arregui et al., 1996). In 2003, 27% of the 
country’s primary schools were single-teacher institutions. For the rural area, this figure 
was 37% (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2003). Teachers who work in a one-teacher 
multi-grade school are often responsible for carrying out official business, obtaining 




foodstuffs, and looking for material support. There is no system of administrative support 
for teachers carrying out their official activities and a system of pedagogical support that 
would help them to improve their actual work in the classroom. In rural areas, in 
particular, the problem of multigrade teaching is also exacerbated by the widely dispersed 
population and difficult terrain, lack of infrastructure, and difficult living conditions that 
lead to teachers’ lack of career satisfaction. 
Teacher Career Laws  
  Ley del Profesorado. In Peru, the teaching profession has been regulated by 
Law No. 23029 (Ley del Profesorado), which provides generous benefits and life-long 
tenure to public school teachers based on credentials, seniority, job security, and union 
privileges (Chiroque, 2001; World Bank, 2001). The Ley del Profesorado was passed in 
1984 and modified in 1990. The law created five salary grades, and salaries were 
calculated based on those grades. Advancement between grades 1 and 2 was by seniority 
only, but beyond grade 2 advancement between grades was based on various promotion 
criteria, as shown in Table 1. Although this law represented an advancement in the 
recognition of the professional status of teachers, in practice it suffered from a lack of 
incentives to encourage teacher commitment, professional development, and higher 
performance, which could translate into better teacher achievement.  
  




Table 1  
 
Promotion Criteria According to Ley del Profesorado 
Criteria Points 
Professional Background: 100 points 
Titles or degrees 
Further course work/specialization 
Seniority  






Professional Performance: 60 points 
Efficiency on the job 
Attendance and punctuality 





Merits: 40 points 





Note. The Ley del Profesorado was approved in 1984 and modified in 1990.  
Source: Chiroque, 2004. 
 
 Since no teacher supervisory system exists under this law, regulations for 
effective teacher professional development and teaching practice were not created. In 
2001, the government of President Alejandro Toledo launched one of the first reforms of 
teaching tenure in Peru to convert a large number of contract-based teachers (contratados) 
into permanent appointments (nombrados). For Peruvian teachers, converting from a 
contract to an appointment represents a major step forward in job stability because 
permanent appointees are much more difficult to dismiss (Schwartzman, 2001). 
However, this new government policy attempted to make the appointments merit-based 
through an open competition on the basis of an examination of substantive and 
pedagogical knowledge. Because of a series of irregularities in the evaluation process for 
permanent appointments, teacher opposition led to serious tensions between the SUTEP 




(the teachers’ union) and the Toledo government, including a 21-day hunger strike and 
widespread violence (Benavides et al., 2007).  
 Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial (CPM). In 2007, the President of Peru 
signed a far-reaching teacher merit-pay bill that has overhauled how teachers across the 
state are evaluated and paid (Cuenca & Stojnic, 2008; Rivero & Vexler, 2012). On July 
11
th
, 2007, the Peruvian Congress approved a controversial bill for the Ley de Carrera 
Pública Magisterial (CPM). This law was the result of many years of consultation and 
negotiation with leading experts, represented by the ex-ministers of education and 
university professors who comprise the Consejo Nacional de la Educación; the law also 
enjoyed considerable public support (Rivero & Vexler, 2012). The main points of the law 
refer to the need for the evaluation of state school teachers as the basis for promotion and 
merit-based pay (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2007). Article 27 of the CPM, which 
outlines the requirement for teachers to be monitored periodically, introduces the testing 
of teachers’ professional abilities. It stipulates the need for further training for those 
teachers who fail a third time and says they should be removed from their posts (Inter-
American Dialogue, 2007). They could either sit for a public exam to work as a teaching 
assistant or receive financial compensation depending on their length of service. The 
government claims that the law is fundamental to improving the quality of education and 
ensuring that teachers in state schools are up to the job. Educational standards in Peru are 
low and the law aims to optimize the quality of teachers through training (Cotlear, 2006), 
teachers will be remunerated as they move up the scale (Salas, 2012). Those who oppose 
the law, on the other hand, oppose the influence of the World Bank regarding the policies 




of teacher quality in Peru and believe that it will lead to massive dismissals and salary 
cuts (Ramírez, 2012). They also question the validity of the evaluations themselves. 
Another criticism of the new law is that it was approved after virtually no dialogue with 
teachers’ organizations, parent-teacher associations, or organizations working on 
educational issues (Inter-American Dialogue, 2007). The problems afflicting the 
education system in Peru are deep-rooted and cannot simply be attributed to the teachers. 
Since the law’s approval in 2007, teachers’ evaluation reforms in Peru have continued to 
generate teacher resistance which reflects two opposite poles found in the literature on 
teacher performance. 
As teacher’s test results for 2007 (which only 60 percent of the teachers took) 
showed that almost one half of all state school teachers could not solve basic math 
problems and only a quarter achieved an adequate level of reading (Peru Support Group, 
2010), and since being certified under the new Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial is a 
voluntary process, teachers’ major concerns are: (1) opposition to the privatization of 
education and the obligation to undergo continuous assessments, (2) teachers’ doubts that 
the incentives will be put into practice and this funding will be sustainable: the previous 
law provided for promotions and pay raises every three years but they were never 
implemented, in fact, there are teachers with more than 25 years of service who are still 
paid 1,000 soles (315 dollars) a month (Paiba, 2012a), (3) massive dismissals of teachers 
and salary cuts, (4) problems with the evaluations themselves, (5) the new law’s approval 
with little  dialogue with teachers’ organizations, parent-teacher associations or 
organizations and without a second vote in Congress, as standard procedure requires, (6) 



















fear of the state’s administrative procedures against striking teachers and union leaders, 
as well as conflicts between government and the heads of the Peru’s 25 regional 
authorities, who favor the teachers’ right to strike as enshrined in the Constitution.  
Figure 1 shows the number of teachers certified by the CPM during the period of 
2009-2011. The bars show a decreasing number of certified teachers per year after the 
implementation of the law, despite the government efforts to certify the majority of 
teachers. The 25,000 compliant teachers, who were regulated by the Ley del Profesorado, 
voluntarily participated in the certification process. Thirty thousand more teachers were 
certified under the Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial as they gained their first 









Figure 1. Number of teachers certified by the CPM. Source: Ministry of   
Education of Peru, 2012. 
 
Ley de la Reforma Magisterial. Despite widespread opposition and resistance to the 
Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial by the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la 
Educación del Peru (SUTEP), the Humala administration’s renewed interest in the 




inclusion of merit pay plans into the teacher evaluation system has been translated in the 
new Law 29944 (Ley de la Reforma Magisterial). The Ley de la Reforma Magisterial is 
an 8-tiered progressive career system in which teachers are required to demonstrate 
increased competencies and undertake increased duties as they progress through career 
levels. Progress through the system guarantees minimum salary levels for teachers at 
different stages of their careers (Salas, 2012; Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012d; 
Paiba, 2012a). The new Law went into effect January 1, 2013 and its main purpose was 
to unify into a single teacher career system the total number of public school teachers 
regulated by the two systems currently in effect (Ley del Profesorado and Ley de la 
Carrera Pública Magisterial). The 8-tiered career ladder also provides teachers with 
opportunities for advancement both inside and outside the classroom, as well as 
additional compensation and increased recognition through accountability and support 
(Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012d). 
 The system links career levels and salaries to teachers who pass professional 
competency tests and demonstrate satisfactory classroom observation results; it supports 
ongoing professional development (Chiroque, Paiba, Rivero, & Trahtemberg, 2012; 
Salas, 2012; Paiba, 2012, October 30). It has been nationally recognized that the new Ley 
de Reforma Magisterial, which calls for a significant boost in teacher salaries, will 
improve teacher quality and performance. The main feature of the new law is a higher 
base pay or beginning salary, which is called Remuneración Íntegra Mensual (RIM). 
Teachers will be paid a starting salary of S/ 49.83 (soles) per hour of class, plus a 
variable pay bonus with extra duties, and a performance pay system starting at Level I. 




As teachers advance up the career ladder, they will become eligible for additional 
compensation, with opportunities to earn more throughout the scale, finally earning 160% 
of their salaries in Level VIII (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012b, 2012e).Table 2 
shows the median salary among all public school teachers, which is S/ 1,554.90 soles. 
The new law has established three different starting salaries (S/ 1,243.92, S/ 1,554.90, 
and S/ 2.073) for teachers who work 20, 30, and 40 hours respectively per week on 
average (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012b). This classification is based on the 
number of hours per week in relation to teachers’ level of specialization (kindergarten, 
primary, secondary, and administration). According to the Ministry of Education (2012e), 
teachers will increase their salary with additional incentives by moving into 
administrative roles with more responsibility, such as school principal, teacher trainer, 
head of the Local Education Management Unit (UGEL); there are also additional 
incentives if the school is located in a rural area or on the border of two countries. 
Teachers will also receive bonuses for working in a single-teacher school, a classroom 
consisting of multiple grades, or bilingual schools.  




Table 2  
 
Remuneración Integra Mensual (RIM) by Career Stages and by Hours per 
Week (Ley de la Reforma Magisterial) 
Level 24 hours  30 hours 40 hours 
VIII S/ 3,234.19 S/ 4,042.74 S/ 5,390.32 
VII S/ 2,861.02 S/ 3,576.27 S/ 4,768.36 
VI S/ 2,487.84 S/ 3,109.80 S/ 4,146.40 
V S/ 2,114.66 S/ 2,643.33 S/ 3,524.44 
IV S/ 1,741.49 S/ 2,176.86 S/ 2,902.48 
III S/ 1,554.90 S/ 1,943.63 S/ 2,591.50 
II S/ 1,368.31 S/ 1,710.39 S/ 2,280.52 
I S/ 1,243.92 S/ 1,554.90 S/ 2,073.20 
Note. Teachers’ per-hour wage is S/ 49.83 soles ($19.16).  
 
Two Controversial Laws and a New Bill. For almost two decades, the policy of 
teacher evaluation in Peru has long been an issue of debate and conflict between the state 
government authorities and the teachers’ union, SUTEP (Chiroque, 2005; Cuenca & 
Stojnic, 2008).
6
 Increasingly, the government of Peru is reforming its methods of 
evaluation through legislation but without negotiations with the teachers’ union. With the 
enactment of the Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial (CPM), the Peruvian Congress 
passed its first landmark piece of merit-pay teacher career legislation. Since being 
certified by the CPM was a voluntary process for public schools teachers, only 19 % of 
teachers became certified during 2007 to 2011, according to the Ministry of Education in 
2011. The enactment of a new law (Ley de la Reforma Magisterial) represents the current 
government attempts at a solution to the longstanding conflict with SUTEP over issues of 
teacher pay, job security, and teacher evaluation based on standardized scores for salary 
                                                          
6
 SUTEP has long been controlled by a left-wing political party, called Patria Roja. This political control 
has been considered as one of the main obstacles to introduce reforms into the teaching profession in Peru 
(Peru Support Group, 2008).  




increases. Table 3 is used to facilitate comparisons between the past and present teacher 
careers laws.  
Table 3 
 





Ley de la CPM 
(29062) 












% of  
Level 
VIII     Until 
retirement 
160 
VII     5 130 





100 5 70 
IV 5 4.5 6 50 4 40 
III 5 2.8 6 30 4 25 
II 5 1.2 5 15 4 10 
I 5  3  3  
Note. Promotion between levels is based on education units, university degrees and years 
of experience. Source: Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012.  
 
In examining Table 3, it is important to highlight the main differences in the three 
systems: (1) number of stages or levels; (2) number of years for each level; and (3) salary 
increases per level. The number of stages was increased from 5 in the Ley del 
Profesorado and the CPM to 8 in the Ley de la Reforma Magisterial.
7
 Increasing the 
number of stages suggests that teachers will have up to 30 years until retirement 
(Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012b). According to Paiba (2012, November 9), the 
increased number of years in each stage of the career will give teachers the opportunity to 
have a more productive professional life until retirement. Teachers received a 100% 
                                                          
7
 For both the Ley del Profesorado and the CPM, the career path and scaled salary for  promotion are 
organized in 5 levels (I-V) for teachers with a title degree, with a minimal of 5 years to be in each before 
reaching a higher one (modification in the law, 1990.  




increase at Level V of the CPM and will receive a 160% increase at of the Level VIII of 
the Ley de la Reforma Magisterial. These increases contrast with the traditional Ley del 
Profesorado, in which such increases were minimal (1.2% up to 6.5% of the teacher 
salary) over a career of 20 years of experience (Díaz & Saavedra, 2002a). 
The overall increase of the base monthly salary did not take into account the spirit of 
the reform or the conflicting relations between the government and teachers (Rivero & 
Vexler, 2012). The overriding aim of the policy is to pay teachers more at the beginning 
but offer more promotions and the possibility of higher salaries at the end of the career. 
Higher salaries and more promotions will make teachers more effective and will motivate 
them to better performance. However, the introduction of merit pay plans into the 
evaluation system of the Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial and Ley de la Reforma 
Magisterial are likely to be complicated by the changes that the government has made in 
the salary schedule. As teachers regulated by the old laws (Ley del Profesorado and the 
CPM) are being reassigned to different levels under the new law, they feel that they are 
losing their benefits and rights. Endorsing merit pay for teachers has been generating a 
conflict of interest between teachers represented by their union and those represented by 
government authorities (Cuenca & Stojnic, 2008; Chiroque, 2005). On the one hand, 
defenders of the Ley del Profesorado (mostly SUTEP’s affiliates) argue that the union, 
using their powerful grip on education politics and policy, is only preserving teachers’ 
tenure and teachers’ right to a fair evaluation. The main concerns for teachers are those 
related to the increase of teacher salaries based on standardized tests, and the 
government’s debt to teachers for preparation class (30 percent of teacher salary). 




Although teachers regulated by the Ley del Profesorado have not received a pay increase 
since 2006 and the Garcia Government had not implemented national tests that allow 
these teachers to advance from level II to the highest level of the career ladder, SUTEP 
bristles at the idea of teachers being fired or rewarded based on teacher test scores. On 
the other side, advocates of the CPM, enacted in 2007, believe that the eight levels of the 
New Ley de Reforma Magisterial are unnecessary and that placing all teachers on the I, 
II, III or IV Level before being evaluated destroys the true sense of meritocracy (Rivero 
& Vexler, 2012). Advocates detest the Garcia government’s lack of political will 
continuing with the implementation of CPM.  
The current Minister of Education in Peru, Patricia Salas, believes that it was 
necessary to unify the two current teacher career legal frameworks into one system in 
order to guarantee the professional development of all teachers in Peru (Salas, 2012). 
However, the National Board of SUTEP considers the present government to be like past 
governments, developing measures that are an expression of neoliberal continuism (Peru 
Support Group, 2010). According to SUTEP, the government is trying to impose an 
education reform law without discussion with the Mesa de Trato Directo, which was set 
up for dialogue in 2007. The most recent national teachers’ strike, which lasted more than 
one month (September 5, 2012 to October 6, 2012), showed that the positions of Peruvian 
educational policymakers are not aligned with those of SUTEP and that the union has 
been effective in stopping policies with which it disagrees. The changes introduced by the 
new Ley de la Reforma Magisterial (Table 3) raised the following questions: would 
paying teachers 100% or 160% more mean that they would be more motivated and have 




better performance in the classroom? Smaller raises of 1.2 to 4.5% of the teacher base 
pay, like the salary increases in the Ley del Profesorado (Díaz & Saavedra, 2002a, 
2002b), have been ineffective according to state tests of student achievement. I argue that 
higher salaries won’t improve teacher performance in Peru unless teacher policy 
designers raise salaries along site enhancements in working conditions and create policies 
that attract and keep good teachers in the workforce, and enhance school working 
conditions. 
El Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación Peruana (SUTEP) 
The Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación Peruana (SUTEP) is a 
consolidated and centralized body that seeks to influence both general policies as well as 
sector decisions. SUTEP is the only teacher’s union in Peru and was founded in 1972 
(SUTEP, 2013). SUTEP has had an important role in the last three decades due to the 
mobilization of teachers. Its political informal power, influence, and economic 
importance declined during the 1990s, although it has started to increase its influence on 
policy based on the controversial process of appointing temporary teachers by the 
Ministry of Education since 2001. The union is the largest in the public sector in Peru. 
Questions about its effect on the quantity and quality of educational services remain of 
clear importance for policymakers and researchers. After 1977, a leftist party of Maoist 
extraction called Patria Roja gained control over the union leadership, which it still holds 
today (Crouch, 2005). During the 1980s SUTEP concentrated its activities on organizing 
eventual national strikes, which were less and less effective as the country’s economic 




conditions deteriorated. In 1984, after several years of union pressure and mobilizations, 
the union was finally recognized by the Belaúnde Government (1980-1985).  
A new law for teachers (Ley del Profesorado) was passed in 1984, which created 
a special status for teachers as public servants with full duties and privileges. A teacher 
who is tenured (i.e., who occupies a formal position in the public sector) has job security 
and social benefits upon retiring. The approval of the Law is considered one of the 
important achievements of SUTEP since its foundation. Since the impact of any salary 
adjustment for teachers on the public budget is generally very large, the last three 
governments (1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-2000) have been totally opposed to any significant 
increase in teachers’ wages in real terms. After 1993, the authorities introduced an 
innovation in their labor relations, allowing the hiring of “temporary” teachers. Currently, 
it is estimated that about 25 percent of teachers have non-tenured status in the public 
sector. This dual structure for teachers is not linked to any significant wage differences 
(differentials are minimal; wages being equally low for all teachers).  
There is, however, an important distinction: non-tenured teachers do not enjoy job 
security and as a consequence can be fired at any moment without compensation in 
addition to not receiving any pension benefits. This is so because they are hired using a 
contract in which the non-tenured teacher is a sort of service provider without any of the 
considerations of a stable labor relationship. Clearly this option was used to avoid 
increasing pressure over social benefits among teachers while accommodating the 
increasing demand for them.  




In the 1990s SUTEP did not play a direct role regarding wage bargaining or even 
policy decisions. After the collapse of wages at the beginning of the 1990s, teachers´ real 
wages could not recover during the decade under Fujimori´s rule and at the end of the 
decade these were a mere 70% of real wages in 1990. Since 1996 the Peruvian 
educational system enjoyed higher levels of investment, especially in inputs, training and 
infrastructure. Although SUTEP did not play a significant role in these decisions, at least 
at the central level, it influenced the impacts on educational outputs. Since 2007, 
SUTEP’s reaction to the new Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial is defensive and 
interpreted as a case of “market forces” affecting education. SUTEP has demanded that 
the proposed new legal framework for the new Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial be 
discussed in a national debate before being submitted to Congress. A new law passed at 
the end of 2012, Ley de la Reforma Magisterial, requires all public school teachers 
without exception to be regulated under the new system based on evaluations and merit 
pay. SUTEP continues their resistance to salary increases based on meritocracy and 
opposes the firing of those teachers identified as “developing” or “ineffective” following 
a second training course.   
Research on Teacher Quality, Evaluation, and Merit Pay 
Research studies that address the issue of teaching quality, teacher evaluation, and 
merit pay plans can be classified into three groups. A first group of studies focus on the 
positive relationship between teachers’ subject matter preparation and student 
achievement as well as higher teacher performance on evaluations, particularly in 
mathematics, science, and reading (Darling-Hammond 1999a, 1999b; Goldhaber & 




Brewer, 2000; Wilson & Youngs, 2005). These studies have been the topic of research 
over the last 50 years (Grossman, 2008). Variables presumed to be indicative of teachers’ 
competence include measures of academic ability, levels of education, years of teaching 
experience, measures of subject matter and teaching knowledge, financial aspects of 
teaching, and certification status. In manipulating teacher inputs, policymakers assume 
that there is an empirical link between these inputs and student test scores and other 
measures of academic performance. Research in this field also focuses on the relationship 
between teacher preparation pathways and student achievement. Goldhaber and Brewer’s 
work (1997, 2000) found that teacher content knowledge as indicated by a Bachelor in 
Arts degree in the field may be more significant than teacher certification in the field. 
Darling-Hammond and Youngs (2002) have argued that there is strong evidence to 
support the assertion that the preparation in pedagogy that pre-service teachers receive in 
traditional certification programs makes a difference. 
A second considerably larger set of studies explores the link between classroom 
practices and student academic performance (Schacter, 2001). Such a link and its 
complexities are recognized by McLaughlin and Talbert (1993) and Wenglinsky (2000, 
2002, February 13) in their study’s contribution to establish a link between classroom 
practices and student achievement. Wenglinsky (2000) showed that teacher inputs, 
professional development, and classroom practices all influence student achievement, and 
that the greatest role is played by classroom practices. In “How Teacher Matters Bringing 
the Classroom Into Discussions of Teacher Quality” (2000), Wenglinshky linked higher 
student test scores in math with teachers' professional-development training in higher-




order thinking skills and in working with special populations of students. The study found 
a similar jump in science-test scores in connection with teachers who had had 
professional-development training in hands-on laboratory skills. The study's data have 
suggested that other, more all-purpose types of training content—e.g. classroom 
management, interdisciplinary instruction, collaborative learning—had a minimal or 
negative effect on student scores (Wenglinsky, 2000). 
A third group of studies focus on the way teaching incentives affect teaching 
quality, and how teachers’ perceptions of evaluation for merit pay relate to teachers’ 
career satisfaction. In “Merit Pay and the Evaluation Problem: Why Most Merit Pay 
Plans Fail and a Few Survive,” Richard Murnane and David Cohen (1986), used the 
framework of microeconomics to account for the short lives of most merit pay plans. The 
authors demonstrated that teaching is not “an activity that satisfies the conditions under 
which performance-base pay” is an efficient method of compensating workers. Larry 
Weber and Janice McBee (1990), in “Teacher Evaluation Instruments for Merit Pay 
Decisions Is Their Use Justifiable?,” investigated how effective representative teacher 
evaluation instruments are for determining eligibility of public school teachers for merit 
pay. Elementary school principals' ratings of teachers were analyzed. Findings suggested 
that rating instruments may be useful for making initial decisions about who should be 
eligible for further consideration. A growing body of empirical works has concluded that 
incentives negatively affect the education sector, both by increasing costs and by 
lowering achievement (Brimelow, 2003; Hoxby, 1996; Lieberman, 2000). Others have 




found mixed and ambiguous results in the way teacher incentives related to student 
achievement (Eberts & Stone, 1984; Grimes & Register, 1990; Stone, 2000). 
Using surveys and interviews, Milanowski and Heneman (2001) evaluated 
whether teachers understood the evaluation system, accepted the teacher standards, 
perceived the standards and evaluation process as fair, felt that evaluators conducted the 
evaluation in a satisfactory manner, and felt that evaluation positively impacted their 
development as a teacher. The researchers found that the understandability, acceptability, 
and personal experiences with the actual evaluation were critical in influencing teachers’ 
reactions to the system. Additionally, in public schools, younger and less experienced 
teachers have higher levels of satisfaction than older and more experienced teachers do. 
Conley, Muncey, and You (2006) found that teachers’ career satisfaction is favorable 
when teachers have positive perceptions of evaluation and supervisory behavior. In a 
more recent study, Heneman, Milanowski, and Kimball (2007) found that subsequent 
evaluations of merit pay plans harm teacher effectiveness, especially given the frequent 
deployment of new plans; it was acknowledged that the problem was not merit pay per se 
but the way the plans were designed, implemented, and administered. 
Paucity in the Research Literature 
Despite all the attention that improving teacher quality has garnered, the research-
based recommendations that have been proposed generally suffer from two problems. 
The first problem is that, in emphasizing aspects of teacher quality that occur outside the 
classroom, these research studies often ignore practices in the classroom (Wenglinsky, 
2000). Most research studies tended to stress aspects of teaching that occurred outside of 




the classroom, known as teacher inputs, as the instrument for improving student 
performance. The non-classroom factors targeted by these proposals include 
qualifications of teachers such as requiring teachers to pass a licensure examination or 
encouraging teachers to obtain a master’s degree (Darling-Hammond, 2000). These 
studies often neglect the important role that the practices actually occurring inside the 
classroom may play in student learning.  
The second problem is that few research studies document the effects of the large-
scale government policies and institutional practices aimed at improving teacher quality 
that affect the overall teachers’ professional career and regulations. In Latin America, 
research on teacher quality and evaluation techniques is scarce. The most notable 
omission is the lack of research studies that make use of teacher data gathered through 
national teacher evaluation systems available at the Ministries of Education. An 
exception is Murillo, Tomassi, Ronconi, and Sanguinetti’s (2002) study of the economic 
effects of unions in Argentina. Based on a substantial amount of new information, the 
authors uncover the main channels of union influence on teachers’ and students’ 
performance. Other variables influencing teachers’ performance were teachers’ tenure, 
job satisfaction, class size, education budget and teachers’ salaries. However, each 
variable probed to be factors determining levels of satisfaction that are decisive in 
professional life.  
Statement of the Problem 
In Peru, a teacher’s career is regulated by statute (Ley del Profesorado, or Teacher 
Statute; Law Number D.S. 019-90-ED signed in 1984). In theory, the law ties monetary 




rewards to increases in salary grade and the salary grade changes should be at least 50 
percent driven by some measure of performance (Crouch, 2005; Chiroque, 2006). Since 
2004, government policies aimed at controlling the quality of teachers have generated 
considerable interest (and conflict), such as applying knowledge tests to candidates for 
permanent appointment without linking those tests to the teaching career ladder. In 2007, 
the President of Peru signed a new far-reaching teacher merit-pay bill (Ley de la Carrera 
Pública Magisterial) that has overhauled how teachers across the state are evaluated and 
paid. The new law creates an evaluation system that relies heavily on teachers’ test score 
data to judge their quality.  
The vast majority of teachers (87%) along with the statewide union (SUTEP) are 
opposed to the law. They say the law will be expensive, will rely on an unproven system 
and won’t fairly evaluate teacher performance. Fulfilling the teacher education reform 
law will require 1.4 billion soles (443 million dollars) per year for the salary incentives. 
Since the law’s inception in 2007, only 55,000, teachers have been certified under the 
new law. This number represents 18.41 % of the total number of teachers in Peru, who 
actually numbers 298, 711 (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2012d).Teachers’ resistance to 
being evaluated and widespread disappointment with the effectiveness of Peru’s new 
teacher career law is the most critical challenge for the current government of Peru. As 
teachers’ test results for 2007 (which only 60 percent of the teachers took) showed that 
almost one half of all state schoolteachers could not solve basic math problems and only 
a quarter achieved an adequate level of reading (Peru Support Group, 2010). Although 
experts and policymakers see this new law as an advance for teachers’ careers, the law 




has proven ineffective both in gaining teacher approval and in attempting to improve 
teachers’ career structure. Both elements are important in order to assure quality teaching.  
At the conclusion of 2012, a new career bill was passed for teachers. The new bill 
has unified the two teacher career structures in a new system that includes evaluation 
based pay plans as the basis for professional development. Last year, SUTEP was seeking 
an immediate non-conditional salary increase based on scores in teacher regulatory 
competency exams. SUTEP continues to demand government compliance with rights 
guaranteed to teachers by the Ley del Profesorado and also a fair evaluation based on 
performance in the classroom. More than eighty percent of public school teachers resisted 
evaluation based on regulatory competency exams during Garcia’s government and 
remain angry that President Ollanta Humala has not upheld commitments to teachers as 
promised during his electoral campaign in 2010. 
Purpose of the Study 
Improving teacher effectiveness is a critical component for improving student 
outcomes in teacher legislation in Peru. However, teachers’ reactions to the reforms have 
significantly impacted the goals of these reforms. It is critical importance to identify 
teachers’ perceptions and beliefs in order to understand causes of resistance and improve 
teacher quality. While the discussion continues regarding of what constitutes a good and 
effective teacher, as well as the most effective way to evaluate them, resistance and 
opposition to reforms persist. The purpose of this study was (1) to determine the 
perceptions and beliefs about a new evaluation process, (2) to identify factors for 
compliance influencing compliance, and (3) to identify causes of resistance to the 




implementation of a new evaluation system and merit pay plans governing career 
advancement.  
Research Questions 
The following questions guide this research: 
Research Question 1. What are the teachers’ perceptions and beliefs about the 
evaluation process as part of the new career structure for teachers in Peru? 
Research Question 2. What factors have had the greatest influence on teachers’ 
compliance with the Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial (CPM)? 
Research Question 3. Of those teachers who are resisting evaluation, what are the 
most compelling reasons for those with more than 20 years of experience and those with 
less than 20 years of experience for such resistant behavior? 
(3.1) Is there a significant difference in the importance of financial incentives based 
on teachers’ competency exam scores related to their levels of experience? 
(3.2) Is there a significant difference between the two groups in the importance of a 
reduction in teachers’ benefits and rights? 
(3.3) Is there a significant difference in the importance of ending teacher tenure as a 
cause of resistance? 
(3.4) Is there a significant difference in the perceived importance of the financial 
costs of the law implementation and is it sustainable? 
Research Question 4. What are the circumstances and conditions under which 
compliance and resistance to new laws occur in Peru? 




Research Question 5. What is the impact of teacher resistance to evaluation in 
schools? How does teacher resistance affect the goals of reform? 
Significance of the Study 
This study is noteworthy in several ways. First, to date, no research has been 
found that formally studies the implementation of a new teacher career policy in Latin 
America. Governmental policies to measure teacher quality with regulatory competency 
exams are controversial in Latin America and ever more prominent part of Peru’s 
educational reform agenda in teacher education, also being discussed in other Latin 
American countries. Second, the study intends to respond to the growing demand for new 
approaches to the design of public policies for the improvement of teacher evaluation 
methods and the introduction of merit pay plans in teacher career structures. Third, 
understanding teachers’ perceptions of the evaluation policy is vital to understanding the 
failure of the policy implementation. Too often teachers’ evaluations are too lenient and 
fail to adequately differentiate between teachers at different levels (Weisberg, Sextom, 
Mulhern, & Keeling (2009). To be effective, teacher evaluation systems must be well 
understood by teachers and should result in the identification of genuine differences in 
performance (Danielson & McGreal, 2000; Milanowski, Princi, & Koppich, 2007). 
 Finally, the study’s findings could be used as a basis for changing teacher’s 
evaluation systems in Peru, which has an impact on teaching and learning as prescribed 
in the CPM (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2007) guidelines, and ultimately, will also 
increase the supply of the best teachers in the high-need areas of the country. This study 
will contribute valuable information to the educational community by offering detailed 




descriptions of the teacher’s perceptions, expectations, and frustrations about the 
implementation of the CPM in Peru. Given the high number of public schools teachers 
that do not reach the minimum score on the regulatory competency exams, additional 
interest in these data may be expected from the public in general. The findings may be 
useful in terms of assessing the impact of the new law. This also may facilitate the 
dialogue between governments, teachers’ organizations, private actors and international 
organizations on key issues when planning policies on teacher quality.  
Term Definitions 
Merit-based Pay. Merit-based pay rewards teachers based on individual merit 
scores as they advance up career ladder. Advancement from one stage to another, 
includes classroom observations and teacher portfolios.  
Teacher Quality. Teacher quality can be thought of as those attributes the teacher 
brings to the classroom, including specialized knowledge. Some factors often included in 
this category (education, certification/licensure, and experience) are considered primarily 
during teaching hiring processes.  
Teacher Tenure. In Latin America, a teacher who is tenured (i.e., which occupies 
a formal position in the public sector) has job security and social benefits when retiring. 
Elsewhere, teacher tenure, which is sometimes called career status, provides job security 
for teachers who have successfully completed a probationary period. Laws pertaining to 
teacher tenure vary from country to country, but the overall spirit is the same.  




Teacher Performance. Teacher performance includes such instructional basics 
as how well a teacher plans learning activities, maintains a positive classroom 
environment, communicates with students, and provides productive feedback.  
Teacher Effectiveness. Teacher effectiveness can be considered the result of 
teacher performance. It encompasses a wide range of outcomes, including student 
learning.  
Teacher Incentives. Teacher incentives are any form of financial support or 
provisions beyond the “normal” contractual salary agreement and employee benefits. The 
design of teacher incentive schemes belongs to 4 distinct groups: (1) individual merit 
pay; (2) group performance-based incentives; (3) competitive incentives; (4) automatic 
incentives.  
Individual Merit Pay. Individual merit pay rewards individual teachers with pay 
bonuses that are based on particular outcomes or behaviors, such as improvements in 
student test scores.  
Teacher Evaluation. Teacher evaluation assesses the professional knowledge of 
teachers using regular competency exams. Its orientation is based on the strengthening of 
the teachers’ careers, specifically to improve professional performance, and to contribute 
to the improvement of the learning competencies of the students.  
Intrinsic Teacher Motivation. Intrinsic teacher motivation is about the 
importance they personally place on the tasks that they are undertaking. It is about the 
engagement and development of teachers’ interests and capabilities. When teachers are 




intrinsically motivated, they are more likely to have the determination to complete a task 
or project, to approach new things creatively and to think flexibly about their work.  
Extrinsic Teacher Motivation. Teachers can be motivated through such methods 
as pay, promotion, praise, etc. This kind of motivation stems from the work environment 
external to the task and is usually applied by others or someone other than the person 
being motivated.  
Resistance to Change. Effective cognitive, and behavioral responses maintain 
the status quo, and aim to stop, delay or alter a proposed change.  
Conclusion 
 A general concern that public school teachers must be more accountable has 
provided the impetus for a variety of reforms in teacher evaluation in Latin America. 
Currently, teacher quality continues as a subject of political debate at local, state, and 
national levels. Evaluation of teacher quality and how to improve it have been two of the 
most complex educational and political challenges. Teachers resist being evaluated, 
complaining a lack of credible and fair systems for measuring the quality and 
effectiveness of their work and adequate measurement of teacher effectiveness for 
rewarding teachers on the basis of their performance. It is much less clear how financial 
incentives affect teacher performance and student achievement. This study is designed to 
address the underlying factors that contribute to Peruvian teachers’ resistance to being 
evaluated and to merit pay plans. I will use different theories of organizational behavior 
motivation to analyze the complex relationships between educational authorities and 
teachers during the implementation of a new controversial evaluation policy.  





In this section, the relevant literature regarding teacher evaluation, merit pay, and 
teacher resistance is reviewed. The focus of this literature is on defining the theoretical 
knowledge for understanding the conditions and circumstances in which a new merit pay 
evaluation process has been implemented and intrinsic-motivation model of teacher 
behavior. This review is divided in three sections: (1) teacher quality and evaluation 
continues to be of one the most direct ways of social control; (2) the complexities of the 
inclusion of merit pay into teacher evaluation system; and (3) organizational behavior and  
motivation theories that explain teacher compliance or resistance to reforms.  
Teacher Quality Reform, Social Control, and Assessment Practices 
The educational reform agenda in Latin American nations today is driven by a 
perceived lack of accountability (World Bank, 2006; World Bank, 2007a). Most 
education policies focus on assessments as one the means by which educational systems 
ensure that schools are accountable to society for the investment made in them 
(Mahinhey, 1998). Social control underlying the evaluative structure and processes 
promoting accountability represents the way societies select, classify, distribute, transmit 
and evaluate the educational knowledge. This method of social control is considered to be 
public, and reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control 
(Bernstein, 1977; Broadfoot, 1996). Broadfoot (as cited in Macpherson, 1998) stated that 
“the institution of formal evaluation procedures in education is instrumental in providing 
and selecting to fulfill specific roles in the division of labor within a particular society” 
(p. 94). 




Assessments can take the form of deliberative and planned procedures of 
measurement through standardized tests, periodic school, district, state, and national 
examinations and formal evaluations by experts outside the school. They represent and 
involve particular institutional patterns of social control. Assessment procedures have at 
least three purposes: selection, certification, and (system) control. The system control 
provides data helpful in judging the quality of the system (Macpherson, 1998). Critics of 
the use of the assessments as social control contend that “assessment as a change agent is 
a risky business, because it is by definition judgmental” (Macpherson, 1998, p. 95). 
Change driven by an external group in authority has the power to exercise influence on 
teachers, and teachers have the capacity to respond to reforms by changing practices. 
Educational change driven by internal forces such as teachers’ motivation to embark in 
the changes process can give them the opportunity to achieve agreement about conflicting 
expectations for quality (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). According to Palamidessi and 
Legarralde (2006), the introduction of performance evaluation systems are perceived as 
control mechanisms which, in addition to establishing rewards and penalties, may 
undermine unionism’s social basis and hamper the aggregate demand for common 
interests.  
Teacher Quality, Performance, and Effectiveness 
While much of the debate on teacher quality revolves around how to improve teacher 
quality, analysis of its definition has been lacking (Santiago, 2002; U.S. Department of 
Education, 1999). Defining teacher quality has been both problematic and elusive 
(Stodolsky, 1996; Liston et al., 2008). Public education defines teacher quality largely in 




terms of the credentials that teachers have earned, rather than on the basis of the quality 
of the work they do in their classrooms or the results their students achieve. A U.S. 
Department of Education report (1999) emphasized the role of teacher preparation and 
qualifications in high-quality teaching. The report showed evidence that teacher 
qualifications provide important information about the quality of America’s teachers. 
Based on several research studies that look at the impact of teacher quality, researchers 
have identified at least three observable features that characterized teacher quality: (a) 
teacher education (number of undergraduate or graduate courses completed in field of 
instruction, whether a teacher has a degree in field he/she teaches, and teachers’ scores on 
national teacher examinations); (b) teacher certification status; (c) academic tested 
ability; (d) teaching experience; and (d) degree of in-service training (Santiago, 2002). 
Based on these identified characteristics, Santiago (2002) contended that it is hard to 
predict high quality teachers solely by considering these observable characteristics.  
Within the larger context of the teacher accountability debate, three terms related to 
the discussion of teacher quality are highly qualified teacher, effective teacher, and good 
teacher. These focus on teacher characteristics or qualifications, teaching outcomes, and 
teaching practices, respectively (Liston et al., 2008). The National Commission on 
Teaching and America’s Future and the National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standards defines teacher quality in terms of teachers’ professional pedagogical 
knowledge and ability to use that knowledge in the classroom. On the other hand, the 
Fordham and Abel Foundations emphasize subject matter preparation instead of 
professional pedagogical knowledge. 




Hinchey (2010) offers a clear distinction between teacher quality, teacher 
performance, and teacher effectiveness. The author defines teacher quality as teacher 
characteristics such as education, experience, and beliefs. Teacher performance is 
defined as what the teacher does, both inside and outside the classroom, and teacher 
effectiveness as the teacher’s influence on student learning activities and includes 
elements such as student test scores and student motivation. Effective teachers are well 
educated in their subject area; they can communicate this knowledge well; and generally, 
they tend to be motivated and organized people. Teachers who have had strong academic 
preparation and have been certified to teach before entering the profession have been 
found to be more effective (Silva, 2009). Lesley, Gee, and Matthews (2010) have 
identified the intellectual characteristics of knowledge of content and life-long learning as 
key to quality teaching. They also identified such personal characteristics as being 
innovative, enthusiastic, caring, committed, flexible/adaptable, and having the ability to 
collaborate.  
How to judge the performance of teachers depends on how teaching is conceptualized 
and the extent to which particular concepts of teaching are translated into evaluation 
criteria and standards. In the past, these criteria tended to be expressed as specific 
behavioral competences, but more recently broader and more comprehensive views of 
teaching are becoming the norm. These describe teachers in relation to their main spheres 
of action: planning, creating an adequate classroom environment, and teaching as 
directed to learning and professionalism. Qualitative examples of how standards and 
evaluation criteria can be embedded in a research-based concept of teaching are found in 




Danielson’s Framework for Teaching (1996), in the framework of teaching competences 
used in the province of Quebec, Canada and in the standards now being proposed by the 
Training and Development Agency in England. This does not mean, however, that 
qualitative measures based on effective teaching prescriptions do not oscillate between 
being highly prescriptive or excessively ambiguous (Peterson, 2000). 
NCLB and Highly Qualified Teachers 
The U.S. federal law, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), defines highly qualified teacher 
as having the following qualifications: a bachelor’s degree, a state teaching certification 
or a passing score on the state teacher licensing examination, and subject matter 
knowledge (Hess & Petrilli, 2006; Birman, Le Floch, Klekotva, Ludwig, Taylor, Walters, 
Wayne, Yoon, Vernez, Garet, & O’Day, 2007). Under NCLB highly qualified teacher is 
defined in terms of content knowledge and has intensified public education’s culture of 
credentialism leading many states to rely on tests for what makes a qualified teacher 
(Wilson & Youngs, 2005; Selwyn, 2007; Toch & Rothman, 2008). NCLB also required 
states to set teaching standards and help teachers to improve their qualifications 
regardless of their highly qualified status. In 2006-2007, according to the (2009) State 
and Local Implementation of the NCLB Act Volume VIII Teacher Quality Under NCLB: 
Final Report, 94 percent of teachers met their states’ requirements to be considered 
highly qualified (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  
In spite of these promising results, tangible results in teacher quality are scarce, and 
there is little evidence that these policies are driving the sort of changes needed to help 
schools recruit, train, place, induct, and compensate quality teachers or implement 




changes that are aligned with broader human capital reforms efforts in education 
(Rotherham, 2008, 2009). For the first time, in 2009, Phase I of the Race to the Top 
(RTTT) stimulus application sets a narrow distinction between effective teacher and a 
highly effective teacher. Essentially, an effective teacher is a “teacher whose students 
achieve acceptable rates of student growth” and a highly effective teacher is a “teacher 
whose students achieve high rates of student growth” (U.S. Department of Education, 
2009, p.12). In defining the problem of teacher quality, decision makers often use the 
poor academic achievement of students as an indicator that strongly correlates with 
teacher quality. Effective and highly effective teachers have been defined in terms of 
acceptable and high rates of student growth. 
In the goal of ensuring that high-quality teacher are spread throughout a district, the 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, or ESEA (known as 
NCLB), tied funding to districts on the basis of equitable distribution of teachers 
throughout the district (National Council of Teacher Quality, 2010). Misunderstanding 
the distinctions between teacher quality, teacher performance, and teacher effectiveness 
has contributed to the development of narrow definitions about teaching. Policy makers 
generally contribute to this misunderstanding by considering a change in an indicator 
(poor academic achievement) to be a change in the state of a system (poor teacher 
quality). Interpretation of indicators can have serious implications, as a broader failure in 
student achievement can also be considered a failure in the educational system, with no 
consideration of context. Selwyn (2007) makes important remarks about the NCLB’s 
definition of a highly qualified and questions if we can quantify what makes a good 




teacher. Teacher characteristics or qualifications, teaching outcomes, and teaching 
practices have been the most common criteria for defining teacher quality; however, 
NCLB’s shift from a focus on  qualifications to describe teacher quality to a focus on 
achievement outcomes does not reflect the complexity and multidimensional nature of 
the teaching profession (Liston et al., 2008). 
Quantitative Teacher Quality Evaluation Systems 
Concomitant to the problem of qualitatively measured teacher quality has been the 
lack of a credible and fair system of quantitative measurement of the quality of teachers’ 
work and of adequate measurement of teacher effectiveness for rewarding teachers on the 
basis of their performance. Researchers also agree that there is no simple way to evaluate 
teachers, and that the multiplicity of methods that exists does not capture the true nature 
of the teaching process ( Hinchey, 2010; National Council on Teacher Quality, 2009; 
OECD, 2009, 2011). According to the National Governors Association (NGA) Center for 
Best Practices (2002), 
Teacher evaluation can be effective mechanisms for increasing student achieving and 
improving instructional practices, if the evaluations are connected with academic 
standards for students and professional standards for educators…developing state 
evaluations ensures consistency throughout a state and shows if teachers are meeting 
state academic goals (Curran, 2001) 
Most forms of evaluation are justified either because diagnostic information is needed 
or because they provide evidence for decision making. The same is true for teacher 
performance evaluation. Thus, discussions, as shown in the literature on the topic (see for 




example Millman & Darling-Hammond, 1990), have focused on whether teacher 
performance evaluation should have a predominantly formative character (provide 
information to guide the provision of teacher professional development) or a 
predominantly summative character (serve as an instrument for promotion or dismissal). 
Student test scores are taken as a central element of discussion, in relation to both of 
these purposes (Glass, 1990). In the U.S., a growing number of school districts have 
adopted a system called value-added modeling, with some saying it is an effective 
method for increasing teacher accountability. However, teachers resist using student test 
scores as a way of measuring teacher effectiveness in the classroom, with most opposing 
the idea of offering higher starting salaries in exchange for smaller pensions (Duffett, 
Farkas, Rotherdam, & Silva, 2009). 
 The second priority of the Race To The Top (RTTT) fund in the U.S. was to develop 
developing a teacher evaluation system that is linked to student achievement and 
performance. States, such as New York and Tennessee, are now considering plans that 
would give as much as 50% of the weight of teacher evaluation and compensation 
decisions to their students’ scores on existing tests of basic skills in math and reading. 
Proponents say it would also treat teachers like the professionals that they are, by giving 
them the opportunity to earn larger salaries for excellent performance. Performance-pay 
advocates also claim that merit pay or performance pay based on students’ scores is the 
most direct way to measure teacher performance (Toch & Rothman, 2008). However, 
opponents such as Bénabou and Tirole, (2003), Hinchey (2010), Rothstein, Jacobsen, and 
Wilder (2008) contended that, as the sole measure of teacher effectiveness, students’ test 




scores are inadequate. Hinchey questioned whether or not school districts have the data 
needed to set up fair measurement and evaluation systems. Issues such as the lack of 
assessments, data systems, and evaluation processes capable of capturing the complexity 
of teaching skills and their impact on student learning as well as the validity and 
reliability of test scores are the main constraints that concern policymakers in the process 
of linking student learning scores to teacher evaluation processes (Goldrick, 2002; 
Marszalek, Odom, LaNasa, & Adler, 2010). 
Linking Teacher Evaluation to Students’ Test Scores 
Educational researchers and analysts suggest that current standardized tests are the 
most accurate means of assessing student progress and teacher effectiveness. However, 
incorporating student learning into teacher evaluation has been one of the main 
challenges and a point of contention for policymakers over the last two decades. 
Researchers have been defining value-added methods, establishing an important 
statistical breakthrough in analyzing standardized test results for signs of student progress 
and teacher impact (Berry, 2010). School reformers have argued that value-added scores 
from these tests should be the primary metric for evaluating teachers and increasing 
accountability. Sanders and his associates used data from the Tennessee Value-Added 
Assessment System (TVAAS) database to run multivariate analyses of students who took 
the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program Test. Sanders’ findings suggested 
that teacher effectiveness is both additive and cumulative with little evidence of 
compensatory effects (Sanders, 1999; Sanders & Horn, 1994; Sanders & Rivers, 1996). 
However, current research data show that value-added systems for measuring teacher 




effects do not always offer reliable measures for making high-stakes decisions (Berry, 
2010). For example, as part of The New Era (TNE) research initiative at Stanford 
University and using a sample of approximately 250 secondary teachers and roughly 
3,500 students taught by these teachers, Newton, Darling-Hammond, Haertel, and 
Thomas (2010) demonstrated that judgments of teacher effectiveness for a given teacher 
can vary substantially across statistical models, classes taught, and years. Furthermore, 
the authors showed that teachers who teach less advantaged students in a given course of 
year typically receive a lower effectiveness rating than the same teachers teaching more 
advantage students in a different year.  
The process of defining teacher effectiveness requires using valid and reliable 
tools for assessing whether an individual teacher possesses these competencies. Thus, the 
debate over standards-based teacher performance continues. The U.S.’s National Teacher 
Association (NEA) President, Dennis Van Roekel, for instance, asked to the U.S. 
Secretary of Education for more clarification about the use of the teacher data systems, 
the Board on Testing and Assessment, a part of the National Research Council, warned 
against using single test, such the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) to 
measure growth in student achievement. The Board on Testing and Assessment also 
suggested that the departments’ plans to use student growth data to evaluate teachers 
could be premature (Maxwell, 2009). 
Teacher Evaluation and Teacher Tests 
Many educational researches agree that a highly qualified teacher can do more 
than pass tests. Standardized assessments do provide fundamental and vital information 




on teacher quality, but this is not a complete indicator of teacher quality. Goertz, Floden 
and O`Day (1996) and Wilson (2010) suggested that policymakers should recognize that 
teacher capacity is multidimensional, encompassing not only teachers’ procedural 
knowledge and skills represented on teacher tests, but their dispositions to meet new 
standards and to make necessary changes in practice. Liston et al. (2008) pointed out the 
narrowness and drawbacks of most states’ standardized tests in making hiring or retention 
decisions. They based their argument on the recent Aspen Institute Report, Beyond NCLB 
(Commission on No Child Left Behind, 2007) written to reauthorization of the law. 
Additionally, Liston et al. (2008) argued that putting too much emphasis on standardized 
testing for teachers is only trying to resolve part of the teacher quality problem.  
Teacher Quality Evaluation and Latin America 
As discussed above, the traditional approach to public teacher management has 
emphasized credentials, seniority, job security— instead of quantitative measures of 
performance, merit, and accountability in Latin America and elsewhere. This input-based 
approach focused on qualifications to describe teacher quality instead of a more 
substantive teacher evaluation strategy such as performance-based teacher evaluation 
(Goldrick, 2002). Opponents of this approach emphasize the overly narrow focus on 
content preparation, and the imprecise nature of measures for each qualification (Liston 
et al., 2008). The first chapter demonstrated that since the 1990s, several countries in 
Latin America have implemented teacher accountability policies based on financial 
incentives to encourage teachers to improve student test scores (Vaillant & Rossel, 2006; 
Carnoy, 2008). Teacher quality evaluation policies based on incentives in Latin America 




represent efforts to change the traditional approach to evaluate teachers, creating and 
improving standardized test scores (Vegas & Umansky, 2005). Notably, there is a paucity 
in the literature whether or not these reforms in Latin America have had their intended 
effect: motivating positive teacher behavior and improving student success. 
Teacher Compensation and Merit Pay in Latin America. Teacher 
compensation is among the most widely discussed school reform initiatives in Latin 
America (Adams, Heywood, & Rothstein, 2009). Public school teachers are currently 
paid according to a uniform salary schedule that was first introduced in the 1920s. 
Research has consistently shown that the two components represented on the traditional 
salary schedule— level of teacher’s education and years of experience— have little if any 
bearing on teacher quality and subsequently student achievement (Crouch, 2005; 
Hernani-Limarino, 2005; Umansky, 2005; Vegas & Umansky 2005). Bolivia, Chile, and 
Mexico have established salary differentials for rewarding teachers working in the rural 
areas or have introduced salary structures that reward teachers for improved performance 
and student learning. With teacher compensation representing more than 80 percent of 
education expenditures, Peru has recently introduced a new policy to tie a portion of 
teacher compensation to teachers’ scores on regulatory competency exams. Research has 
found that teachers respond to incentives (Ballou, 2001; Ballou & Podgursky, 1997).  
Education policymakers are assured that the quality of teaching can be improved 
by designing effective incentives that attract, retain, and motivate highly qualified 
teachers. However, researchers also have found that stronger incentives associated with 
tangible, quantitative measures of performance will not always lead teachers and students 




to work harder. Opponents have worried that the emphasis on standardized teaching 
testing may lead teachers to ‘cheat on the test.’ Teachers in some cases respond adversely 
to incentives by reducing collaboration among teachers, excluding low-performing 
students from class, cheating on or manipulating the indicator on which rewards are 
based, decreasing the academic rigor of classes, or “teaching to the test” to the detriment 
of other subjects or skills. 
The most common designs of teacher incentive schemes in Latin America are 
individual merit pay and competitive incentives, which reward individual teachers and 
groups of teachers respectively (Vegas, 2005). Umansky (2005) has stated that the 
success of incentives schemes depends on the employers’ ability to accurately determine 
and evaluate the desired behavior. However, a growing body of research has shown that 
individual financial rewards can be detrimental for employees’ intrinsic motivation to 
work, obscure the reasons for suboptimal performance, and harm the cooperative aspect 
of workers’ environment (Bénabou & Tirole, 2000, 2003; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; 
Kohn, 1993). 
As Latin America countries lack reliable and fair teacher evaluation systems, 
teachers’ incentives based on competency standardized tests are particularly vulnerable to 
corruption, such as teachers’ cheating on the tests. Cost associated with performance-
based compensation also matter/present challenges. Developing and funding incentives 
sufficient to entice teachers to participate is the primary issue, but administrative costs are 
also a factor. Conley, Muncey, and You (2006) found that teachers’ career satisfaction is 
favorable when teachers have positive perceptions of evaluation and supervisory 




behavior. Milanowski and Heneman (2001), using surveys and interviews, evaluated 
whether teachers (a) understood the evaluation system; (b) accepted the teacher 
standards; (c) perceived the standards and evaluation process as fair; (d) felt that 
evaluators conducted the evaluation in a satisfactory manner; and (e) felt that evaluation 
positively impacted their development as a teacher. The researchers found that the 
understandability, acceptability, and experiences with the actual evaluation were critical 
in influencing teachers’ reactions to the system. In public schools, younger and less 
experienced teachers have higher levels of satisfaction than older and more experienced 
teachers do.  
Educational sector reforms that include merit pay plans into career structures are 
seen by unions as a source of conflict because they increase the probability of 
unemployment, competition among their members, and higher level of control over their 
affiliates while threatening their political sustainability and forcing organizational 
adaptation. Researchers have demonstrated that the conditions influencing teachers’ 
resistance or acceptance of reforms are related to their interaction with policymakers and 
to the context of such interaction. In “Pay-for-Performance Teacher Compensation: The 
Inside View of Denver’s ProComp Plan,” Gonring, Teske and Jupp (2008), based on 
unprecedented management collaboration, demonstrated how a compensation plan 
implementation would be the best scenario for the introduction of entrepreneurial 
behavior in collaboration with teachers’ union and support from outside philanthropic 
groups. It is widely acknowledged that major conflicts around educational sector reforms 
arise due to perceived changes in payment mechanisms, such as those associated with 




performance as a way to increase competition among union members, hindering internal 
solidarity while increasing the probability of lay-offs and uncertainty about teachers’ 
income.  
Theoretical Framework 
Latin American governments are experimenting with the introduction of merit pay 
plans linked to evaluation into the teacher career structure in an attempt to foster teacher 
quality, and thus student achievement. The impact of the government investment into 
teacher quality, resistance to evaluation reform and merit pay plans had been explored, 
with a focus on the causes driving opposition demonstrated by public school teachers. 
Critical questions that arise are what motivate teachers to resist or comply to such policy. 
Why do teachers resist evaluation?, Can extrinsic rewards (such as financial incentives) 
increase teacher motivation and, thus, quality?  
The majority of published research on these issues is based on the interaction 
between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic rewards. An examination of education research 
literature has found that extrinsic rewards reduce and undermine intrinsic motivation 
(Deci, 1971; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Research, such as the works of social 
psychologists and humanistic researchers, began with the demonstration that extrinsic 
motivation can permanently undermine and have detrimental effects for employee 
intrinsic motivation and performance (Deci 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; 
Kohn, 1993). In the public sector, extrinsic motivation factors, such monetary incentives 
and performance regulation, may have detrimental effects for employee intrinsic 
motivation and performance (Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 1976; Lepper & Greene, 




1975). Research has shown that this is not always true. Modern behaviorist researchers 
argue that offering extrinsic rewards has either neligible effects on intrinsic motivation 
and it could actually contribute to intrinsic motivation (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). 
Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, and Deci (1978) reported that some contextual factors 
such as providing choice about aspects of task engagement tend to enhance feelings of 
autonomy, and thus, increase intrinsic motivation. Providing satisfactory explanations for 
the combined effects of extrinsic and intrinsic factors, researchers, such as Ryan and Deci 
(2000) and Frey and Jegen (2001), presented their motivational frameworks for 
facilitating versus undermining intrinsic motivation.  
A Multiple Framed Approach 
I used the multiple-framed theoretical approach to understand the role of teachers 
in policy change. Rather than relying on a single theoretical approach as traditional policy 
research does (Young, 1999), this study focused on an exploration and comprehensive 
understanding of teachers’ reactions to evaluation through different lens. While a number 
of theories explaining policy changes, mostly based on the rational tradition, have 
evolved and matured in the public policy literature, they cannot offer a complete picture 
and explain the phenomena of policy change. At the same time, when taken alone, any 
single theory is limited in purview and knowledge, and fails to “provide a robust, 
dynamic, and multifaceted description of the policy context and problem (Forester, 1993; 
Hamilton, 1991, as cited in Young, 1999, p. 679). In addition, Young (1999) pointed out 
that using more than one theoretical approach may help us to “better understand the 
relationships among policy discourse, planning, implementation, and practice, the 




dynamics of policy contexts; and the impact of policy and practice on individuals” (p. 
679).  
This was particularly noteworthy for this study. In order to achieve the goals of 
the study, motivational factors associated with compliance and resistance to evaluation 
and the distribution of rewards served as the basis for this study and led me to use three 
theoretical perspectives approaches. I used Principal-agent theory to explain how 
governments policy makers design compensation schemes to improve teacher quality and 
foster student achievement. Then, I used Procedural Justice Theory to analyze teachers’ 
reactions of compliance and resistance to the new policy. Finally, I used Herzberg’s Two 
Factor Theory to identify the factors that contribute to teacher’ motivation and their effect 
on their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. These analytical approaches related to the 
economic approach, organizational behavior and motivational theory (see Figure 2) 
which influenced  my study in three different ways: (1) these theories serve as the basis 
for the design of the survey; (2) to organize the quantitative and qualitative data related to 
the survey and interview responses of teachers, during the data analysis phase; (3) to 
discuss research findings and interpret teachers’ reactions, considering the complexities 
of the context and the multi-layered nature of both the low level of teacher compliance 
and the high level of resistance to evaluation and merit pay plans. 
 





Figure 2. Conceptual framework 
Principal-Agent (PAT). As an economic theory, PAT is concerned with how 
principals, such as employers, design compensation structures to get agents, such as 
employees, to work in the principals’ interest (Ross, 1973; World Bank, 2003). The 
process of providing incentives to workers, however, encompasses monitoring, 
evaluation, and control of workers who must demonstrate high levels of performance 
(Prendergast, 1999). Starting in the mid to late 1970s and 1980s, the view of incentives 
schemes emerged in management thinking that the primary role of corporate leadership 
was to maximize the interests of shareholders. In time, this rational view of fostering 
employee’s motivation still enjoys considerable currency in policy design (World Bank, 
2003). According to Umansky (as cited in Vegas, 2005), as principals’ and agents’ 
interests are frequently not aligned, “employers want high employee productivity and 
efficiency while employees want high compensation for little effort” (p. 22). One of the 
PAT’s principles states that employers design schemes to motivate their employees to 




behave in certain ways that employers believe will result in high productivity and 
efficiency. To what extent agents will alter their behaviors rely on the agent’s degree of 
risk aversion, the assessment of the risk involved, and the desirability of the reward or 
aversion to the sanction (Baker, 2002; Prendergast, 1999).  
Proponents of high-stakes testing argue that the stronger incentives associated 
with tangible, quantitative measures of performance will lead teachers and students to 
work harder. Opponents have worried that the emphasis on standardized tests will lead 
teachers to “teach to the test,” or cut out subjects such as social sciences to emphasize 
reading and mathematics. Given the importance of teacher quality for student learning, 
policy makers devote a great deal of attention to incentive schemes that can potentially 
increase the quality distribution of teachers. The main question of interest is whether 
monetary incentives for teachers lead to a more qualified teaching workforce. In the 
United States, as with many issues in education, the intensity of the debate over 
performance-based pay reflects the relative lack of clear evidence about its effects. One 
of the NCLB’s strategies for capacity building, for example, is to provide teachers with 
incentives to improve their performance, knowledge, or skills. The incentive strategy 
requires the design and implementation of alternative teacher compensation systems that 
depart from the single salary schedule. Most of these new or proposed plans link pay to 
combinations of teacher performance, acquisition of new knowledge and skills, and 
student test score gains (Heneman, Milanowski, Kimball, & Odden, 2006). 
Performance-pay advocates also claim that merit pay or performance pay based 
on students’ scores is the most direct way to measure teacher performance (Toch & 




Rothman, 2008; Rothman, 2009). Harris (2011) notes that value-added measures of 
school and teacher performance have many potentially positive uses, especially when 
combined with other measures that capture a broader range of educational goals and 
important instructional practices. Research also has found that merit may also increase 
teacher retention, particularly more experience teachers ( Jones, 2011). However, 
opponents such as Hinchey (2010) contends that, as the sole measure of teacher 
effectiveness, students’ test scores are being used due to their convenience: statistical 
analysis is objective, simple, and unreliable. The author questions –do school districts 
have the data needed to set up fair measurement and evaluation systems for performance-
based teacher payment. Given the large amount of funds dedicated to merit pay 
policymakers and researchers understandably want to know whether these programs 
improve student academic performance. 
Principal-Agent Theory vs. Intrinsic Motivation. Since its inception, PAT has 
been highly criticized for its excessive reliance on financial incentives. Rooted in 
economic theory, PAT states that bonuses and stock options often improve performance. 
Research studies made by Gibbons (1997) and Lazear (2000) showed that there is a 
wealth of evidence that incentives can motivate higher levels of performance and 
productivity. Instead, opponents say, employers should pay greater attention to agents’ 
intrinsic motivation (Bénabou & Tirole, 2000, 2003; Holmstrom & Milgron, 1991; Kohn, 
1993). Contrary to the different perspectives posited by Principal-agent theory (PAT), 
social psychology researchers argued that intrinsic motivation is pivotal for work effort, 
and that extrinsic factors (such as performance regulation and economic incentives), 




under particular conditions, can undermine intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene, & 
Nisbett, 1978; Deci, 1975; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Kruglanski, 1978). More 
research may be needed to tease out the implications of these findings for influencing 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation by financial incentives. A study of paramount 
importance was carried out by Rynes, Gerhart, and Minette (2004).  
In “The Importance of Pay in Employee Motivation: Discrepancies Between 
What People Say and What They Do” (2004), using major studies that attempted to 
determine the importance of pay to employees, relative to other potential motivators, the 
authors showed that pay is much more important in people’s actual choices and behaviors 
and that people tended to over-report the importance of pay in employee surveys. Major 
studies in Rynes’ et al. study found that, on average, individual financial incentives 
increase employee performance and productivity by 42% to 49%. This result showed 
strong evidence that pay was a powerful motivator of performance. But these gains come 
at a cost. One unintended consequence posited by Bénabou and Tirole (2003) is that 
extrinsic incentives damage individuals’ perception of their own capabilities. Further 
extrinsic rewards undermine work interests (Kohn, 1993) and harm the congenial 
atmosphere of teachers’ work (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Vegas and Umansky (2005) 
posited that weaknesses in measurement and evaluation make incentives particularly 
vulnerable to employee manipulation. Firestone (1991) suggested that job enlargement is 
more likely than merit pay to improve teacher motivation. It also enriches teaching 
practice while merit pay standardized it. 




Research that confirms these findings has been conducted by Amabile, Goldfarb, 
and Brackfield (1990) and McGrawn (1978) who showed that contingent, tangible 
rewards and other extrinsic factors such as competition and evaluations can be 
detrimental to outcomes such as creativity, cognitive, flexibility, and problem solving 
which have been found to be associated with intrinsic motivation. McGraw and 
McCullers (1979) found monetary rewards to decrease cognitive flexibility in problem 
solving, and Erez, Gopher and Arzi (1990) showed that monetary rewards decreased 
performance on a complex task with difficult goals. When financial rewards are based on 
performance, managers and employees doing the same jobs receive different levels of 
compensation. Numerous studies have shown that people judge the fairness of their pay 
not in absolute terms, but rather in terms of how it compares with the pay earned by 
peers. As a result, pay inequality can lead to frustration, jealousy, envy, disappointment 
and resentment. The bottom line is that financial incentives, by definition, create 
inequalities in pay that often undermine performance, collaboration and retention.  
Numerous studies spearheaded by University of Rochester psychologists Edward 
Deci and Richard Ryan (2000) have shown that rewards often undermine our intrinsic 
motivation to work on interesting, challenging tasks, especially when they are announced 
in advance or delivered in a controlling manner. This means that instead of monetary 
incentives, policymakers should design teacher career structures that provide 
opportunities to make choices, develop skills, do work that matters, and build meaningful 
interpersonal connections. However, using rewards such as financial incentives to 
maximize intrinsic motivation may characterizes teachers’ behavior as the strategic 




pursuit of self-interests. According to this theory, if teachers receive more compensation 
or harder sanctions will provide greater work effort. Teachers weigh the costs of 
complying certain mandated regulations against the rewards associated with their 
attainment. Under this approach, government authorities would induce teachers through 
monetary incentives or regulation in the form of regulatory competency tests to maximize 
their interests by striking an advantageous balance between rewards and performance.  
The Influence of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Teacher Motivation. Before 
discussing the basic idea that rewards, and in particular monetary rewards, will impact on 
teacher motivation, it is important to consider that in countries which the lowest salaries 
for teachers, the fulfillment of teacher basic and psychological needs should be discussed 
at the outset. Humanistic and social psychological approaches focus on these needs 
frequently mentioned as “lower-order needs.” Extensive research has found that money is 
an important motivator for most people. According to Trank, Rynes, and Bretz (2002), 
status- and accomplishment-based signals are inextricably linked to relative pay. Rynes et 
al. (2004) suggested that pay is fundamental in obtaining virtually any level of the highest 
level of the motivational hierarchies, including social esteem and self-actualization of 
Maslow’s theory.  
More satisfactory explanations for the combined effects of extrinsic and intrinsic 
factors on teachers’ motivation, have been given by social psychology researchers such 
as Ryan and Deci (2000), and Frey and Jegen (2001) who presented new perspectives for 
facilitating versus undermining intrinsic motivation. Ryan and Deci (2000) have 
established clear differences between intrinsically motivated behaviors, and extrinsically 




motivated behaviors. They found that extrinsic rewards, such as money, had a negative 
effect on intrinsic motivation. However, when positive feedback and verbal 
reinforcement were used tended to have positive effect on intrinsic motivation. Frey and 
Jegen (2001) suggested that external intervention via monetary incentives or sanctions 
may undermine and under different identifiable conditions strengthen intrinsic 
motivation. If motivation comes from internal tendencies and can direct and motivate 
behavior with or without the presence of financial rewards or constraints in teachers’ 
decisions for compliance or resistant will be examined with more detail in this section. 
Before reviewing, important psychological theories, it is important to establish 
differences between the types of motivation: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic 
motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the “involves people doing an activity because they 
find it interesting and derive spontaneous satisfaction from the activity itself ” (Gagne & 
Deci, 2005, p. 331). Intrinsic motivation is the motivation to behave or act in one’s own 
interests or simply for the enjoyment of the activity itself (Hennessey & Amabile, 2005).  
Extrinsic motivation is a “construct that pertains whenever an activity is done in order to 
attain some separable outcomes” (Ryan, & Deci, 2000, p. 60). Before discussing the basic 
idea that rewards, and in particular monetary rewards, will impact on teacher motivation, 
it is important to consider that in countries which the lowest salaries for teachers, the 
fulfillment of teacher basic and psychological needs should be discussed at the outset. 
Humanistic and social psychological approaches focus on these needs frequently 
mentioned as “lower-order needs.” According to Trank, Rynes and Bretz (2002), status- 
and accomplishment-based signals are inextricably linked to relative pay. The 




psychological functional differences between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and how 
they interact and influenced each other in a continuum is informed by self-determination 
theory. 
Organizational Justice Theory. Organizational justice refers to the study of  
individuals’ perceptions of fairness in organizations. The extent to which employees 
perceive workplace procedures, interactions and outcomes as fair in nature (Baldwin, 
2006; Greenberg, 1990; Lawrence, 2005; Poole, 2007). Greenberg (1987) and Tornblom 
(1990) differentiated between two types of organizational justice: distributive and 
procedural. Distributive justice concerns the “individuals’ beliefs that they receive fair 
amounts of value work-related outcomes, such as pay and recognition” (Tornblom, 1990, 
p. 44). Fairness and equity in evaluation procedures, standards, and criteria that determine 
these work-related outcomes concerns the scope of procedural justice. Procedural justice 
research has resulted in overwhelming evidence that decision control (or the authority to 
make a decision) is an important contributor to perceptions of justice. In order to form 
judgments of procedural justice, Greenberg and Colquitt (2005) defined the following 
criterion: (1) voice in the making of decisions; (2) consistency in applying rules; (3) 
accuracy in the use of information; (4) opportunity to be heard; and (5) safeguards against 
bias. As teachers usually do not have a voice in the evaluation policy design, they are less 
likely to accept unfavorable outcomes as the results of unfair practices.  
Procedural Justice. Evaluation procedures’ outcomes are affected by individuals’ 
perceptions of organizational justice as a whole or by different factors thereof. 
Commonly cited outcomes affected by organizational justice include trust, performance, 




job satisfaction, organizational commitment, organizational citizenship behaviors, 
counterproductive work behaviors, absenteeism, turnover, and emotional exhaustion. The 
relationship between trust and organizational justice perceptions is based on reciprocity. 
Trust in the organization is built from the employee’s belief that since current 
organizational decisions are fair, future organizational decisions will be fair. The 
continuance of employee trust in the organization and the organization continuing to meet 
the employee’s expectations of fairness creates the reciprocal relationship between trust 
and organizational justice (DeConick, 2010). Research has found that procedural justice 
is the strongest predictor of organizational trust (Hubbell & Chory-Assad, 2005; Cohen-
Charash & Spector, 2001). A positive relationship between an employee and supervisor 
can lead to trust in the organization (Karriker & Williams, 2009).  
In “Teacher Evaluation and Merit Pay: Legal Considerations, Practical Concerns” 
Dessander (2000) examined critical legal considerations and concerns that exist 
throughout the implementation of a merit pay evaluation process. Dessander pointed to 
the inherent complexity of designing system that are valid and reliable in terms of being 
able to consistently identify and reward the most effective teachers; how best to measure 
performance and over what time period, how to link pay with performance levels; and the 
size of the rewards and how to eliminate preferential treatment from the performance 
appraisal systems. Springer (2007) argued that some of these evaluation problems have 
been diminished by increased availability of longitudinal student-level test score data and 
by sophisticated value-added statistical methodologies. Teachers’ reactions to evaluation 
in Peru continue to be one of the most critical issue that affects teacher quality reforms 




for the past and current government. The inclusion of merit pay plans into teacher 
evaluation systems, according to SUTEP (2012), has been seen as unfair and divisive, 
promoting competition that is counterproductive to a collaborative atmosphere and 
having a demoralizing effect on non-recipients. Due process procedures are the bricks for 
building a solid foundation of trust and fair play between the evaluator and the evaluated. 
Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory. Herzberg (1966) theorized that there were two 
sets of factors that affected satisfaction and job performance. Herzberg’s factors were a 
set of motivators and a set of hygiene factors. Herzberg argued that both set of factors 
were important, but the attention to the hygiene factors was important to prevent job 
dissatisfaction and attention to the motivators was important to increase job performance. 
Herzberg (1996) defined human motivation as a bipolar phenomenon. Figure 3 shows 
that, according to Herzberg, the motivation factors are the six job content factors that 
include achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, advancement, and 
possibility of growth. Hygiene factors are the job context’ factors, which include 
company policy, supervision, relation with supervision, work conditions, relationship 
with peers, salary, personal life, relationship with subordinates, status, and job security 
(Ruthankoon & Ogunlana, 2003).  
Basically the theory differentiates the factors between intrinsic motivators and 
extrinsic motivators. The intrinsic motivators, known as the job content factors, define 
things that the people actually do in their work; their responsibility and achievements. 
These factors are the ones that can contribute a great deal to the level of job satisfaction 
an employee feels at work. The job contexts factors, on the other hand, are the extrinsic 




factors that someone as an employee does not have much control over; they relate more 
to the environment in which people work than the nature of the work itself (Schermerhon, 
2003). Herzberg identified these factors as the sources for job dissatisfaction. Herzberg 
believed the factors causing satisfaction are different from those causing dissatisfaction, 
and the two feelings cannot simply be treated as opposites of one another. Intrinsic 







   
 
              Figure 3 . Herberz’g two-factor theory of motivation 
 
The Herzberg two-factor theory has been implemented in school systems in a 
variety of ways and seems to be well supported (Owens, 1998). In the school context, 
hygiene factors are job related factors that cannot, in themselves, motivate a worker; they 
can only prevent dissatisfaction (Daresh, 2001). Hygiene factors are generally described 
as tangible, extrinsic elements such as wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions. 
For teachers, this also includes supervision, merit pay and recognition of performance 
(Garrett, 1999; Pearson & Moomaw, 2005). Compensation has little association with 
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satisfaction (National Center for Education Statistics, 1996). Overall, intrinsic rewards 
are much powerful for motivating teachers than are extrinsic rewards (Pearson & 
Moomaw, 2005). Intrinsic rewards, according to Herzberg, are more satisfying and 
motivating. More recent research (Frank, Bennet, & Kanfer, 2002; Sinclair, 2008) 
suggests that teacher intrinsic motivation and satisfaction is related to intrinsic concepts 
such student achievement, helping students to modify their attitudes and behavior, 
positive relationships with others, self-growth, mastery of professional skills, and feeling 
part of a collegial, supportive environment, and professional ethics.  
The major sources of dissatisfaction are outside of the task of teaching children 
and working with other staff. These “dissatisfiers” are out of the control of teachers and 
schools, and are found within the wider domain of society, governments, and the 
employing body. The sources of dissatisfactions include the public poor opinion of the 
work of teachers, and their negative image in the media. Perie and Baker (1997) used the 
1993-1994 Schools and Staffing Survey and discovered that, overall, secondary teachers 
as less satisfied than elementary school teachers. These authors also found that young 
teachers are more likely to be categorized as having high levels of satisfaction than older 
teachers.  
Overall, workplace conditions relate more strongly with satisfaction. These 
include parental support, student behavior, principal interaction, staff recognition, teacher 
participation in school decision-making, influence over school policy, and control in the 
classroom (National Center for Education Statistics, 1996; Perie & Baker, 1997; 
Whiteford et al., 1990). Perie and Baker identified only a weak relationship with teacher 




satisfaction and salary and benefits. According to Leithwood and McAdie (2007), salaries 
that are noticeably lower than those in other nearby districts have a particularly 
significant impact on teachers’ feelings. 
Professional Development and Professional Recognition. 
Research into professional development and its contribution to teacher quality has 
come to prominence in recent years (UNESCO, 2007; Phillips, 2008). Professional 
development encompasses all formal and informal learning, which enables teachers to 
improve their own practice (Ganser, 2000; Fielding & Schalock, 1985). Under this 
approach, professional development is viewed from a range of systematic activities to 
prepare teachers for their jobs, including initial training, induction courses, in-service 
training, and continuous development. This perspective is new to teaching. For years, the 
only form of professional development available for teachers in Latin America was 
teacher training or in-service training, usually consisting of workshops or short-term 
courses that would offer teachers new information on a particular area of the curriculum, 
but usually was unrelated to the teachers’ work in the classroom. Ingvarson (1998) 
compared the traditional system of professional development, “in-service training” and 
the “standard-based system.” In “in-service training” the government has control and 
establishes goals. Actors can be universities, employers or consultants, and the models 
used are usually short-term courses or workshops. In the standards-based system, the 
professional body of teachers has the control when deciding on goals and helping to 
implement the models based on real needs identified by the teachers in their daily 
activities. In contrast to the standardized system and in-service training, some proponents 




have advocated locally developed measures to professional development with the 
potential to more accurately representing the professional needs of teachers (Birman, 
Desimore, Porter, & Garet, 2000). 
Teacher training in Latin America is “thought to compensate for whatever they 
lack in terms of skills, motivation, or knowledge; and training is treated separately from 
the larger context of the classroom, school, community, teacher education programs, and 
career regulations” (Navarro & Verdisco, 2000, p. 3). Some of the problems in the 
teacher training found in Navarro & Verdisco’s report include weaknesses in pedagogic 
methods used to teach teachers, failures in the content of training, failures in the impact 
of training, and failures in integrating teacher training into the larger context of education 
policy and institutions. Alongside the limited opportunities for professional development, 
there is also a lack of opportunities for teachers to gain professional recognition. Some 
progress in this field has been made by Lawrence Ingvarson in “The Power of 
Professional Recognition” (1999), which showed how recognition can empower teachers 
and widen their involvement in professional leadership activities. The introduction of a 
national certification system is a highly relevant strategy for tackling the crisis in the 
teaching profession. 
Teacher Unions and Meritocracy 
Teacher unions in Latin America have been playing a prominent role in 
determining the conditions under which teachers’ careers are regulated (Loyo, 2001; 
Palamidessi & Legarralde, 2006; Vaillant & Rossel, 2006). Teacher unions present 
significant differences in their capacity to negotiate teacher policy with national 




governments (Centro de Estudios en Políticas Públicas, 2008; Eberts & Stone, 1987; 
Milkman, 1997). Chile and Mexico, for example, have strong, autonomous and politically 
commitment teacher unions to engage in social dialogue based on respect for the freedom 
of association principle, and on creating opportunities to build a national consensus. 
Teacher unions in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Peru are 
regarded as strong, autonomous, and having the technical capacity for social change but 
lack the political conditions to build consensus. Unions in these countries generally 
oppose teacher reforms resorting to confrontation and collective bargaining as the main 
tool for social changes.  
In Honduras and El Salvador, teacher unions are weak or scattered with low 
technical capacity to conduct negotiation; scarce or no political will and commitment for 
social change; restricted freedom of association; limited conditions for consensus 
building; and little or no connection between unions, ministries, and the public opinion 
(Palamidessi & Legarralde, 2006). Using a psychological approach to understand the 
causes of resistance to change, Dent (1993) made a useful comparison of five current 
management books (Aldag & Stearns, 1991; Dubrin & Ireland, 1993; Griffin, 1993; 
Kreitner, 1992; Schermerhorn, 1989). The cited authors found that misunderstanding, 
lack of trust, threat to job status, work group breakup, fear of poor outcome, and 
uncertainty as the most causes of resistance. The same causes may be attributed to the 
resistance of teachers to quality reforms in Latin America. In Peru government-teacher 
union conflicts are frequent and pervasive (Diaz, 2003; Murrugarra, 2003; Rivero & 
Vexler, 2012). Two of the current polemical debates between these two parties concern 




opposition to use of standardized testing to evaluate teachers and the inclusion of merit 
pay plans into the career ladders (Cuenca & Stojnic, 2008).  
 Some of the pressing challenges to governments is the unions’ opposition to new 
reforms because of a lack of consultation before the reforms, unproven methods of 
teacher evaluation and changes in regulatory norms that may revert conditions previously 
obtained through union mediation or strengthened rights in exchange for wage cuts, 
without any offers for salary recovery; and disagreement over the introduction of 
performance evaluation systems perceived as control mechanisms which, in addition to 
establishing rewards and penalties, undermine unionism’s social basis and hamper the 
aggregate demand for common interests. Further, teachers continue to reject the 
implementation of teacher evaluation systems based on regulatory competency exams 
(Benavides et al., 2007).  
 In addition, the discretion of the governments over teacher career regulations 
along with the political volatility in the region has contributed to the politicization of 
teacher quality reform. Long periods of discussion and negotiation between national 
governments and the teachers’ unions are being held to try to devise what kind of teacher 
evaluation system should be implemented. The debate surrounding teachers’ unions and 
the Peruvian government centers on the issue of teachers’ and students’ rights. On the 
one hand, Government contends that it is the state’s responsibility to guarantee teaching 
of quality to the students and, on the other, SUTEP argues that teacher tenure is a teacher 
rights that cannot be violated (Cuenca & Stojnic, 2008).  
Conclusion 




Teacher evaluation has recently come under increasing debate. Governments in 
Latin America assign most teachers the minimum score, provide minimal feedback for 
improvement, and have little connection with teacher career ladders. Educational policy 
analysts argue that the nature of the problem of teachers’ resistance to evaluation linked 
to merit pay plans can be better understood using Principal-agent theory, a strong 
framework for analyzing institutional arrangements governing the work of teachers. P-A 
theory proposes factors that determine whether or not paying teachers in relation to 
measures of performance improves teacher productivity. 
It is widely acknowledged that major conflicts around educational sector reforms 
arise due to perceived changes in payment mechanisms, such as those associated with 
performance as a way to increase competition among union members, hindering internal 
solidarity while increasing the probability of lay-offs and uncertainty about teachers’ 
income. In order to understand the motivational factors associated with compliance and 
resistance to evaluation and the distribution of rewards, I used Principal-agent Theory 
Procedural Justice Theory, and Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory.  
  





Teacher evaluation systems based on regulatory competency exams and merit pay 
plans for teachers are increasing in popularity throughout Latin America. The purpose of 
this study is to examine the causes of teachers’ resistance or compliance to a new law. As 
teachers’ resistance to new policy comes mostly from teachers for whom the policy has 
the greatest impact, and particularly from teachers who see the policy as threatening their 
embedded assumptions about education, power, culture, and society, I will use a mixed-
methods sequential explanatory approach to uncover how the new policy seriously 
interfere with organizational processes (Corey, 1995). I will combine two sources of data 
and mix methodology to explore teachers’ reactions to evaluation and factors associated 
to compliance and resistance based on merit pay in Trujillo, Peru. This study’s 
methodological approach combines quantitative research paradigms (postpositivist) and a 
qualitative approach (interpretative).  
Because the complexity of teachers’ resistance and compliance to a new law can 
also be determined by the social, ideological, and political conditions of contexts in 
which teachers work, the use of an integrated design was of paramount importance. This 
section includes: (a) research design and approach, (b) data sources and instruments; (c) 
setting, population, and sample; and (c) data collection and analysis for the quantitative 
and qualitative study. In addition, my role as the researcher in data collection analysis, 
and the measures taken for the protection of participants’ rights, are summarized. 
Mixed Method Study 
The purpose of this mixed methods study was to collect, analyze, and mix 
quantitative and qualitative data in the exploration of the causes and factors influencing 




teachers’ compliance and resistance to a new policy. According to Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2010), mixed methods designs “are those that include at least one quantitative 
method (designed to collect numbers) and one qualitative method (designed to collect 
words), where neither type of method is inherently linked to any particular inquiry 
paradigm” (p. 2). In this study the priority is given to the qualitative aspects of the study. 
The mixed-methods sequential explanatory design implies collecting and analyzing 
quantitative and then qualitative data in two consecutive phases within one study. The 
rationale of deciding on the priority or weight given to the quantitative and qualitative 
data collection and analysis in the study, the sequence of the data collection and analysis, 
and how the quantitative and qualitative data were connected and integrated in the results 
were discussed in the next section.  
Mixed-methods, as a methodology for conducting research, combines elements of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches for the broad purposes of breadth and 
depth of understanding and corroboration (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). 
Mixed methods involve “collecting, analyzing, and mixing) quantitative and qualitative 
research in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understanding 
of research problems than either approach alone” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 5). 
This kind of methodology provides a better understanding of a research problem or issue 
than either research approach alone. As many researchers question what philosophical 
paradigm is the best foundation for mixed methods (Hanson, Creswell, Plano Clark, 




Petska, & Creswell, 2005), a growing body of research has acknowledged that the 
philosophical underpinning guiding the mixed-methods approach is pragmatism.  
According to Tasahkkori and Teddlie (1998), the deconstructive nature 
(debunking of metaphysical concepts such as truth) of pragmatic philosophy gives a 
mixed methods researcher the opportunity to integrate different theoretical perspectives 
when interpreting data. Pragmatism represents a practical and applied research 
philosophy that allows a researcher to use a mixed design to the fullest, and to use the 
results in ways that can bring about positive consequences with the value system of the 
researcher (Tashakkori & Teddli, 1998). Qualitative research is by definition exploratory, 
and it is used when we don’t know what to expect, to define the problem or develop an 
approach to the problem. It’s also used to go deeper into issues of interest and explore 
nuances related to the problem at hand. Mixed methods research designs are particularly 
well suited to both the generalization of findings as well as the exploration of 
conditionalities of contexts. This practical and nuanced utility has attracted growing 
interest in educational research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
A straightforward sequence of mixed methods research includes: statement of the 
problem, statement of the purpose, formulation of the research questions and hypothesis, 
collection and analysis of the data pertinent to the hypothesis and research questions, and 
then the protocol for reporting the findings, using a written structure that best fits the 
research problem and methods. Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) highlighted five 
major ones that might enhance the evaluation as follows: (1) triangulation tests the 
consistency of findings obtained through different instruments. In case studies, for 




instance, triangulation will increase chances to control, or at least assess, some of the 
threats or multiple causes influencing our results; (2) complementarity clarifies and 
illustrates results from one method with the use of another method. In this study, in- 
depth interviews  added  information to clarify the study under question; (3) definitions of 
subsequent methods or steps in the research process; (4) initiation stimulates new 
research questions or challenges results obtained through one method. In our case, in-
depth interviews with teachers and principals  provided new insights on how the 
evaluation process has been perceived and valued across districts; (5) expansion provided 
richness and detail to the study exploring specific features of each method. In our case, 
integration of procedures mentioned above expanded the breadth of the study and likely 
enlighten the more general debate on teacher accountability, how to evaluate teachers and 
how to improve the teacher preparation programs.  
 Explanatory Sequential Design. Explanatory sequential design “consists of two 
distinct phases: quantitative followed by qualitative” (Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006, 
p. 5). In explanatory sequential design, the researcher starts with the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data, followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data to 
help explain the initial quantitative results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2010). The 
qualitative data are collected and analyzed second in the sequence and help explain, or 
elaborate on, the quantitative results obtained in the first phase. The rationale of this 
approach is that the quantitative data and their subsequent analysis provide a general 
understanding of the research problem. 
 







Figure 4. The explanatory sequential design 
 The qualitative data and their analysis then refine and explain those statistical 
results by exploring participants’ views in more depth (Rossman & Wilson, 1985; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 2002; Creswell, 2005). As the purpose of the 
present study is to identify factors contributing to teachers’ decisions to take regulatory 
competency exams and the causes of teachers’ resistance to evaluation, for the 
quantitative phase of the study, 58 teachers who took the formal examinations and 375 
teachers who resisted the evaluation process were surveyed face-to-face. Then the 
qualitative phase of the study involved following up with 20 purposefully selected 
individuals, 10 for each group (compliant and resistant) to explore the circumstances and 
conditions in which the new teacher evaluation reform is being implemented, and to what 
extent the intended goals of the reform are being achieved. 
The quantitative phase of the study was composed of two parts: First, descriptive 
statistics was used to answer research questions about teachers’ perceptions regarding the 
purpose, contents, and the reliability of teacher evaluation tests as a means to evaluate 
teacher quality and the factors that contributed to teachers’ compliance to the new 
evaluation process. Second, this quantitative phase was oriented to determine statistically 
significant differences in the importance assigned to certain variables (financial 















implementation) between less experienced (under 20 years of experience) and more 
experienced teachers (over 20 years of experience). In the second, qualitative, phase, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews (Seidman, 1998; Spradley, 1980) and the selected 
case studies from each distinct group (compliant and resistant teachers) were explored, in 
depth, the results from the statistical tests. In this phase, the research questions addressed 
several internal and external factors contributing to teacher compliance and resistance to 
evaluation, found in the literature and in the quantitative phase of this study. 
  


































Figure 5. Visual model for mixed-methods (Sequential Explanatory Design Procedures) 












Integration of the 
Quantitative and 
Qualitative Results  
Descriptive analysis: Univariate 
descriptive analysis; Frequency 
counts; Summary values for 
frequencies; Pictorial 
representations of distributions. 
 Bivariate descriptive analysis. 
 
Numeric data. 
Frequency counts. Distribution 




Statistical data analysis: 
Explanatory analysis. Inferential 







Purposefully selecting 20 
participants, 10 for each group 
(n1=58 ; n2=375 ) based on 
typical response and maximal 





Case Study: Individual in-depth 
interviews with the selected 
participants; e -mail follow-up 
interviews. 
Text data (interview 
transcripts, documents). 
Coding and thematic analysis. 
Within-case and across-case 
theme development. 
 Cross-thematic analysis. 
 
 
Interpretation and explanation of 
the quantitative and qualitative 
results.  
Visual model of multiple case 
analysis; codes and themes, 
similar and different themes 
and categories; cross-thematic 
matrix. 
 
Side-By-Side Comparison of 
Quantitative and Qualitative 







Future research.  
 




The Role of the Researcher in Mixed Method Design 
The researcher who will conduct this study had been a practitioner of teacher 
training for 10 years for the public school system in Peru. For these 10 years the 
researcher held supervisory and training positions in public schools in the three regional 
areas of the country: the Coast, the Highlands, and the Jungle. As a supervisor of 
preschool and primary school teachers, the researcher used qualitative and quantitative 
personal profiles integrated with observations and discussions to assist primary school 
teachers with reflection on their practice. The researcher will consider the following 
philosophical assumptions:  
1.  Hidden personal and institutional sources of resistance to change such as 
teachers’ different ideologies, institutional structures, political will and the 
state’s lack of capacity to forge broader consensus at local, regional, and 
national levels that prevent teachers to be certified under the new law. 
Explanations of participant constructed realities will substantiate any bias 
during the study process. 
2. The researcher used survey instruments that identify belief systems regarding: 
the purpose of the new law; the accuracy of the evaluation instruments, the 
fairness of the process, and bias suppression; factors contributing to teachers’ 
compliance; and causes of resistance to the new law. Participant interviews 
will be conducted to identify belief systems, social contexts and in-service 
settings, and teachers’ –perceptions about the new teacher career law.  




3. Common collection data were not generalized to the population of in-service 
primary teachers, but it can explain why the subjects differed on the key 
variables. Data collected from the selected interviews were not generalized.  
4. Due to the multifaceted nature of this research the researcher used abduction 
(uncovering and relying on the best set of explanations for interpreting results) 
as the primary logic of inquiry. Results from the survey were deductively 
analyzed and results from the interviews were analyzed inductively. 
Abduction was used to interpret the “mixing” of the quantitative and 
quantitative results. The data collection methods used in the qualitative 
research were dyads, in-depth interviews, and individual surveys. Quantitative 
research is conclusive in its purpose as it tries to quantify the problem and 
understand how prevalent its prevalence by looking for projectable results to a 
larger population. 
Unit of Analysis  
The primary unit of analysis was the responses, insights, and perspectives of the 
teachers who participated in the study.  
The study focused on the following units of analysis: 
(1) Teachers’ reactions and responses 
Compiled data and categorized responses were used to compare individual 
teachers’ responses across the data collecting setting. Data sources included 
individual surveys, document analysis, interviews, and cases studies. 
(2) Structures that cause teacher resistance 




Data were analyzed to identify long-term reactions and discover the meaning 
teachers assigned to their reactions to change. This analysis reflected teacher 
reactions about the structure of the evaluation system and the new teacher career. 
The examination of documents was especially important to this study in order to 
investigate patterns and trends from the past conflicts between the Peruvian 
government and teachers.  
Research Procedures 
Two data analysis approaches were used: quantitative and qualitative. Statistical 
treatment of data from the research for this study involved the use of descriptive, 
explanatory and inferential analysis for quantitative reporting and a narrative description 
of the qualitative open-ended questions.   
Quantitative Instrumentation. The goal of the quantitative phase was to identify 
teachers’ general perceptions about a new evaluation process and the factors associated 
with teachers’ compliance or resistance to the new law. In order to reach these goals, I 
used the Teacher Individual Survey.  
Teacher Individual Survey. The teacher survey consisted of 30 statements 
covering three main topics areas: general views about the evaluation process, factors that 
influenced teachers’ compliance to evaluation, and causes or reasons of teachers’ 
resistance to evaluation. Part I of the survey consisted of 10 items (Items 1 through 10) 
based on the Milanowski and Heneman’s (2001) and Heneman and Milanowski’s (2003) 
studies, in which teachers rate their performance, both through interviews and survey-
based reactions of teachers to standard-based testing. Part II and III of the Survey 




consisted of 20 items (Items 11 through 30). They were based on the regulations of the 
CPM available at Peru’s Ministry of Education web site. It also includes a thorough 
review of the literature on teachers’ reactions to performance appraisal. 
 Research Question 1. What are the teachers’ perceptions and beliefs about the 
evaluation process as part of the new career structure for teachers in Peru? 
To answer Question 1, I used the first ten items (items 1 through 10) of The Teacher 
Evaluation Individual Survey based on five-point Likert-type scales related to the 
evaluation process. Individual teachers’ perceptions and expectations of the evaluation 
process were explored by items adapted from Milanowski and Heneman (2001) and 
Heneman and Milanowski (2003). Milanowski and Heneman’s study survey instrument 
examined if teachers understood the evaluation process, accepted the evaluation 
procedure, perceived the evaluation process as fair, perceived evaluators in a satisfactory 
manner, and if they felt that the evaluation positively impacted their development as 
teachers. The four dimensions of the evaluation system were: characteristics of evaluation 
feedback, perceptions of fairness, and perceptions of evaluator qualifications. The criteria 
used by the authors in the study were procedural justice, distributive justice, utility, 
accuracy, session satisfaction-peer, session satisfaction-administrator, system satisfaction, 
stress, and effort (Heneman & Milanoswki, 2003; Conley, Muncey, & You, 2006).  
This survey was adapted based on information and recurrent topics that were revealed 
in the review of literature. Both groups (resistant and compliant) will be surveyed and 
asked to respond to questions about the teacher evaluation process in general by number 
selection using a Likert scale. The theoretical framework underlying these series of 




questions is Procedural Justice Theory. According this theory, teachers will perceive the 
evaluation procedures as fair if they feel they had a voice or a sense of process control, 
and accept negative evaluation scores when they perceive the process of arriving at the 
decision was fair. 
 Research Question 2. What factors have had the greatest influence on teachers’ 
compliance with the Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial ?  
To answer Q2, I used Section II (items 21 through 30) of the Teacher Evaluation 
Survey whose core items based on five-point Likert-style scales are intended to identify 
teachers’ main factors contributing to teachers’ decisions to participate in the process of 
evaluation as part of the new teacher career law in Peru. The theoretical framework for 
these items was on Self-Determination Theory and Herzberg’ Two-factor Theory. 
Specifically, within the Herzberg’s Two-factor Theory, these questions were based on the 
following, factors: recognition, seniority, feedback and support, payment, and 
advancement.  
Research Question 3. Of those teachers who are resisting evaluation, what are the 
most compelling reasons for those with more than 20 years of experience and those with 
less than 20 years of experience for such resistant behavior? 
(3.1) Is there a significant difference in the importance of financial incentives based 
on teachers’ competency exam scores related to their levels of experience? 
(3.2) Is there a significant difference between the two groups in the importance of a 
reduction in teachers’ benefits and rights? 




(3.3) Is there a significant difference in the importance of ending teacher tenure as a 
cause of resistance?  
(3.4) Is there a significant difference in the perceived importance of the financial 
costs of the law implementation and is it sustainable?  
To answer Question 3, I used Section III (items 21 through 30) of the New 
Teacher Career Individual Survey which core items are based on six-point Likert-type 
scales. Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory served as the theoretical frame for these items. 
These variables are as follows: (1) salaries and fringe benefits; (2) professional 
advancement; (3) level of personal/ professional recognition; (4) teacher tenure; and 
(5) general working conditions (hours, class size, workload, etc.). The scale range of 
item on this Likert-type scale was 1-6 (1= not very important to 6=very important).  





21 Salary increased based on teachers’ score data based on competency exam 
scores. 
25 Teachers’ tests lack of validity and reliability. 
27 Teachers test scores’ don’t reflect teachers’ performance in the classroom. 
29 Teacher financial incentives undermine teachers’ collegial atmosphere and  
teachers’ union membership. 
 
Benefits and Rights 
 
Items  
22 Ending teachers’ rights and benefits (bonuses) and tenure-like job protections. 
28 The law was signed without teachers’ consultation and negotiation. 
 







24 Teachers taking competence exams every three years. 
26 Teachers failing the exam three times will be dismissed. 
 
Financial Cost of the Law Implementation 
 
Items  
23 The financial costs of the law implementation and its sustainability in the 
long-term. 
30 Principals, existing teachers, and parents will have something to say in teachers’  
hiring and promotion. 
 
This section used the t-test to report the responses of 375 public school teachers in 
the city of Trujillo.  
t-Test. The research hypotheses were not stated as directional or non-directional, 
but in null form. That is, the prediction is that there are no statistically significant 
differences between the means of the groups. The null hypothesis was evaluated via a 
two-tailed t-test. The null hypothesis was: 
H0: Mean1 – Mean2 
H0: Mean1 – Mean2 = 0 
The alternative hypothesis was nondirectional and predicted that there would be a 
difference between the two means, but the direction of the outcome was not specified.  
H1: Mean1  ≠  Mean2 




In order to calculate the t test value, the mean for each group, according to the 
established variables (financial incentives, teacher rights and benefits and rights, teacher 
tenure, and the financial cost of law implementation), was obtained. 
 Qualitative Instrumentation.  As a follow-up to statistical inquiry, this study 
presented instances where statistical enquiries present findings that need further 
explanations and more detail about the phenomena is needed. According to Ritchie and 
Lewis (2009), qualitative research may be used as a follow-up to a survey to provide a 
greater understanding of the factors underlying a problem. Therefore, to answer the 
research questions Q4 and Q5, teacher interviews were used. 
 Teacher Interviews. Because the goal of the second, qualitative, phase of the 
study is to explore and elaborate on the results from the first, quantitative, phase of the 
study, this study used semi-structured interview to understand underlying factors or 
causes to teachers’ compliance or resistance to evaluation. Thus, for teachers who have 
been certified by the new law and teachers who haven’t, open-ended questions in the 
interview protocol explored the role of the four factors (financial incentives based 
teachers’ competency exam scores, teachers’ benefits and rights, teacher tenure, and 
financial costs of the law and its sustainability) in relation to any statistical difference 
found in the first, quantitative, stage of this study.  
The researcher conducted qualitative analysis on the open-ended questions of the 
Teacher Evaluation Individual Survey Instrument in the following sequence: 
 (a) all narrative responses to the open-ended questions were read in order to get 
an overall picture of the responses and their emerging themes, 




 (b) the researcher identified the primary themes that emerged,  
(c) the researcher then reread the data and coded them by theme,  
(d) the data was read again by each theme, 
 (e) themes that have emerged within and among the primary themes were 
identified as cross-categorical themes,  
(f) themes were analyzed as they relate to the research questions,  
(g) the researcher summarized all the qualitative data into like themes and defined 
in a narrative qualitative format.  
In order to answer to Research Question 4 (What are the circumstances and 
conditions under which compliance and resistance to a new law occurs in Peru? ) and 
Research Question 5 (What is the impact of teacher resistance to evaluation in schools? 
How does teacher resistance affect the goals of reform?) I used a multiple case study 
approach (Yin, 2003) to help explain why certain factors, tested in the first phase of this 
study, are significant or not significant predictors of teachers’ compliance or resistance to 
the new law. A case study is an exploration of a bounded system or a case over time 
through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information and 
rich in context (Merrian, 1998). A multiple case study design includes more than one case 
study, and the analysis is performed at two levels: within each case and across the cases 
(Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). The criterion for selecting participants for the case study was 
the maximal variation sampling strategy (Creswell, 2005). For this purpose, I deliberately 
selected 20 participants, 10 for each group (resistant and compliant teachers), from those 




who complete the Individual Teacher Evaluation Survey. As main sources for collecting 
data, I used: 
 (1) in-depth or unstructured interviews;  
(2) researcher’s reflection notes on each participant’s compliance or resistance to 
the new law, recorded immediately after the interview; 
 (3) electronic follow-up interviews with each participant to secure additional 
information on emerging themes; and  
(4) participants’ responses to the open-ended and multiple-choice questions on the 
survey in the first, quantitative phase.  
Integrative Instrumentation. I connected quantitative and qualitative phases 
during the intermediate stage in the research process while selecting the participants for 
the qualitative cases studies from those who responded to the Teacher Evaluation 
Individual Survey. The second connecting point included developing the interview 
questions for the qualitative data collection based on the results of the quantitative phase. 
Survey and questionnaire instrument are the most common forms of data collection in 
descriptive research (Commonwealth of Learning, 2004). The use of a questionnaire is 
time efficient, cost effective and allows for data collection from a much larger 
population. Surveys must do more than merely uncover data; they must interpreted, 
synthetize, and integrate these in data in relation to the problem and point to their 
implications and interrelationships.  
Survey Validity. For content validity, the survey was reviewed by a minimum of 
five practicing public school teachers, current public school administrators, and graduate 




professors at Cesar Vallejo University in Trujillo, Peru for comments and editing before 
field-testing was conducted. The panel of experts was asked to review the final survey to 
determine if, in their expert judgment, the instrument measured what it was intended to 
measure. Only after validity and reliability were determined was the instrument employed 
in the study. Field-testing was conducted in two stages. An initial version of the survey 
was piloted with 10 teachers (5 certified and 5 not certified). The first field test group 
completed a paper copy of the survey (see Appendix A). Needed adjustments were made 
regarding the purpose of the survey and contents of the questions. Teachers at three 
schools in Víctor Larco district participated in the initial paper version of the field test 
and a sample of thirty teachers participated in final testing of the survey. No teachers 
involved in the field-testing were a part of the sample in the final study. In the first 
version of the survey, respondents had the opportunity to give comments and suggestions. 
Responses and comments to the survey were analyzed to whether the instrument achieved 
the intended purpose. Results from the first tests were compared to the second to 
determine whether results were substantially similar.  
Setting, Population and Sample  
 The study took place in the city of Trujillo in northwestern Peru. Trujillo city is 
the capital of the province of Trujillo, and is the third largest city in the country. Trujillo 
is located in the region of La Libertad. The Region of La Libertad
8
 is divided into 12 
provinces: Trujillo, Sánchez Carrión, Ascope, Pacasmayo, Chepén, Pataz, Otuzco, 
Santiago de Chuco, Virú, Julcán, Gran Chimú, and Bolívar (Figure 6).   
                                                          
8
 La Libertad  is the third-most populated region in Peru since the census in 2007, and  the number of 
inhabitants was 1617, 050 in that year representing 5.9 % of the Peruvian population. 










                   
Figure 6. The 




 The educational governing entity for the region of La Libertad is the Gerencia 
Regional de Educación de La Libertad (GRELL). La Libertad has 3,670 schools, of these, 
2,309 fit the criteria to be classified as urban under the 2011 National School Census 
(GRELL, 2012). According to the GRELL (2012), La Libertad had an enrollment of 
approximately 349,948 students (see Table 4). There are approximately 18,225 teachers 
and the majority of them work in urban areas where social and economic conditions are 
better. Teachers who work in rural schools tend to be those who scored lower on their 
teacher certification exams. The Ministry of Education of Peru (MED) provides incentive 
packages primarily to attract teachers to rural areas (MED, 2012). This disparity starts at 










La Libertad’s School Population by Area 
 Total Rural Urban 
        N                      %                    N                      % 
Schools 3670 1361 37.1 2309 62.9 
Students 349498 102107 29.2 247391 70.8 
Teachers 18225 5955 32.7 12270 67.3 
Source: School Census 2011-GRELL 
The Public School System of the City of Trujillo. According to the Institute of 
National Statistics and Informatics (INEI), in 2012, the city of Trujillo had a population 
of 765,495 people and was Peru's third largest city. Trujillo is the most important 
economic center of northern Peru. It is an inland commercial and transport center for the 
surrounding farming areas. The Local Education Management Unit (Unidad de Gestión 
Educativa Local, UGEL) is the only educational entity in the province. The UGEL 
Trujillo consists of 1,524 schools. The district of Trujillo serves approximately 21,000 
students, and it employs 13,553 teachers in 1,524 schools (see Table 5). 
Table 5  
 
Number of Schools, Students, and Teachers in UGEL Trujillo 






Trujillo 1,524 21,5905 13,553 
Source: Gerencia Regional de Educación de la Libertad, 2008.  
 
The sample was selected to answer the research questions and was based on the 
number of teachers working in the province of Trujillo in La Libertad region in Peru. In 
2008, the statistic unit of the Ministry of Education of Peru reported that the 1,524 
schools of Trujillo served a population of 215,905 students. The number of teachers 




working in the province of Trujillo during that year was 13,553 (Gerencia Regional de la 
La Libertad, 2008), the highest in the region of La Libertad. Figure 7 shows the 
geographic categorization of the province of Trujillo based on districts.  
 
Figure 7. Province of Trujillo and Districts 
 
The population of public school teachers was 7,750, which was taken from the 
total number of teachers of the UGEL Trujillo (13,553 both public and private school 
teachers). The target population for this study (7,750) fell into two different identifiable 
groups: 1,860 teachers who participate in the teacher evaluation process, of whom only 
660 reach the minimum score through regulatory competency exams and are therefore 
certified by the new law Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial, and 1,200 teachers who 
failed the exam; and 5,950 teachers who have resisted to take formal examinations since 
2007. Due to the geographical distribution of teachers to the new evaluation process, and 
taking into account that not all the teachers who took regulatory competency exams 
(1,860) passed the test (only 660, this represent 8.51 percent of 7,750 teachers), a 
convenience sampling (Bogdan & Biklin, 1982) was used in this study. 




Four high schools were selected in order to obtain a set of schools that was as 
similar as possible on school demographic characteristics such as socioeconomic status 
indicators. Schools were also selected based on their accessibility to the researcher owing 
to her geographic location and prior professional experience. Four hundred and sixty-four 
teachers were invited to respond to survey questions designed to uncover factors and 
causes associated with teachers’ compliance and resistance to the new law process in 
Peru. The basic structure of population distribution is as follows: veteran teachers are in 
their fifties. Young teachers are in their thirties. The percentage of female schoolteachers 
is 51.2%. The percentage of male teachers is 48.7%. All teachers belong to the Latino 
population and they are healthy in average.  
Table 6  
 
Teachers’ Sample of Schools  
Schools Total of teachers 
School 1 100 
School 2 132 
School 3 130 
School 4 104 
Total 464 
 
The number of years of teaching experience, gender, and levels of education in 
both groups will be also considered for the analysis of the data. For the quantitative phase 
of the study, 58 teachers who took the formal examinations and 375 teachers who resisted 
the evaluation process were surveyed face-to-face. Then the qualitative phase of the study 
involved following up with 20 purposefully selected individuals, 10 for each group 
(compliant and resistant) to explore the circumstances and conditions in which the new 




teacher evaluation reform is being implemented, and to what extent the intended goals of 
the reform are being achieved.  
1) The first school for this study was one of oldest schools in the urban area of 
Trujillo. School 1, a large school serving over 1,500 students (GRELL, 2012), 
was founded in 1,908. School 1 serves male students from the surrounding 
districts of Trujillo, and the parents belong to the working class neighborhood 
of Trujillo. The majority of the students` parents are self-employed or 
dependent employees with a salary of S/. 1,500 to S/. 2,000 ($ 576 to $ 769) 
soles per month.  
2) As a public school, School 2, is similar to School 1 in serving student 
populations with the same demographic characteristics. It is a large school 
serving nearly 2,500 students (GRELL, 2012). It was built in 1912 and was 
remodeled in 2011 by the central government. In contrast to School 1, School 
2 is located in the surrounding area of the City of Trujillo. There were about 
132 teachers.   
3) School 3, the third school in my study, is located within urban Trujillo. It 
serves approximately 1,800 students with 130 classroom teachers. The school 
is currently engaged in a comprehensive teacher professional development 
delivered by the Ministry of Education.  
4) The final school in my study, School 4, is located in a surrounding area of 
Trujillo and serves a 1,400 female student population. Teachers at this school, 




which number is 104, are relatively younger in comparison to the teachers of 
the other schools that composed the sample of this study.  
Limitations  
First, the number of teachers who were certified by the new CPM differed greatly 
from the number of teachers who resisted the new law. The selected groups of teachers 
who belong to different 4 schools did not have the same number of teachers. Though we 
can learn about teachers’ beliefs, perceptions and reasons for compliance or resistance in 
a specific province of the coastal region of Peru, results will not be perfectly applicable to 
the other regions of the country like the Highland area, where the teachers’ union has 
exerted more influence than in the coastal areas. This limitation is critical because the 
specific context in which teachers work is crucial to understanding the particularities and 
commonalities that influence teacher decisions to make life-changing career decisions. 
Second, the teachers’ union (SUTEP) exerts strong influence on teachers’ decisions for 
being certified or not. We cannot assume with a high level of certainty that teacher 
decisions to be certified or not are based on personal beliefs or professional expectations 
about a new law intended to improve the teacher career ladder. Finally, although the 
study, in the quantitative phase, used a convenience sample, teacher participation in this 
study was voluntary. In order to avoid validity concerns extended time and repeated 
interviews in research site were used.  
  





What are the causes of teachers’ resistance to evaluation? The goal of this study 
was (1) to determine the perceptions and beliefs about a new evaluation process; (2) to 
identify factors causing compliance and resistance to the introduction of a system of 
evaluation-based pay plans into the teacher career ladder. Specifically, this chapter 
presents and analyzes the data that were collected in a manner consistent with the 
methodology described in Chapter III. The participants in this study completed a 30-item 
Likert-type individual survey. Section I, the first 10 items of the survey, were based on 
Milanoswki and Heneman’s (2001) and Heneman and Milanoswki’s (2003) studies 
survey. Section II and III of the survey, (items 11 through 30) were developed by the 
principal investigator of this study based on the regulations of the New Teacher Career 
Laws in Peru and on the literature. A field test was performed to assess the legitimacy of 
the entire survey. 
As this chapter will illustrate, the analyses produced mixed results, which suggest 
that Peruvian teachers’ perceptions of evaluation are negative in general. Sixty-eight 
percent of respondents to the survey indicated that the evaluation process did not reach its 
goal— to identify the “best teachers.” However, the same percentage of teachers (68%) 
agreed with the teacher appraisal system as motivating teachers to work hard and 
improve teacher performance. The most influential factors that contributed to general 
compliance are related to the professional recognition of teachers’ qualifications and 
experience. The results show significant variation between resistance shown by more or 
less experienced teachers when measuring how important a given issue is. 




The findings presented in this chapter have brought into focus the complexity of 
factors associated with teachers’ resistance. This chapter is organized as follows: first, 
descriptive results of Question1 and 2. Next, t-test analyses of independent samples to 
determine whether differences between less and more experienced teachers (over-20 and 
under-20 years of experience) are statistically significant. Special focus was placed on 
significant differences in the level of importance assigned to financial incentives based on 
teachers’ competency scores, benefits and rights, ending tenure, and the financial costs of 
the implementation of the law. Statistical significance of each hypothesis was evaluated. 
Next the results of a more focused analysis to further untangle the relationships, using a 
critical value of p < .05. Finally, integrated results of the quantitative and the qualitative 
phases are presented.  
Survey Respondents 
The study identified the perceptions and beliefs of public school teachers 
regarding a new teacher evaluation process which links merit pay plans to a career ladder. 
A convenience sample was used as a method of investigation. Four urban schools were 
selected and participation resulted in 433 completed teacher surveys, a participation rate 
of 92 percent. The instrument contained 30 Likert-items divided in three sections 
designed to respond to each of the research questions. Teachers were asked to express 
their level of agreement with the statements about what motivates their compliance and 
resistance to evaluation and merit pay plans. 
Survey Reliability. The reliability estimates of the survey items were determined 
using two methods: Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and item-to-total correlations. 




Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha. Coefficient alpha measures how well items or 
variables that measure a similar trait or concept correlate with each other, which is 
considered by researchers to provide good reliability in most situations (Ravid, 2011; 
Blaikie, 2003; DeVellis, 2003). To obtain Cronbach’s coefficient alpha estimates as well 
as improve survey reliability, the instrument was divided in three sections: Section I, 
teachers’ perceptions of the evaluation process; Section II, factors contributing to 
teachers’ compliance to the new policy; and Section III, causes of teachers’ resistance to 
evaluation. The coefficient alpha reliabilities for each section of the survey are presented 
in Table 7. The results show high alpha values indicating a high level of consistency in of 
each the three categories.  
Table 7  
 
Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha Test Values  
Number of items Coefficient alpha 
Section I 
10 Items (from 1 to 10) 
0.82 
Section II 
10 Items (from 11 to 20) 
0.88 
Section III 
10 Items (from 21 to 30) 
0.73 
  
Item-to-total correlations. In this procedure, the distribution of responses to each 
item is correlated with the distribution of the total scores of the responses to all 30 items. 
It was assumed that the items all measure the same thing (Blaikie, 2003; Ravid, 2011). 
For the analysis of the items, the criterion used was a correlation coefficient of less than 
0.30 between any item and the total score needs to be examined. Data were processed 
using the statistical package software SPSS 18.  




 Section I of the survey. Table 8 shows that the Section I of the survey are higher 
than 0.30. The first 10 items of the survey correlate with the distribution of the total 
scores of the responses considered valid for the study. Deletion of any of these 10 items 
would not have caused significant variation in the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (0.84). 
Table 8  
 
Reliability and Commonalities of 10 Items (Section I of the Survey) 
Items Mdn if item is 
deleted 
 




Alpha if item 
deleted 
1 24.8056 47.025 .623 .821 
2 23.8356 49.975 .495 .833 
3 24.5972 49.383 .551 .829 
4 24.6065 47.548 .533 .830 
5 24.6088 48.684 .493 .834 
6 23.3380 50.428 .399 .842 
7 24.4954 47.926 .576 .826 
8 24.6690 50.125 .512 .832 
9 24.6111 49.473 .521 .831 
10 23.9329 44.406 .703 .812 
 
 Section II of the survey. Table 10 shows that item correlations for Section II of 
the survey are higher than 0.30. The higher correlations between responses of items 11 to 
20 of the survey compared to the distribution of the total scores of the responses to all 10 
items showed that the items were valid for the study. The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
(0.88) would not have suffered significant variation with removal of any item.   




Table 9  
 
Reliability and Commonalities of 10 Items (Section II of the Survey) 
Items Mdn if item is 
deleted 




Alpha if item 
deleted 
11 33.9138 49.729 .607 .874 
12 33.9828 47.035 .702 .866 
13 34.1034 50.340 .624 .873 
14 33.8793 52.003 .505 .881 
15 33.4310 51.934 .578 .876 
16 33.4310 55.688 .379 .887 
17 34.1207 46.880 .665 .870 
18 33.6207 48.345 .704 .866 
19 33.9655 47.227 .742 .863 
20 33.6724 50.294 .634 .872 
 
Section III of the survey. When looking at the total correlation for the items 21 
through 30 of Section III of the Survey, Table 10 shows a low correlation coefficient 
between item 30 and the total score which suggests two things: (1) item 30 was 
measuring some other variable; or (2) the item itself is unreliable and that could have led 
to different interpretations and, thus, inconsistent responses. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
generally increase as the correlations among test items increase, but in this case the 
average correlation was not affected, so it was decided to keep the item in the survey.  
  




Table 10  
 
Reliability and Commonalities of 10 Items (Section III of the Survey) 
Items Mdn if item is 
deleted 




Alpha if item 
deleted 
21 31.0853 48.319 .312 .725 
22 30.1787 46.511 .395 .713 
23 30.2160 45.448 .449 .704 
24 30.3680 46.062 .432 .707 
25 30.7227 46.393 .369 .717 
26 30.4187 42.335 .523 .690 
27 30.7893 47.418 .391 .713 
28 30.3093 47.000 .391 .713 
29 30.6613 47.497 .396 .713 
30 30.6507 48.447 .274 .731 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 464 teachers invited to participate in the survey, 433 (92%) actually did so. Table 
11 shows the number of teachers of each selected school and the number of survey 
respondents. All teachers were invited to participate and the survey respondent rate was 
92 percent. The four schools selected for this study have a large number of teachers and 
are considered as traditional, emblematic, and as having the highest number of teachers 
who oppose to school reforms in the city. Schools 2 and 3 represent the schools that have 
the largest number of teachers with 132 and 130 teachers respectively. 
Table 11 
 Study Population and Level of Response Overview 
 
Schools Total of teachers Number of survey 
respondents 
% 
School 1 100 92 92 
School 2 132 118 89.3 
School 3 130 121 93.1 
School 4 108 102 94.4 
Total 464 433  
 




 Table 12 presents the frequencies of each of the variables of the study. As a 
whole, the largest group was the resistant teachers who made up 87% of the total sample 
of teachers (433). Two hundred and twenty- two (51%) of the teachers were female and 
two hundred and eleven (49%) were male. Of the 375 (87%) who were categorized as 
“resistant” for the purpose of this study, 248 (66%) were experienced or veteran teachers 
with over 20 years of experience and 127 with fewer than 20 years of experience.  
Table 12 
 
Frequencies of Demographic Data  
 
Variable f % 
Teachers 433 92 
Males 211 49 
Females 222 51 
Compliant teachers 58 13 
Resistant teachers 375 87 
Less experienced resistant 
teachers 
127 34 




 The 433 teachers who answered the survey ranged in age from 24 to 69 years. 
Their median age was 50 and they have taught from 10 to 33 years. Although respondents 
were not asked about their age in years, age of people is public through the Accreditation 
link of El Seguro Social del Peru (ESSALUD)’s website, one of the health public entities 
of Peru. Teachers ranged in age from 28 to 67. Responses rates from each school were 
high (94% in School 4), as can be seen in Table 13. 
 
 






Study Survey Respondents 







School 1 92 10 82 
School 2 118 21 97 
School 3 121 9 112 
School 4 102 18 84 
Total 433 58 375 
 
Specifically, Figure 8 shows that the number of resistant teachers surpassed the 
number of compliant teachers. It should therefore come as little surprise that the school 
systems face particular difficulties implementing teacher evaluation policy.  
 
Figure 8. Number of teacher respondents by school 
 
Table 15 displays numbers of resistant teachers for each school. In School 1, 2 



























percentages (84%, 62% and 70%). In School 4, the percentage of more experienced 
teachers (over 20 years) comprised the smaller percentage (37%). 
Table 14 
 
Resistant Teachers Overview 









School 1 83 13 69 
School 2 97 27 70 
School 3 112 34 78 
School 4 84 53 31 
Total 375 127 248 
 
 
 Figure 9. Percentages of resistant teachers by level of experience 
Quantitative Data Analysis  
Research Question One. Question 1 in this study was asked to determine 
teachers’ views and beliefs about the new evaluation process linked to merit pay plans as 


























Individual Survey were given a Likert-scale response to statements regarding the 
purpose, instruments, content of the evaluation process, quality of evaluators, feedback, 
and the link between evaluation and professional development of teachers. Teachers were 
asked to pick a number from 1-5 with 1 being strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neither 
agree nor disagree, 4= agree, and 5= strongly agree. Results are summarized in Table 16. 
The response data were analyzed and presented in percentage form for each item to 
display level of agreement as an entire sample. The reliability coefficient using 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for teachers’ perceptions of the evaluation process had a 
reliability ranking of 0.84. The percentages are presented with responses indicating 
general agreement combined under the heading strongly agree/agree, responses 
indicating general disagreement combined under the heading disagree/strongly disagree, 
and responses indicating no opinion under the heading neither agree/nor disagree.  
Table 15 shows overall teachers’ response to the evaluation process. Over 65% of 
respondents indicated that the teacher evaluation process has not done a good job in 
defining the best teachers, whereas the same percentage of teachers (68%) believe that a 
teacher performance appraisal should motivate teachers to work hard and improve their 
performance. These results suggest that almost 70% of teachers support merit pay plans, 
however they oppose teachers’ evaluation based on test scores; 58% of teachers said that 
the tests’ rubrics were not clear and correct; and 61% did not believe that reaching the 
minimum score on teacher tests will help them to improve performance. More than 50% 
of teachers did not agree with the evaluation contents. There is a substantial research base 
that confirms these findings as cited earlier. Cole, Robinson, Ansaldo, Whiteman, and 




Spradlin (2012) have confirmed that teacher compliance alone will not ensure that a 
system of evaluation will have create understanding and acceptance among teachers, a 
culture of shared responsibility, or a system of internal accountability. The 2009 Teacher 
Project reported that most teacher evaluation system suffer from a slew of design flaws.  
  






















01 The evaluation process has done a 
good job in defining the best 
teachers.  
68% 12% 20% 100% 
02 I have a good understanding of the 
purpose of the evaluation process.  
30% 21% 49% 100% 
03 The teacher evaluation test rubrics 
are clear and correct.  
58% 21% 20% 100% 
04 Reaching the minimum score on 
the teacher evaluation tests will 
really help teachers to improve 
their performance. 
61% 15% 25% 100% 
05 The new salary schedule would 
help teachers to improve student 
achievement.  
61% 10% 28% 100% 
06 A  performance appraisal system 
would motivate teachers to work 
hard and improve their 
performance. 
21% 11% 68% 100% 
07 The contents on which teachers are 
evaluated correspond to their level 
of education (pre-school, 
elementary, secondary and 
specialization.  
59% 13% 28% 100% 
08 The evaluation committee 
members are qualified to evaluate 
teaching quality in the second stage 
of the evaluation process of the 
CPM. 
61% 21% 18% 100% 
09 The mentoring and feedback that 
teachers have received from 
evaluators, if any, is satisfactory. 
53% 28% 19% 100% 
10  The evaluation process allows 
teachers to advance fairly through 
the five levels of the new career 
structure and contribute to 
professional development. 
36% 12% 52% 100% 




In more than half of the cases (53%) studied, teachers overwhelmingly reported 
that evaluation did not give them useful feedback on their performance in the classroom. 
Approximately 30% of the respondents indicated that they do not have a good 
understanding of the purpose of the teacher evaluation process whereas 49% indicated 
that they have a clear and a good understanding of the purpose of the evaluation, and the 
remaining 21% have no opinion. The results suggest a lack of commitment and 
ownership of the evaluation policy, which can be considered as one of the main causes of 
teachers’ resistance to evaluation. Another finding with typical teacher evaluations 
concerns the subjects by which teachers are evaluated and their correspondence to the 
levels of education (pre-school, elementary, secondary) taught. There is often a lack of 
connection between teacher evaluation and student learning (Ellet & Teddlie, 2003).  
Teachers’ Perceptions about Evaluation by Schools. In order to establish and 
compare differences in teachers’ perceptions the selected schools for this study, the 
following Likert-type score was used, to give an overall rating to the evaluation process 
(see Table 16).  
Table 16  
 
Score Range and Scales for Teachers’ Perceptions  
Score Range Scales 
0-10 Totally disagree 
11-20 Disagree 
21-30 Neither agree/nor disagree 
31-40 Agree 
41-50 Totally agree 
 
School 1. An overall examination of the responses of School 1 shows that more 
than 30% of teachers reported to agree or strongly agree with the evaluation process (see 




Table 18). However, when these teachers had the opportunity to take teacher competency 
exams during the period of 2007– 2010, only 10 (11%) teachers took advantage of the 
opportunity. School 1 is one of the two schools with the highest level of resistance (89% 
of the School 1 teachers resisted evaluation). The majority of teachers’ responses from 
School 1 are concentrated in the scale neither agree nor disagree (50%). These findings 
represent teachers’ overall dissatisfaction and lack of understanding of the evaluation 
process in general. With regard to differences in percentages between resistant and 
compliant teachers, the majority of resistant teachers of School 1, are concentrated in the 
scale neither agree nor disagree (55%). This high percentage of uncertainty about the 
evaluation process is remarkable (see Table 17 and Table 18).  
Table 17 
School 1 Teachers’ Perceptions to Evaluation  
cale f % 
Strongly disagree 0 0  
Disagree 16 17  
Neither agree nor disagree 46 50  
Agree 28 30 
Strongly agree 2 2  
Total 92 100 
  














0 0 0 0 
Disagree 16 20 0 0 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
45 55 1 10 
Agree 21 26 7 70 
Strongly agree 0 0 2 20 
Total 82 100 10 100 
 
School 2. School 2 is considered to be the most traditional school of Trujillo and 
has the same demographics as School 1 and School 3. The higher concentrations of 
responses regarding general perceptions of teacher evaluation were neither agree nor 
disagree (41%). Table 20 shows that 36% of teachers agree with the evaluation process. 
This represents a higher level of acceptance of the evaluation than in School 1, but a lack 
of commitment because of the failures of its implementation. Almost 50% of resistant 
teachers at School 2 reported that they have no opinion regarding the evaluation in 
general (see Table 19).  
Table 19  
School 2 Teachers’ Perceptions to Evaluation  
Scale f % 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Disagree 25 21 
Neither agree nor disagree 48 41  
Agree 43 36  
Strongly agree 2 2  








Table 20  
 








0 0 0 0 
Disagree 25 26 0 0 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
46 47 2 10 
Agree 26 27 17 70 
Strongly agree 0 0 2 20 
Total 97 100 21 100 
 
School 3. School 3 has the highest level of resistance (92%) of the evaluation. 
Although 33% of teachers at School 3 either agree or strongly agree with the evaluation 
process, statistics shows that 8% of teachers (9) took the competency exams during the 
period of 2009-2011 (see Table 21 and Table 22). 
Table 21  
School 3 Teachers’ Perceptions to Evaluation  
Scale f % 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Disagree 43 36 
Neither agree nor disagree 39 32 
Agree 31 26 
Strongly agree 8 7 
























0 0 0 0 
Disagree 43 0 0 38 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
39 0 0 35 
Agree 30 11 1 27 
Strongly agree 0 89 8 0 
Total 112 100 9 100 
  
School 4. The results from School 4 (see Table 23 and Table 24) indicate that of 
the 102 teachers who completed the survey, almost 30 % of the respondents agree with 
the evaluation process. Just over 40% of teachers also reported that they had no opinion 
about the teacher evaluation. Furthermore, most teachers categorized as resistant reported 
having no opinion about the evaluation process.  
Table 23 
 
School 4 Teachers’ Perceptions to Evaluation  
Scale f % 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
Disagree 18 18 
Neither agree nor disagree 45 44 
Agree 30 29 
Strongly agree 9 9 



















0 0 0 0 
Disagree 18 21 0 0 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
42 50 3 17 
Agree 24 29 6 33 
Strongly agree 0 0 9 50 
Total 84 100 18 100 
   
 In conclusion, the general findings regarding teachers’ perceptions to evaluation 
suggest high levels of resistance by the majority of teachers (87%) in this sample group.  
Research Question Two.  In order to investigate the second research question, it 
was necessary to identify the most important factors influencing teachers’ compliance to 
evaluation. A total of 58 teachers responded to the second part of the survey (Items 11 
through 20). The survey found that compliant teachers gave confirmatory responses 
regarding their decisions to be become certified. As shown in Table 25, respondents were 
participants of the four schools selected for this study who make up 13% (58) of the total 
sample of teachers (433). Table 26 also shows that two statements received the highest 
scores. These statements focused on professional recognition of teacher degrees, 
research, specialization, past appointments, intellectual productivity, distinctions, and 
honors. Both statements received the same rating of agreement with a mean ranking of 
4.14. The other two significant factors for compliance were (1) opportunities for 
professional development and improvement of academic qualifications and (2) 




professional autonomy to advance from Level I of La Carrera Pública Magisterial to the 
Levels II, III, IV, and V. 
 Table 25 also shows the statements with the least agreement, which were the 
salary benefits package and years of experience as a professional educator being 
considered for career development. These statements scored a rating of 9.2 landing just 
slightly in the agree portion of the Likert scale. Although these responses did not rank 
very low when comparing with the other statements, they demonstrate the least 
representative factors influencing teachers’ motivation. The Cronbach’s alpha test results 
produced a coefficient of 0.88, which indicates a high level of consistency among the 
items.  
  




Table 25  
 
Factors Associated to Teachers’ Compliance 
  
No. Factors Score % M SD 
11. Teacher career ladder based on 
incentives. 
212 9.7 3.66 1.15 
12. Competitive salary. 208 9.5 3.59 1.27 
13. Salary benefits package. 201 9.2 3.47 1.06 
14. Merit-based increments based on 
competency exam scores. 
214 9.8 3.69 1.06 
15. Professional recognition of degrees, 
research, specialization, and abilities.  
240 11.0 4.14 0.96 
16. Professional recognition of past 
appointments, intellectual productivity, 
distinctions and honors.  
240 11.0 4.14 0.84 
17. Years of experience as a professional 
educator will be considered for career 
advancement.. 
200 9.2 3.45 1.34 
18. Opportunities for professional 
development and to improve academic 
qualifications. 
229 10.5 3.95 1.15 
19. Professional support after being 
certified to improve performance. 
209 9.6 3.60 1.20 
20. Professional autonomy to advance from 
Level I of La Carrera Pública 
Magisterial to the levels II, III, IV and 
V. 
226 10.4 3.90 1.05 
Total 2179 100   
 
Research Question Three. Question 3 sought to analyze the causes of teachers’ 
resistance. Section III of the survey (Questions 21 through 30) asked teachers to rate the 
causes of their opposition to evaluation. The primary goal of Question 3 was to measure 
the difference between the responses of less and more experienced teacher responses to 
four different variables (financial incentives based on teachers’ competency exam scores, 
teachers’ benefits and rights, teacher tenure, and the financial costs of the law 
implementation), which are considered the most compelling reasons why teachers 




resisted evaluation. This section used the t-test to report the responses of 375 public 
school teachers in the city of Trujillo.  
t-Test. The research hypotheses were not stated as directional or non-directional, 
but in null form. That is, the prediction is that there are no statistically significant 
differences between the means of the groups. The null hypothesis was evaluated via a 
two-tailed t-test.  
The assumptions underlying the t-test were: 
1. The two groups were independent of each other (teachers over 20 and teachers 
under 20 years of experience).  
2. Each individual teacher (or case) appeared only once in each group. 
3. The two groups came from two different populations whose variances were 
approximately the same (homogeneity of variance). 
4. The null hypothesis was non-directional. 
Hypothesis Testing for Financial Incentives 
 Null Hypothesis- H0: When considering teachers’ resistance to evaluation, there is 
no statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers 
regarding the importance of financial incentives based on teachers’ competency exam 
scores. 
Alternative Hypothesis-H1: When considering teachers resistance to evaluation, 
there is statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers 
regarding the importance of financial incentives based on teachers’ competency exam 
scores. 




An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if there is significant 
difference between more experienced and less experienced teachers regarding the 
importance of financial incentives based on teachers’ competency exams scores. 
Table 26  
 
Independent Samples t-Test for Levels of Experience and Financial Incentives  
Level of 
experience 
N M SD df t p 
More 
experienced 








127 14.60 3.68 
Note. p<.05 
 
The results, t(353) = 2.52, p =.001, showed that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the levels of importance assigned to financial incentives based on 
teachers’ competency exam scores when comparing more experienced teachers 
(M=13.61, SD=3.54) and less experienced teachers (M=14.60, SD=3.68). Since the t-test 
(2.52) exceeds its appropriate critical value, the null hypothesis was rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis was accepted in its place (see Table 26). The hypothesis stated in 
this study: When considering teachers’ resistance to evaluation, there is no statistically 
significant difference between less and more experienced teachers regarding the 
importance of financial incentives based on teachers’ competency exam scores. Based on 
these results, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative hypothesis was 
accepted. We can be at least 95 percent confident that the financial incentives based on 
test scores was one of the main causes of resistance for less experienced teachers similar 
to more experienced teachers.  




Hypothesis Testing for Teachers’ Benefits and Rights 
Null Hypothesis H0: When considering teachers resistance to evaluation, there is 
no statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers 
regarding the importance of reducing teachers’ benefits and losing rights. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1: When considering teachers resistance to evaluation, 
there is statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers 
regarding the importance of reducing teachers’ benefits and losing rights. An 
independent sample t-test was conducted to determine if there is significant difference 
between more experienced and less experienced teachers regarding the importance of 
reducing teachers’ benefits and losing rights. 
Table 27 




N M SD df t p 
More 
experienced 
248 6.54 2.49 373 1.96 0.051 
Less 
experienced 
127 7.08 2.52 
Note. p<.05 
 
Regarding the issue of reducing teachers’ benefits and losing rights, the results 
(t(373) =1.96, p = 0.051) showed that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the levels of importance assigned by more experienced teachers (M=6.54, 
SD=2.49) and less experienced teachers (M=7.08, SD=2.52) (see Table 27). Based on 
these results, the null hypothesis was accepted and the alternative hypothesis was 
rejected.  




Hypothesis Testing for Teacher Tenure  
Null Hypothesis H0: When considering teachers resistance to evaluation, there is 
no statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers when 
measuring the importance of ending teacher tenure. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1: When considering teachers resistance to evaluation, 
there is statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers 
when measuring the importance of ending teacher tenure. 
An independent sample t-test was conducted to determine if there is significant 
difference between more experienced and less experienced teachers regarding the 
importance of ending teacher tenure (see Table 28).  
Table 28 
 
Independent Samples t-Test for Levels of Experience and Teacher Tenure  
Level of 
experience 
N M SD df t p 
More 
experienced 
248 6.65 2.00 373 1.64 0.10 
Less 
experienced 
127 7.01 2.09 
Note. p<.05 
 
The results, t(373) =1.64, p=0.10, showed that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the levels of importance assigned to teacher tenure when comparing 
more experienced teachers (M= 6.65, SD=2.00) and less experienced teachers (M=7.01, 
SD=2.09). Based on these results, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted.  
  




Hypothesis Testing for the Financial Costs of the Law Implementation 
Null Hypothesis H0: When considering teachers resistance to evaluation, there is 
no statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers 
regarding the importance of the financial costs of the law implementation and its 
sustainability. 
Alternative Hypothesis-H1: When considering teachers resistance to evaluation, 
there is statistically significant difference between less and more experienced teachers 
regarding the importance of the financial costs of the law implementation and its 
sustainability. 
An independent sample t-test was conducted to determine if there is significant 
difference between more experienced and less experienced teachers in the importance of 
the financial costs of the law implementation and its sustainability (see Table 29).  
Table 29  
 
Independent Samples t-Test for Levels of Experience and the Financial Costs of the 




N M SD df t p 
More 
experienced 
248 6.29 1.96 373 3.61 0.01 
Less 
experienced 
127 7.06 1.98 
Note. p<.05 
 
 Regarding the issue of the financial costs of the law and its implementation, the 
results t(363) =3.61,  p=0.01, showed that there is a statistically significant difference 
between the levels of importance assigned by more experienced teachers (M= 6.29, 




SD=1.96) and less experienced teachers (M=7.06, SD= 1.98). The hypothesis stated in 
this study: when considering teachers resistance to evaluation, there is statistically 
significant difference between less and more experienced teachers regarding the 
importance of the financial costs of the law implementation and its sustainability. Based 
on these results, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative hypothesis was 
accepted. We can be at least 95 percent confident that the financial costs of the law and 
its sustainability was one of the main causes of resistance for less experienced teachers 
similar to more experienced teachers.  
Qualitative Data Analysis 
 In order to answer research Question 4 (What are the circumstances and 
conditions under which compliance and resistance to a new law occurs in Peru? ) and 
Question 5 (What is the impact of teacher resistance to evaluation in schools? How does 
teacher resistance affect the goals of reforms?), twenty-one hour interviews were 
conducted to explore factors of compliance and patterns of resistance in teachers’ 
responses. 
Participants were selected based on the following criteria:  
1. Representatives of both compliant and resistant participants were interviewed to 
identify patterns of resistance. 
2. Representatives of resistant participants of the two different groups (over-20 and 
under-20 years of experience) were interviewed to investigate significantly 
different results.  




3. Participants who scored far outside the norm were interviewed in order to 
understand why they might have scored as they did. 
4. Participants who had differing scores and significant predictors (positive scores, 
neutral scores, and negative scores) were interviewed in order to further examine 
the causes of different results.  
Ten resistant participants, 5 from each cohort (under-20 and over-20 years of 
experience) were asked a variety of questions designed to examine critical issues 
regarding opposition. Ten compliant teachers were invited also to participate in order to 
explore the factors associated with compliance. The interview protocol is presented in 
Appendix B. Appendix C presents a portion of 5 highly resistant participants’ responses 
and 5 compliant participants’ responses to a series of questions regarding compliance and 
resistance to a new law and how this affected the goals of reform.  
In order to analyze the data produced from the 20 interviews, the Analysis 
Method Framework was used. The analysis method framework was developed during the 
1980s at the National Centre for Social Research (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) and is now 
widely used by qualitative researchers. It is a matrix-based analytical method, which 
facilitates rigorous and transparent data management so that all stages involved in the 
‘analytical hierarchy’ can be systematically conducted (Ritchie & Lewis, 2009).  
Conceptual Framework for the Study 
1. Purpose of teacher evaluation 
1.1 Good and effective teachers. 
1.2 Evaluation process accuracy 
1.3 Sound research/evaluation methods 
1.4 Reaching the minimum score 
1.5 Teachers’ reactions to evaluation 




2. Accuracy and validity of teachers’ tests 
2.1 Flawed tests 
2.2 Valid or reliable tests 
2.3 Unfair methods and flawed tests 
2.4 Standardized tests 
2.5 Content knowledge tests 
3. Teacher evaluation as a voluntary process 
3.1 Level of teacher participation 
3.2 Mandatory evaluation 
3.4 Voluntary process 
4. Financial incentives based on student achievement 
4.1 Merit pay and student achievement 
4.2 Merit pay evaluation process  
5. Merit pay plans linked to teacher competency exam scores and performance 
5.1 Fair methods to evaluate teachers 
5.2 Rewarding teachers based on test scores 
5.3 Financial recognition and improved performance 
5.4 Underpaid teachers 
5.4 Teacher performance in the classroom 
6. Teacher motivation to take professional competency tests 
6.1Recognition of teacher qualifications  
6.2 Teacher weaknesses 
6.3 Feedback and training 
6.4 Areas in need of improvement 
6.5 Professional development 
7. Teachers’ benefits and rights 
7.1 Teacher tenure 
7.2 Teacher career status 
7.3 Participation and involvement in policy design 
8. Teacher tenure 
8.1 Teacher dismissals 
8.2 Remediation plan 
8.3 Teacher contracts 
9. Financial costs of the law and its sustainability 
9.1 Budget constraints 
9.2 Costs of teacher performance evaluation 
  10. Miscommunication and lack of consensus in policy design 
10.1 Misconceptions about teacher quality 




10.2 Lack of understanding of the purpose of the law  
10.3 Lack of communication  
11. Teacher career policy 
11.1 Teacher career advancement 
11.2 Improvement of the teacher profession 
11.3 Poor management and administration of the policy 
11.4 Teachers’ lack of trust in government policies  
12. School environment  
12.1 Unhealthy competition 
12.2 Collegial atmosphere 
12.3 Teacher union’s membership 
Labeling the Data. Having constructed the initial conceptual framework, my next 
task was to apply it to the data gathered by the interviews. Forty-two different index 
categories were applied involving twelve different major themes. It was common to find 
several themes closely related, such as financial incentives based on student test scores 
and linking merit pay and student achievement.  
  




Merging Data Analysis in an Explanatory Design 
 After the initial quantitative and qualitative analyses and indexing were 
performed, a side-by-side comparison for merged data analysis was chosen for 
comparing results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). As the quantitative data were 
collected before the qualitative data (explanatory design), the following mixed methods 
questions needed to be addressed: in what ways do the qualitative data help to explain the 
quantitative results? 
  Summary tables that merged the quantitative and qualitative findings were used to 
answer this question. As shown in Table 30, survey data are compared interview data of 
resistant teachers on four major themes (purpose of the evaluation, accuracy and validity 
of teachers’ tests, financial incentives based on student achievement, and merit pay plans 
linked to teacher performance). The main themes were based on the similar information 
found in both sources of data regarding teachers’ perceptions of evaluation and its link to 















Comparison of Teacher Evaluation Survey and Interview Data: Resistant Teachers 
 Themes QUAN results (Surveys) QUAL results (Face to face 
interviews) 
1. Purpose of 
teacher 
evaluation 
68% indicated that evaluation did 
not fulfill its purpose of defining 
the best teachers.  
 
30% indicated that they did not 
have a good understanding of the 
teacher evaluation process. 
 
21% have no opinion about the 
purpose of the teacher evaluation 
process.  
Unrealistic and dishonest 
teacher evaluation. Preserve the 
contract teacher regime to avoid 
social debt. Lack of trust in 
government policy, lack of 
understanding of the evaluation 
purpose. Evaluation based on an 
unconstitutional law. Legal 
framework for unfair 
dismissals. The evaluation 





58% said test rubrics are not clear 
and correct.61% believed that 
reaching the minimum score will 
not help teachers to improve their 
professional performance. 
59% agree that there were flaws 
in the contents of teachers’ tests.  
Mandatory knowledge- based 
tests with punitive purposes. 
Teacher quality cannot be 
measured through test scores or 
with a knowledge-based test. 
Comprehensive teacher 
evaluations. No real objective 






61% thought that financial 
incentives would not be linked to 
student achievement. 
New certified teachers but no 
increases in student 
achievement 




21% believed that a teacher 
performance appraisal would 
inspire teachers to improve 
performance  
Only 2% of teachers would 
improve performance due to 
financial incentives. Teachers 
without vocation. 
 
Table 31 summarizes the quantitative and qualitative findings of compliant 
teachers. A comparison was made between both sources of data in five majors themes 
(purpose of teacher evaluation, accuracy and validity of teachers’ tests, teacher evaluation 
as a voluntary process, salary incentives based on teachers’ test scores, and teacher 
motivation to take competency professional tests). In this section, I examined the results 




of the compliant teachers’ response. By and large, it appears that teachers in Peru 
expressed concerns about understanding the purpose of the law. Forty-nine percent of 
teachers expressed concern about their capacity to gain an understanding of the 
evaluation system. Only 28% agree that the content on which they were evaluated 
corresponded to their level of education.  
  










QUAN results (Surveys) QUAL results (Face to face 
interviews) 
1. Purpose of 
teacher 
evaluation. 
49% admitted to having a 
good understanding of the 
purpose of teacher evaluation.  
Teacher evaluation selected 
the best teachers. Criterion for 
teachers’ selection: academic 
preparation and years of 
experience.  
2. Accuracy and 
validity of 
teachers’ tests.  
28% agree with the contents 
on which teachers were 
evaluated as corresponding to 
their level of education.  
Teachers demonstrated their 
subject knowledge through 
tests. 
3. Teacher 
evaluation as a 
voluntary 
process 
 All teachers should be 
evaluated. Low participation 
of teachers in evaluations. It is 
important to teachers to assess 




on teacher test 
scores 
68% admitted that a new 
performance appraisal system 
would motivate them to 
improve their performance. 
Teachers need high salaries 
and incentives. Not only 
incentives, permanent training 
is necessary. High salaries will 







The most important factors for 
compliance: professional 
recognition of degrees, 
research, and specialization 
(M=4.14) and professional 
recognition of past 
appointments, intellectual 
productivity, distinctions, and 
honors (M=4.14). 
Teachers are highly motivated 
for improved performance in 
the classroom. Highly 
motivated teachers.  
  
Table 32 shows that no differences were found between less and more 
experienced teachers in the level of importance assigned to teacher tenure and teachers’ 
rights and benefits; however, there were differences between both groups regarding 




financial incentives based on test scores and the financial implementation of the law and 
its sustainability. 
Table 32  
Comparison of Survey and Interview Data by Cause of Resistance 
 Theme QUAN results (Surveys) QUAL results (Face to face 
interviews) 




Statistical difference exists 
between more experienced 
teachers (over-20) and less 
experienced (under-20). 
Difficulties with the management 
of the financial incentives by the 
Ministry of Education. Unhealthy 
competition Path to privatization.  
7. Teachers’ rights 
and benefits 
No statistical difference 
between more experienced 
teachers (over-20) and less 
experienced (under-20). 
 
Threatened teachers’ rights and 
tenure. It is necessary a 
comprehensive teacher 
evaluation. Government blocked 
the union´s right to strike.  
8 Teacher tenure No statistical difference 
between more experienced 
teachers (over-20) and less 
experienced (under-20). 
 
Reduced opportunities for career 
advancement by reducing the 
number of new positions at each 
stage of the career ladder due to 
reduced budget. Legal teacher 
job insecurity. 
 
9 Financial costs 
of the law 
implementation 
Statistical difference exists 
between more experienced 
teachers (over-20) and less 
experienced (under-20). 
 
Government does not guarantee 
the budget for the law 
implementation. High levels of 
corruption between the media 
and the economic and political 
groups. 
 
In order to draw conclusions or inferences, the meta-inferences are included at the 
end of the study and are also included in the larger interpretation being made in the 
discussion section of a study. The meta-inferences relate to whether the follow-up 
qualitative data provide a better understanding of the problem than simply the 
quantitative results.  





A preliminary descriptive analysis was conducted. Means, standard deviations, 
and ranges among study variables were computed. Several points appeared notable with 
regard to the purpose of the study. First, perceptions of evaluation in general show a 
fairly high level of dissatisfaction for the whole group of teachers (68%). At the same 
time, almost 70% of the teachers of the population support evaluation. Second, the 
compliant teachers (87%) appear to view the evaluation system as somewhat effective. 
When individual items are examined, however, teachers’ lowest ranking were “years of 
experience” and “salary benefits package” (M=3.47 and M=3.45 respectively). Third, 
more experienced and less experienced teachers tend to agree, that losing tenure and 
ending benefits and rights are the main causes for opposition and resistance. Resistant 
teachers had less agreement, however, that the causes of resistance were opposition to 
financial incentives based on test scores and concerns about the financial costs of the 
implementation of the law. The findings from the qualitative interviews showed that 
teachers’ perceptions of evaluation are based mostly on issues of trust, fairness, and 
accuracy of the evaluation process. Most of the respondents, whether compliant or 
resistant, mentioned other critical issues in the implementation of the law such as lack of 
consensus in the policy design (87%) and political corruption in the education sector. 
Another important observation is the concern expressed by teachers about the extent to 
which merit pay plans are linked to student achievement and how to assure that teachers 
receiving salary incentives are actually increasing student achievement.   





As part of a broad 2007 teacher reform, the Congress of Peru passed Law 29024 
(Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial), a bill that significantly changed the way teachers 
will be evaluated and compensated. The requirement for teachers to move from a 
traditional system of evaluation and compensation that has been in practice for decades to 
a system that more directly links teacher performance to compensation. The 
implementation has been problematic throughout the country. On the one hand, many 
believe that the traditional system of teacher evaluation needs to change. On the other 
hand, comfort with the old system and fear of attaching compensation to performance has 
generated a fierce battle between government and teachers. Fifty-five thousand out of 
nearly 300,000 teachers complied with Law 29024 (Ley de la Carrera Pública 
Magisterial). The SUTEP’s reactions to and the arguments against this new law have 
included: (1) general resistance to financial incentives based on teacher test scores, (2) 
concern that the new law represents a government strategy to restrict teachers’ rights and 
benefits, (3) loss of teacher tenure, and (4) concern about the financial costs of the law 
and its sustainability over time.  
The purpose of this study was (1) to determine the perceptions and beliefs about a 
new evaluation process and (2) to identify factors for compliance and causes of resistance 
to the implementation of a new evaluation system and merit pay plans governing which 
lead to career advancement. In order to reach the goals of the study, a mixed methods 
sequential explanatory analysis was used. This mixed methods study examined teacher 
resistance to the new evaluations and assessed the importance teachers assigned to 4 
variables. The study investigated whether teachers with more versus less experienced 




assigned the same level of importance to the most compelling reasons for resistance (the 
four variables measured in the quantitative phase): financial incentives, teacher benefits 
and rights, teacher tenure, and the sustainability of the financial costs of the law 
implementation. The qualitative phase involved using qualitative data for critical case 
sampling to increase data richness around quantitative results. 
The following questions guided this research:  
Research Question 1. What are the teachers’ perceptions and beliefs about the 
evaluation process as part of the new career structure for teachers in Peru? 
Research Question 2. What factors have had the greatest influence on teachers’ 
compliance with the Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial (CPM)? 
Research Question 3. Of those teachers who are resisting evaluation, what are the 
most compelling reasons for those with more than 20 years of experience and those with 
less than 20 years of experience for such resistant behavior? 
(3.1) Is there a significant difference in the importance of financial incentives based 
on teachers’ competency exam scores related to their levels of experience? 
(3.2) Is there a significant difference between the two groups in the importance of a 
reduction in teachers’ benefits and rights? 
(3.3) Is there a significant difference in the importance of ending teacher tenure as a 
cause of resistance?   
(3.4) Is there a significant difference in the perceived importance of the financial 
costs of the law implementation and is it sustainable?  




Research Question 4. What are the circumstances and conditions under which 
compliance and resistance to new laws occur in Peru?  
Research Question 5. What is the impact of teacher resistance to evaluation in 
schools? How does teacher resistance affect the goals of reform? 
Discussion of Findings 
This section provides a discussion of the major research findings of research of 
teachers’ motivational factors related to compliance and resistance to a new law. 
Discussion is based on a framework of psychological and educational research traditions 
that examine resistance, conflict, and compliance of teachers with a new policy. The 
findings are presented in relation to other current research. To facilitate this discussion, 
this section is divided into participant responses to each research question.  
Research Question One: Teachers’ Perceptions of the New Evaluation Policy.  
Teachers showed reactions of compliance and resistance to the evaluation system as a 
whole. On the one hand, the study shows that resistant teachers’ perceptions were 
influenced by perceptions of trust, fairness, and accuracy. The most critical concern 
expressed in teachers’ responses was that the policy would not identify the “best 
teachers” (68% ). Few teachers agreed that reaching the minimum score will help 
teachers to improve their professional performance (39%) and that the new teacher salary 
schedule would help teachers to improve student achievement (39%). Teachers were also 
concerned about the validity and reliability of the tests (58%) and did not believe that 
there was any correspondence between the subjects on which they were tested and their 
curriculum and pedagogy (59%). To make matters worse, nearly 60 percent of teachers 




didn’t trust evaluators. Teachers overwhelmingly reported that evaluations did not give 
them useful feedback on their performance in the classroom (53%) in spite of the fact it 
was stipulated by the law. Teachers also reported that the new system did not have any 
impact on their instructional practice or school environment.  
Compliant teachers, on the other hand, perceived the new policy as necessary for 
the legitimacy of their work. However, most teachers (80%) were somewhat concerned 
about the way the government authorities implemented the process of teacher evaluation. 
Teachers were more positive regarding the idea of evaluations in general. In analyzing 
qualitative data, teachers reported concerns of misconceptions about teacher quality, the 
constitutionality of the law, lack of research, and unfair evaluation methods and 
dismissals. Teachers also reported lack of trust in government policies, political 
corruption, and a reduction in number of teacher positions at the higher level of the career 
structure. As a way to find a solution for these problems, teachers suggested the design of 
a comprehensive model of teacher performance evaluation and a clear consensus on what 
“best teachers” actually means. Teachers also reported that the new system did not have 
any impact on their instructional practice or school environment.  
Table 33 outlines the statements about the teachers’ beliefs regarding evaluation 
and the counter-propositions regarding merit pay. As depicted in the table, over 80% of 
teachers (375) categorized as resistant did not take competency tests and 61% of teachers 
did not believe the new salary would help to improve student achievement; however, 
68% of them agree with the new teacher performance appraisal motivation to work hard 
and improve performance.  





General Teachers’ Response 
1 375 (86.60%) teachers out of 433 opposed evaluation as they declared in the survey as 
not taken regulatory competency exams. 
2 264 (61%) out of 433 did not believe the new salary would help teachers to improve 
student achievement. 
3 294 (68%) agreed with the new teacher performance appraisal to motivate teachers to 
work hard and improve their performance.  
 
These findings argue for a much more comprehensive system for explaining 
teachers’ reactions as they tried to meet the demands of the policy. There are, however, 
some critical issues in which Peruvian teachers’ responses could deviate from the 
expected response depending on the particular assessment tool. Research on the impact 
of merit pay on teacher quality found that what limited survival of merit pay plans was 
not necessarily merit pay, but the way the plans were designed, implemented, and 
administered (Heneman et al. 2007; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Robinson, 1983). 
Notwithstanding these unsuccessful experiences, national surveys have found that 
teacher attitudes toward some forms of performance pay are favorable. 
Teachers, who saw the evaluation as inaccurate, unfair, and flawed also viewed 
the new teacher appraisal system positively (68%). The interviews revealed that teachers 
were aware of and troubled by implementation pitfalls and lack of clarity in testing 
procedures. These pitfalls led many teachers to question the fairness and validity of the 
system, causing conflict between government authorities and teachers (Rivero & Vexler, 
2012). Researchers and policy makers agree that most current teacher evaluation systems 
do little to help teachers improve or to support personnel decision-making. There’s also a 
growing consensus that use of teacher contributions to student learning and 




measurements of the quality of teacher practices should be part of teacher evaluation 
systems (National Comprehensive Center for Teaching Quality,  2011; Hightower, 
Delgado, Lloyd, Wittenstein, Sellers, & Swanson, 2011). The high sensitivity to 
evaluation showed by the participants of this study may be due to the pressure they feel 
from the government, parents, and others outside the classroom. Qualitative findings also 
revealed that the results of evaluations are rarely used to make important decisions about 
development, compensation, tenure or promotion. In fact, in most of the cases studied, 
the majority of the teachers considered that they were evaluated only for the purpose of 
dismissing them. Teachers’ reactions to pay systems were largely negative, and consisted 
of concerns about competitive salaries increasing risk of future dismissals, future pay 
uncertainty, and rumors of government quotas on the number of experienced teachers. 
The shortcomings found in the quantitative and qualitative data reflect and 
reinforce a pervasive but deeply flawed belief that all teachers are essentially the same, 
rather than individual professionals. Findings of this study have also found support in the 
research of Kimball (2002), Heneman and Milanowski (2003), and Milanowski and 
Heneman (2001), which suggested that teacher acceptance of standards-based evaluation 
cannot be taken for granted and depends on several factors including: characteristics of 
evaluation feedback, perceptions of feedback, perceptions of fairness, and perceptions of 
evaluator qualifications. Survey results were largely consistent with interview 
information. Teachers resisting evaluation were, on average, negative or neutral about the 
fairness of the process, the accuracy and fairness of their own evaluation results, and the 
usefulness of the evaluation process to them.  




Research Question Two: Factors Influencing Teacher Compliance. Research 
question two sought to identify the factors that determined teachers’ compliance to a new 
law. The data from this study indicate that the most important factors relating teachers’ 
decisions were those related with professional development, recognition, and autonomy. 
Compliant teachers’ responses were more consistent with regard to those factors 
(M=3.95; M=4.14; M=3.90 and SD=1.15; SD=0.96, SD=1.05). The evaluation process 
gave teachers the opportunity to link professional recognition of advanced degrees, 
research, specialization, and abilities. Recognition were also granted for past 
appointments, intellectual productivity, distinctions, and honors. These findings are 
supported by results from a study of Massachusetts’ teacher attrition rates. In a 
longitudinal study of 50 new teachers in Massachusetts, Johnson and Birkeland (2003) 
found that respondents’ reasons for staying in their schools, moving to another schools, 
or leaving public school teaching within their first 3 years of teaching were based on the 
level of satisfaction of their experiences at the school sites. Central in influencing their 
decisions were satisfaction with students’ learning, school support, collegial interaction, 
and adequate resources.  
A minority of compliant teachers agreed that a teacher performance appraisal system 
would motivate them to work hard and improve their performance. These findings align 
with those reported by Conley and Odden (1995), who developed a model in which 
teacher skill- and knowledge-based pay plans in education may be related to major 
demarcation points in teachers’ career development. An analysis of survey data from 
career ladder programs in the U.S. and Australia, led the authors to describe three or four 




stages that would qualify a teacher for a significant pay increase. These findings are also 
supported in the studies of Springer (2009), Coggshall et al. (2009), Firestone (1991), and 
Springer et al. (2010). According to Springer (2009), there is highly visible support for 
linking teacher quality and compensation, based in part on the weak links between 
teacher experience and educational credentials and student achievement. Coggshall, Ott, 
Behrstock, and Lasagna (2010), Firestone (1991), and Springer, Ballou, Hamilton, 
Lockwood, McCaffrey, Pepper, and  Stecher  (2010) stated that financial incentives can 
contribute to positive changes in teaching practices and student outcomes, particularly 
when coupled with professional development and a supportive organizational structure. 
In a review of market forces in the teacher labor markets, Murnane and Steele (2007) 
described how decisions about teaching depend on financial incentives “but also in a 
wide range of non-pecuniary incentives, such as working conditions” (p. 20).  
Research Question Three: Reported Importance to Causes of Resistance. The 
study results found significant differences among resistant teachers regarding the 
importance of the studied variable; these differences in results are related to respondents’ 
years of experience. Results of hypothesis t-test testing suggested no statistical difference 
related to the level of importance of losing teacher benefits and rights and ending teacher 
tenure. Less and more experienced teachers have rated tenure and teachers’ benefits and 
rights as the most important factors that generated resistance. However, results of 
hypothesis t-test testing suggested statistical difference regarding the implementation of 
financial incentives based on test scores and the financial costs of the law implementation  
and its sustainability. Study results showed that teachers were suspicious of evaluation 




and merit pay plans because of funding questions. More experienced teachers were often 
unwilling to buy into the program because of this skepticism.  
While teachers’ responses for Question 1 and Question 2 illustrate the need for 
effective and fair methods of evaluating teaching performance and a better definition of 
the purpose of evaluation policies, teachers’ responses for Question 3 have cast on 
teacher tenure and rights, as a form of job protections. Resistant teachers argued that 
tenure protects them from being fired for political reasons and prevents the firing of 
ineffective experienced teachers. Resistant teachers didn’t agree that poorly performing 
teachers would harm student achievement. Resistant teachers also believed that the  law 
was passed without dialogue between themselves and the government because the 
purpose of the law was to avoid governmental fiscalization, maintain control, and protect 
political interests. 
The results for Question 3 are consistent with those of Putney (2011), who reported 
that in an online survey of 1,576 respondents, the 2011 North Carolina Association of 
Educators (NCAE) found that there is strong support for retaining tenure because its 
members feel that not only is it fair, it protects teachers, students, and the public. Sixty-
eight percent of the respondents also believed that ending tenure will prevent teachers 
from exercising their constitutional right to publicly criticize cuts to public education. 
Retaining tenure for qualified teachers in North Carolina Public Schools was also 
supported by 92% of the respondents. Most importantly, 72% of the respondents said that 
if legislation ending tenure was considered, they would be willing to explain to local 
legislators what tenure means to them.  




Research Question Four and Research Question Five. A description and analysis 
of the open political conflict between the government of Peru and resistant teachers was 
generated based on the integration of the quantitative and qualitative results. The results 
of this study suggest that the causes of teachers’ resistance to evaluation are not only 
methodological and technical, but political too. The shortcomings of the current system 
of teacher evaluation found in this study support prior research showing that teacher 
evaluation involves problematic processes with common problems being low test 
validity, high evaluator subjectivity, limited attention to the quality of teachers’ 
instruction, and pervasive mistrust of evaluation (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Frase, 
1993; Milanowski & Kimball, 2003; Scriven, 1997). Goldhaber (2009) suggested that 
evaluations should be centered on teachers’ classroom performance and student learning, 
which would create compensation systems more closely linked to effectiveness than the 
vast majority of those now in place. Weisberg, Sextom, Mulhern, and Keeling, (2009) 
examined how 12 school districts across four states used teacher evaluation to make 
human resource decisions. The authors found that the districts had broken evaluation 
system that tended to recognize and deal with incompetence and failed to reward 
excellence. 
From a political perspective, the circumstances and conditions underlying teachers’ 
resistance must be understood in terms of the political processes and dimensions of 
power in Peru, especially when the political parties have different expectations and 
interest which may conflict. Some of the most pressing concerns expressed by teachers in 
the interviews were the lack of trust in the past and current government and the 




constitutionality of the CPM. Resistant teachers’ skepticism about the political 
motivation for a new interest in assessment, and suspicions that the neo-liberal political 
agenda of the government will drain resources away from programmatic needs made 
teachers demanded that the bill must be declared unconstitutional. Because it makes it 
harder for teachers to obtain the job protection status and benefits offered by tenure 
teachers’ benefits, teachers’ resistance to evaluation has definitely affected the goals of 
reform. National teachers’ strikes produced a loss of class hours and significant violence 
in the poorest regions of the country (Peru Support Group, 2010; Diaz, 2012).  
Discussions of Findings in the Context of the Conceptual Framework  
As reflected in the literature review of teachers’ perceptions as causes of 
compliance and resistance to a new policy, the theoretical context of this study uses 
Principal-agent Theory, the motivational constructs of Procedural Justice (a sub theory of 
Organizational Justice Theory) to understand teachers` reactions to the evaluation, and  
Herzberg´s Two-Hygiene Factor Model to explain overall resistance to the policy. 
Principal-agent theory provides a strong framework for analyzes institutional 
arrangements governing the work of teachers. Principal-agent theory proposes factors 
that determine whether or not paying teachers in relation to their individual performance 
improves teacher productivity.  The question that needs asking is to what extent Latin 
American policymakers should design merit based pay plans in countries with the lowest 
teacher salaries and very poor working conditions? Many concerns arise from this 
question. It is widely acknowledged that PAT, based on a rational approach, does not 
take into account the contextual factors of schooling that impacts upon a teachers 




motivation to act upon his or her own self interests. The roles of social and political 
context, poor working conditions, teacher status, and low salaries of public school 
teachers in Latin America, are critical issues to be examined in determining the 
importance of pay to teachers. However, using monetary rewards as a central 
motivational strategy for teachers seems practical and appealing (Conley & Odden, 1995; 
Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
Using the logic of the rational behavior of Principal-agent theory to teachers’ 
reactions to evaluation and merit pay incentives, it would be necessary to assess teachers’ 
efforts to reach the task goals and to improve student achievement. Unfortunately, no 
well-defined teachers’ performance standards and teacher accountability exists in Peru 
and the existing policies and resource allocation strategies for improving teacher quality 
are not theoretically linked to student outcomes. Teachers in Peru receive an increasing 
number of financial incentives if they work in poor working conditions or areas located in 
the highlands or jungle regions of the country. Transfers to more desirable locations, such 
those located on the Coast, reduces the teachers opportunity to receive performance based 
financial bonuses. According to the Ministry of Education (2012), 10% (95,491) of 
public school teachers work in the rural areas of Peru. Translating this fact to the work of 
teachers, it demonstrates that designing effective compensation systems “involve trade-
offs among related factors, such as ratios of students to teaching staff, class sizes…and 
other working conditions” (OECD, 201, pp. 40, 41).  
As this study uses Principal-agent theory to provide a framework for analyzing 
institutional arrangements governing the work of teachers, a human capital approach can 




be used to address how the resources can best be allocated for the improvement of 
teacher quality.  While Spender (as cited in Burton-Jone and Spender, 2011) argues that 
the shortcomings of the Principal-agent theory would allow us to see human capital as a  
more widely acknowledged concept, Plecki (2000) uses the economic perspectives of 
human capital to explain the design and implementation of investment policies targeted at 
improving teacher quality.  Using this economic approach, the government has 
implemented two types of investment in teacher quality: teacher evaluation and teacher 
compensation. Teacher evaluation results will provide information about teacher 
competency deficiencies and will be used as input for teachers’ specific professional 
development plans. However, when considering resource allocation strategies for 
improving teacher quality, the extent to which investment payoff is dependent on the 
closeness of the conceptual link between the teacher training and the knowledge and 
skills needed and used in the classroom is unclear.  
SUTEP see the new teacher career law as a top-down policy created by the 
Government and educational authorities and question the legitimacy of World Bank 
influence on teacher quality policies in Peru (SUTEP, 2012).  Teachers protest that the 
real purpose of the Law is to privatize education, massive dismissals and salary cuts.  
Critics of the neoliberal approach are concerned about the connection of schools to a 
market place, especially the global capitalist market, and the labor needs and processes of 
such a market.   
Organizational Justice Theory proposes that a person's motivation is based on 
what individuals consider to be fair when compared to others (Redmond, 2010). The 




theory recognizes that motivation can be affected through an individual's perception of 
fair treatment in social exchanges. For the purpose of this study, procedural justice was 
utilized as the primary focus for judging the fairness of the performance pay evaluation 
process. Teachers’ opposition and resistance over issues of fairness and equity in the 
evaluation process and the sense that government is ignoring the problem were the most 
remarkable findings in this study. The main causes of resistance for both groups (more 
and less experienced) were ending tenure and the risk of losing their benefits as a result 
of unfair evaluation procedures. Under the new CPM, tenured teachers would be 
dismissed if they do not reach the minimum score in professional tests. Salaries would 
vary according to the tier. Top performers could make twice the salary of the lowest-paid 
teachers, who could be paid the minimum teacher salary, which is as low as $350.00 per 
month. Data from the interviews revealed that when teachers compared themselves to 
people from other professions, they felt that they were not being compensated fairly and 
therefore demanded to be justly compensated.  
Teachers’ perceptions and beliefs in regards to what is and what is not fair 
affected their motivation, attitudes, and behaviors. Teachers’ perceptions that the 
government is using unfair evaluation methods contribute to conflict and a stalemate at 
the bargaining table. Procedural justice plays a role in the teacher-government conflict in 
Peru when teachers perceive that they did not have a voice in policy decisions that affect 
their work. Procedural justice can also explain the differing levels of importance 
attributed by teachers with differing amounts of experience to the idea that financial 
incentives are the cause of teacher resistance. Although there was significant difference 




between groups, neither group was motivated by financial incentives based on test scores. 
Teachers with more years of experienced tended to assign a low degree of importance to 
financial incentives based on test scores when compared with teachers with less years of 
experience. The same result was found for the issue of financial costs of the 
implementation of the law.  
These findings beg the question of whether or not teachers regulated by the Ley 
del Profesorado think they are fairly paid. Clearly, the long history of strikes in Peru has 
demonstrated a strong belief that the current system is unfair. Storey (2000) hypothesized 
that perceptions of procedural justice are likely to be improve if people are given the 
opportunity to present information and voice their concerns before decisions are taken. 
SUTEP representatives confronted government officials with questions about the change 
in procedure and argued  that government legislation violated teachers’ collective 
bargaining rights as outlined in the previous Ley General de Education. 
Herzberg´s Two-Hygiene Factor Model was used to explain teachers’ overall 
opposition and resistance to the new CPM law. Hygiene factors that caused teachers’ 
dissatisfaction are extrinsic and are linked to high levels of compensation, fear of losing 
their jobs (dismissal of failing teachers), political interests and corruption, poor working 
conditions, lack of effective leadership, poor quality of leadership, and the conflicting 
relationships with government. According to Herzberg, these factors do not motivate 
teachers. However, when they are missing or inadequate, hygiene factors can cause 
serious dissatisfaction. When teachers in Peru have the option to choose to work for a 
high salary in schools located in poorest areas and to work for an average salary in 




schools in urban areas, teachers tend to choose urban schools. Motivators or satisfiers, 
such as engaging in duties of more responsibility, job satisfaction, professional 
recognition, student achievement, and opportunities for professional growth have the 
function of preventing teacher job satisfaction.  
Herzberg’s theory does not place dissatisfaction and satisfaction at opposite ends 
of a single, unbroken continuum, but rather considers satisfaction and dissatisfaction as 
separate dimensions. Herzberg made a major contribution to the field of work motivation, 
but the idea of separate and independent factors (Locke, 1976) may not be logically and 
empirically defensible in the education sector. Crouch (as cited in Vegas, 2005) has 
shown how institutional factors may affect teachers’ jobs. Crouch presented an elaborated 
discussion of the institutional weaknesses in the implementation and development of 
incentives and their consequences for the teaching profession. Crouch argues that the lack 
of regulatory development guided by law is historically the main impediment to the 
successful implementation capacity of incentive policies in Peru.  
Implications for Policy 
  Results of this study and the review of economic, organizational behavior, and 
motivation theories have implications for the design and implementation of investment 
policies targeted at improving teacher quality. The implementation of a new evaluation 
system and merit based pay plans created a conflict of interest which caused teacher 
resistance and consequently, the enactment of a new law.  This study shows a disjointed 
portrait of concerns about the individuals’ rights in the education sector. On the one hand, 
SUTEP’ views of  teachers’ rights regarding evaluation linked to pay plans are quite 




controversial. SUTEP demanded the right to have a fair evaluation and cost-of-living-
adjustment increases in their salaries (Cuenca, 2011). SUTEP also demanded the amount 
of 30% of their salaries for class preparation done at home, as promised by previous laws. 
Educational authorities claimed that it is the children’s right to have qualified teachers 
and receive a quality instruction. While the debate on teachers and children rights rages, 
independent scholars question how well SUTEP reflects the views of the teachers they 
represent?  
A significant challenge emerges from the lack of a solid conceptual framework for 
understanding teacher resistance and compliance to new policy as a whole. The lessons 
learned from Procedural Justice Theory, reviewed earlier, suggest that the fairness of the 
evaluation pay process was instrumental in teachers’ resistance. The union opposition to 
the CPM and Ley de la Reforma Magisterial was mainly based on concerns over 
evaluation procedures and meritocracy. Although the CPM was the result of a large 
number of consultations with the most influential educational experts of the country, no 
SUTEP delegates participated in these consultations. Without technical capacity for 
social dialogue and lacking the political conditions to build consensus, SUTEP plays a 
critical role in opposing the government reforms and causing values resulting in 
confrontations and resistance. Palamidessi and Legarralde (2006) characterized the 
conflict between the union and the government in Peru as political-ideological, 
questioning the practice of privatization and the influence of international organization in 
the education sector. SUTEP disagrees with the introduction of performance evaluation 




systems, perceiving these as control mechanisms that establish rewards and dismissals, 
while undermining common interests.  
From a technical standpoint, investment in teachers’ human capital research has 
found that tracking “investments” in teacher quality is limited and problematic (Plecki, 
2000). Policymakers take for granted that the incentives they allocate will improve the 
efectiveness of teachers (Plecki, 2000; Milanowski, Heneman III, & Kimball, 2011). 
These capabilities are further assumed to impact on student learning. However, the 
conceptual basis for measuring the relationship between the teachers’ inputs and the 
productivity of these inputs is loose. Research on investments on teacher quality should 
address the following question:  “How much and in what ways incentives influence 
teacher performance and student learning?” (Plecki, 2000; p. 7). Most educational leaders 
and government authorities in Peru believed that it would be unfair to pay teachers the 
same when all them don´t put forth the same effort. Some teachers consider that financial 
incentives were awarded to teachers than did not deserve such incentives. Apart from the 
credibility and unfairness issue, some teachers view merit pay plans as divisive, 
promoting competition that is counterproductive to a collaborative atmosphere and 
having a demoralizing effect on non-recipients. Results also suggest that it is imperative 
to improve the accuracy and validity of teacher tests, as well as to develop and evaluation 
criteria that are succinct and concise, denoting exactly what is expected of teachers. 
Despite Herzberg’s emphasis on the fact that motivation can only be achieved by the 
motivators, modern research has found it truly wrong in his approach to link job 
satisfaction and job dissatisfaction to different factors. Findings of this study show the 




same results. Agreement with evaluation procedures, recognition and opportunities for 
professional development and professional autonomy were identified as the most 
important factors that contributed to compliance in this study, and therefore, can be 
identified as motivators. However , relations with colleagues, teacher tenure, and working 
conditions cannot be ignored, nor can the government policies that generated, in most on 
the cases, opposition and resistance.  Arguably, the CPM and the new Ley de la Reforma 
Magisterial represented the government´s effort to increase opportunities for professional 
development and improve teacher quality; however, without a consensus on the goal and 
purpose of the system, as suggested by respondents in this study, teachers´ reactions are 
not difficult to predict.  
Findings of this study suggest that even though teachers rejected content knowledge 
tests as unfair methods for evaluating quality, they value evaluation for the legitimacy of 
their profession. What can teacher evaluation do to financially reward quality within this 
kind of context? How can teachers be motivated to take evaluations? Teachers’ strong 
opposition and resistance to the way the evaluation process was implemented suggest a 
number of hindrances in policy implementation in Peru. Many teachers were concerned 
about the fairness of the evaluation procedure and of the applicability of the teacher tests. 
The renewed interest in the inclusion of merit pay in the evaluation system, heralded by 
the Peruvian government as the means to achieve the desired end and providing the 
requisite incentive for superior teacher performance has proved to be problematic (Rivero 
& Vexler, 2012).  




Evaluation systems that help teachers improve and that support timely and efficient 
personnel decisions have been extremely helpful. Successful systems use well defined 
standards of teacher performance and  multiple classroom observations across the year by 
expert evaluators looking at multiple sources of data and provide timely and meaningful 
feedback to the teacher (Darling-Hammond, Amrein-Beardsley, Haertel & Rothstein, 
2011). Surveyed and interviewed respondents in the study expressed that there was no 
clear consensus of what actually defines “best teachers.” Although there is an extensive 
documentation to show how policymakers define and understand the differences in 
teacher quality, effectiveness, and performance (Liston et al., 2008; Hinchey, 2010), there 
are disagreements on the specific teacher qualities that contribute to student learning. 
Added to this complexity is lack of consensus on exactly how the “best teachers” can be 
objectively scored. It is puzzling that there is little to no consensus about the purpose of 
the evaluation process. This finding may be due to the lack of standards and 
accountability system in Peru. More clearly the missing evaluation criteria substantially 
diminished the likelihood of challenges to personnel decisions that are based in whole or 
in part on performance evaluation (Hunt, 2009; Esser, Weickenberg, & Feder, 2004). 
According to Ingvarson and Chadbourne (1997) “incorporating standards into evaluation 
practice provides the necessary reference point to developing a supportive culture of 
teacher appraisal and evaluation in schools” (p. 27).  
The finding that there was no significant difference in the level of importance 
assigned to teacher tenure and teachers’ benefits and rights should not necessarily be 
viewed as reflecting negatively on merit pay programs. Teachers’ lack of motivation to 




take competency tests and comply with the law is related to the nullification of tenure and 
rights. Teachers’ motivation was decreased, as evidenced by the long periods of strikes 
since the enactment of the CPM. Strikes demonstrate teacher dissatisfaction in bargaining 
and have the potential to disrupt the educational system (Herzberg, Maunser, & 
Snyderman, 1959). Avalos and Assael (2006) proffered that the possibility of being 
evaluated produces anxiety in teachers and feelings of victimization, especially if the 
process is publicly presented as a strategy to deal with unsatisfactory student learning 
results. It is also important to note that, even though the majority of teachers (80%) do 
not believe that any standardized test will ever adequately assess what they do in their 
class, 30% of them would agree or strongly agree with the evaluation itself. Similarly, 
Richard Murnane and his colleagues posited in their 1991 book, Who will teach?, that 
teachers tend to oppose top-down policy. Coggshall et al. (2009) contended that teachers’ 
perceptions of evaluation and compensation reforms are the most essential component for 
the legitimacy of the reforms as they are implemented.  
Ultimately, the responses of teachers in this study and others indicated that teachers 
believed they deserved incentives to work hard. Although the Peruvian teacher pay plan 
has been touted as “merit pay,” it is really a hybrid system that awards teachers additional 
compensation based on four types of evaluations: a national entrance assessment for first 
appointment at the public sector, classroom observations, career advancement 
assessment, and assessment for administrative positions. In practice, only the first type of 
evaluation is in effect; the other 3 will be implemented at a future date due to the current 
budget restrictions.  





Government and school administrators at national, regional, and local levels in 
Peru can have a great impact on motivational factors encouraging teachers to comply 
with policies that would improve the quality of education. While teacher policies in Peru 
are complex and difficult to implement, there are some generally agreed upon responses 
that may help to overcome this resistance. Agreement upon the purpose of the evaluation, 
public sharing, and adherence to the purpose and scope of the evaluation will help to 
establish the foundations for the success of the reform. Research presented in this study 
also suggests that in order to achieve these goals policymakers and educational 
administrators who have authority over the design and implementation of teacher policies 
will gain teachers’ support if they establish conditions conducive to social dialogue and 
political exchanges in order to avoid opposition and resistance. Although intended to 
motivate teachers to improve performance, the evaluation-based pay plans designed by 
the government of Peru were perceived by teachers to be unfair. While some teachers 
appeared to be more willing to accept pay alternatives, the overwhelming majority didn’t. 
Both government and SUTEP will need to find a way to reward teachers for their work. 
The challenge will be to find a meaningful way of differentiating compensation for 
teachers while maintaining the perception of fairness and justice.  
One unexpected finding in this study was that teachers support evaluation and 
merit pay, believing that better paid teachers could have a great impact on student 
achievement. More experienced teachers were more concerned than less experienced 
teachers about financial incentives based on test scores and the sustainability of the 




financial costs. These findings suggest that teachers favor merit pay plans as a way to 
improve performance. These findings also suggest that issues related to the fairness in the 
evaluation process and the distribution of rewards need further research. Further research 
to examine the sources of these differences would be beneficial in the design of future 
compensations plans in Latin American countries.  
Future studies should therefore focus on how to accurately quantify and qualify 
the impact on individual teacher may have on the academic performance of students in 
Peru. Comparison of perceptions of teachers from the three different regions of the 
country should be made regarding attitudes and perceptions about evaluation and merit 
pay plans, this would generated a nuanced understanding of opinions throughout the 
country. Furthermore, research should be conducted to gain insight on whether 
motivating factors will change for veteran vs. less experienced teachers. Perhaps large-
scale studies, using random samples, could probe more deeply into understanding how 
teachers are motivated.  
Conclusion  
Governments in Latin America are trying to improve their teacher evaluation 
systems without referencing many of the findings that are supported by research for 
effective teacher evaluation. Considering the findings in this dissertation, further studies 
are necessary to determine how these policies impact teachers´ perceptions as measured 
by specific questions on the Teacher Evaluation Individual Survey. The findings in this 
study also illustrate in the Peruvian context many tenets of contemporary research about 




teachers’ disagreement on the introduction of evaluation linked pay plans, which are 
perceived as control mechanisms. 
In addition to establishing salary increases and penalties for teachers who fail the  
tests, teachers subverted reform efforts by modifying the new assessment tools so that 
they fit more closely with practice-based beliefs. These examples identify some of the 
existing incongruities between thinking about assessment and the reform philosophy 
advocated by the government. While teachers held to a practice-based view of 
assessment, reform leaders espoused a performance-based philosophy that coupled with 
financial incentives and advancement through a career ladder. Had this dissonance been 
identified early in the process, perhaps it could have been debated and considered in a 
more meaningful way. Such a public statement of belief and the subsequent debate might 
have informed teachers’ thinking so that they could have used the new assessments in 
ways that support evaluation reform.  
As the educational policy reform agenda continues to define what it means to be a 
good teacher, educator evaluation remains a highly controversial subject in Peru and 
elsewhere in the world. Empirical research has demonstrated mixed evidence about its 
effects on student learning and teacher quality. Thus, an important open question of our 
time is what implications for practice various iterations of teacher evaluation systems will 
have on teacher motivation and student success. 






Teacher Evaluation Individual Survey 
Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to obtain information from teachers who are 
certified by the Nueva Carrera Publica Magisterial (CPM) and teachers who are not. All 
information collected in this survey is confidential and responses are anonymous. The 
data obtained in this survey will be used as the basis for a dissertation being completed at 
the University of Texas at Austin, U.S. involving perceptions and attitudes about the 




































Teacher Evaluation Individual Survey 
Instructions 
This scale is designed to gather information about teachers´ perceptions regarding the 
new teacher evaluation as a part of the New Teacher Career Law in Peru. Please respond 
to each question below.  
General Information 
How do you describe your current position in education? 
Contract teacher  (   ) 
Permanent teacher  (   ) 
 
Are you certified by the new Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial ? 
Yes (    )      No (    ) 
 
Which best describes the total number of years you have been employed as a professional 
educator?  



























Teacher Evaluation Process 
On the scale from 1 to 5, mark the number that best represents your response to each 
statement below. 
1=Agree     2=Disagree     3=Neither Agree Nor Disagree     4=Agree     5=Strongly 
Agree 
 Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
01 The evaluation process has done a good job in defining the 
best teachers. 
     
02 I have a good understanding of the purpose of the teacher 
evaluation process. 
     
03 The teacher evaluation test rubrics are clear and correct.      
04 Reaching the minimum score on the teacher evaluation tests 
will really help teachers to improve their professional 
performance. 
     
05 The new salary schedule would help teachers to improve 
student achievement. 
     
06 A teacher performance appraisal system would motivate 
teachers to work hard and improve their performance. 
     
07 The contents on which teachers are evaluated correspond to 
their level of education (pre-school, elementary, secondary) 
and teaching specialization.  
     
08 The evaluation committee members are qualified to evaluate 
teaching quality in the second stage of the evaluation process 
of the Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial. 
     
09 The mentoring and feedback that teachers have received from 
the Ministry of Education evaluators, if any, is satisfactory. 
     
10 The teacher evaluation process allows teacher to advance 
fairly through the five levels of the new teacher career 
structure and contribute to teachers’ professional 
development. 
     
  




SECTION II (For teachers certified by La Nueva Carrera Pública Magisterial) 
Factors of Teachers`Compliance to the Nueva Ley de la Carrera Pública 
Magisterial 
Please circle the number for each item to indicate the level of importance you assigned to 
the factors that contributed to your decision of taking the teachers’ competency tests to be 
certified by the New Teacher Career Law. 
1= Not Important    2=Little Important    3=Important    4=Very Important    5=Extremely 
Important    6=No Applicable 
 
 Factors 1 2 3 4 5 6 
11 Teacher career ladder based on incentives.       
12 Competitive salary.       
13 Salary benefits package.       
14 Merit-based increments based on competency 
exam scores. 
      
15 Professional recognition of teacher advanced 
degrees, research, specialization, and abilities. 
      
16 Professional recognition of past appointments, 
intellectual productivity, distinctions and 
honors. 
      
17 Years of experience as a professional educator 
will be considered for career advancement. 
      
18 Opportunities for professional development and 
to improve academic qualifications. 
      
19 Professional support after being certified to 
improve performance. 
      
20 Professional autonomy to advance from Level I 
of La Carrera Pública Magisterial to the levels  
II, III, IV and V. 
      
  




SECTION III (For teachers not certified by the Nueva Carrera Publica Magisterial) 
Causes of Teachers´ Noncompliance to the Nueva Ley de la Carrera Pública 
Magisterial 
Please circle the number for each item to indicate the level of importance you assigned to 
the causes that contributed to your decision of not participating in the teacher evaluation 
process to be certified by the New Teacher Career Law. 
1=Not Important   2=Little Important   3=Important   4=Very Important   5=Extremely 
Important   6=No Applicable 
 
 Causes 1 2 3 4 5 6 
21 Salary increased based on teachers’ score data 
based on competency exam scores. 
      
22 Ending teachers’ rights and benefits (bonuses) 
and tenure-like job protections. 
      
23 The financial costs of the law implementation and 
its sustainability in the long-term. 
      
24 Teachers taking competence exams every three 
years. 
      
25 Teachers’ tests lack of validity and reliability.       
26 Teachers failing the exam three times will be 
dismissed. 
      
27 Teacher test scores’ don’t reflect teachers´ 
performance in the classroom. 
      
28 The law was signed without teachers’ 
consultation and negotiation. 
      
29 Teacher financial incentives undermine teachers’ 
collegial atmosphere and teacher union’s 
membership. 
      
30 Principals, existing teachers, and parents will 
have something to say in teachers’ hiring and 
promotion. 
      
  





Teacher Interview Questions 
1. Do you think the new evaluation process will identify the best teachers? Explain your 
answer. 
2. Do you think all teachers should be required to participate in the new evaluation 
process? Why or why not? 
3. Talk to me about what you believe the purpose of the new teacher evaluation process is 
in terms of the overall outcomes for participants? 
4. Talk to me about your motivation about the new evaluation process. Tell me why you 
decided to participate (or not participate) in this process? 
5. What is your opinion of this process as a voluntary certification of teachers? 
6. In your opinion, how would an average teacher have handled this process? Talk to me 
about the skills, knowledge, behaviors and attitudes they might need to pass the exam? 
7. Will financial incentives make teachers more effective? 
8. Do you feel you are more motivated to teach now than before participating in 
the evaluation process? Explain. 
9. Talk to me about what new knowledge you believe you gained from your participation 
in the teacher evaluation process as part of the Nueva Ley de la Carrera Publica 
Magisterial.  
10. How do you think that your participation in the teacher evaluation process impacted 
your classroom teaching practices? 




11. What is your opinion about the value of the teacher evaluation process and how it 
impacts school environment? 
12. Do you believe that incentives would reduce collaboration and positive school 
culture?  

























Labelling the Data: Resistant Teachers Interview Transcripts 
Interview 1 Theme 
Code 
 
“The new evaluation system for teachers centers on misconceptions about 
teacher quality, with potentially negative impact on professional 
development. We believe it is our moral obligation to teach with quality. 
The proposed teacher evaluation not only lacks a sound research basis, but 
in some instances, it has already proven harmful. The evaluation promoted 
by the CPM is based on an unconstitutional law. The system was not based 
on how well teachers can teach, but rather on the preservation of the 
contract regime to avoid budget constraints. Now, with the new Ley de la 
Reforma Magisterial, it is mandatory for all teachers to pass competency 
exams, and government has made it clear that the prescribed pass mark in 
these tests would not affect teacher tenure. This is not at all true, teachers 
who do not reach the minimum score after the third try will be dismissed. It 
is my position that there will be no restriction on the number of attempts a 









Interview 2 Theme 
Code 
 
“Although the CPM represented one of the most significant efforts of the 
government for the improvement of the teaching profession, the poor 
management and administration of the law during Garcia’s government is 
regrettable. The CPM is a law that existed along with the Ley del 
Profesorado. The tests were full of mistakes. For example, teachers who 
failed in one test one year, got the highest scores the following year. 
Teachers’ lack trust in government policies, and lack of understanding of 
the evaluation purpose. If the scores truly measure a teacher’s quality, there 
should be an independent institution to prepare and manage the test results. 
Teachers who passed tests knew them in advance. Further, taking part in the 
evaluation process has made teachers lose their rights such as teacher 
tenure, years of experience, status on the teacher career structure. Teachers 
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Interview 3 Theme 
Code 
 
“As a teacher, I want to know what my weaknesses are so that I can 
improve, but the test scores currently in use don’t do that. We did not have 
any feedback, it was an unrealistic and dishonest way to evaluate teachers. 
We should have received training before evaluation, focusing on the 
evaluation contents. The evaluation must include a personal observation of 
the teacher in the classroom. At the end of the evaluation, a teacher should 
receive proper feedback. The evaluation also needs to include a description 
of the teacher’s strengths and areas in need of improvement. If a tenured 
teacher fails the exams, the Ministry of Education is required to prepare a 
remediation plan to correct the deficiencies. If the deficiencies persist, 
teachers will receive a new remediation plan. Teachers are expected to 
pass.If the score is still unsatisfactory at the end of the second remediation 
period, the teacher must be dismissed. This law represents a legal 










Interview 4 Theme 
Code 
 
“Teachers who are tenured must be evaluated at least once every other year 
in order to advance up the career ladder. All evaluations are to be made by a 
certified university, but our educational system does not have either a 
teacher performance evaluation system or experts in the field of teacher 
evaluation who have received proper training.  A teacher merit pay 
program, however, is an improper and unfair method of doing this. 
Judiciously standardizing and enforcing the process of identifying and 
removing underperforming teachers should,  I believe, be discussed  at the 
bargaining table with all the stakeholders in play.  Because a merit pay 
program will create a reduced number of teacher positions in each stage of 
the career structure, a few teachers will be recognized as the best and the 
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Interview 5 Theme 
Code 
 
“Teachers aren’t opposed to being evaluated and being held accountable for 
their performance in the classroom. Teachers’ test results show that they 
responded to the questions in an objective way, but the results were 
manipulated by political interests to favor some teachers. This is only one 
side of the problem. On the other side, what we are opposed to is to being 
evaluated with unfair methods and flawed tests. None of the tests that have 
been designed so far are valid or reliable. We don’t believe in standardized 
tests. The measure of teacher effectiveness has been shown to be valid only 
in the classroom. What is worse, in schools in which the CPM has been 
implemented, student achievement has actually flat-lined or gone down. The 
evaluation policy did not attain its goal. One critical issue in the current 
government administration in implementing merit-pay plans is defining 
“merit” and what should be rewarded: teacher subject knowledge or teacher 
performance in the classroom? I wonder about the student achievement. 
Compensation plans that reward teachers based on test scores are 



















Labelling the Data: Compliant Teachers Interview Transcripts 
Interview 1 Theme 
Code 
 
“Current teacher tests can be used to identify good and effective teachers. 
Knowledge-based test scores are good predictors of teaching quality.  
Assessments selected the best teachers and allow me to be more prepared 
for the new education approaches and theories, they also allow me to have a 
higher salary.  Teachers who passed the tests were the more prepared and 
more experienced teachers. More rigorous tests, such as those which 
measure higher-order thinking skills are likely to be better at differentiating 
teachers, but even the current tests that the government is using are valuable 
in identifying effective teachers. Once these scores will be combined with 
teachers’ observations in the classroom, they will provide more detailed and 
timely feedback to help teachers improve their practice. Teachers in Peru 
are already underpaid. Merit pay would help address this injustice. Teaching 
is due for financial recognition, support, and respect in this country. I 
support meritocracy and I strongly believe that the highest performing 















Interview 2 Theme 
Code 
 
“I believe that all teachers should participate in the evaluation process of the 
CPM. Because of the large number of teacher preparation institutions, some 
of these degrees and diplomas are quite suspect and the quality of training 
imparted by the Ministry of Education is sub-standard, making it impossible 
to assess the relative merits of teachers at the time of their first appointment. 
The CPM represents a benchmark of teacher quality in the evaluation 
process. Teachers will work harder and produce better results, but the 
simple possibility of extra cash would not likely translate into smarter 
teaching and better results for our children in the short term. I believe 
policymakers should consider using merit pay as a tool to recruit and retain 
effective teachers, but only under certain conditions. For example, when 
communicating the advantages of the CPM, teachers do not have a clear 
idea of what merit pay is, what the payout scheme is, and how it is being 
translated in the new career structures. Teachers also lack a clear 
understanding of what is expected from them. Teachers also fear tests and 
fear that the newly designed merit-plans would create unhealthy 
competition among teachers. The financial incentives are fairly high and 
would improve our quality of life, but how do we assure that teachers who 
passed tests are focusing on student learning? The law does not consider any 
















Interview 3 Theme 
Code 
 
“I supported teacher evaluation and the CPM. I strongly believe that the 
only way to improve teacher quality is by training and support.  However, in 
my school there are teachers who passed the tests but are incompetent or 
ineffective in the classroom; I agree that they should be removed.  A fair 
way to assess them is by their performance in the classroom. I doubted that 
the CPM was beneficial for our professional development. Without a 
reliable evaluation system and an established procedure for removing 
underperforming teachers, I did not feel very optimistic about the new bill. I 
believe that if we want a change in teacher attitudes, financial incentives 














Interview 4 Theme 
Code 
 
“In spite of being certified by the CPM, there are neither salary increases for 
teachers nor advancement in student achievement. Teachers’ job satisfaction 
starts with improving social status, improving student achievement, quality 
of life, better employment opportunities, and, most importantly, better 
opportunities for professional development. The poor working conditions 
undermine teacher motivation and the excitement of being under a new 








Interview 5 Theme 
Code 
 
“Teacher evaluation is critical for improving our educational system, but the 
actual process of determining who deserves the merit pay is highly 
politicized. Because the current pay system does not include monetary 
rewards directly tied to effectiveness, many ineffective teachers are certified 
under this law. I agree that more compensation will make better teachers, 
but with better working conditions. Good teachers have to have other duties 
outside the classroom to increase their compensation. If teachers can apply 
for an administrative position with higher pay, it would be a great 
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